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This thesis examines the role that violence plays in the practice and theory of nonviolent resistance. 
The project investigates not only the occurrence of violence in movements and movement 
dynamics, but also the role of different definitions of violence, and disagreements about this. In this 
way, the thesis removes the concept of nonviolent resistance from an assumed violence-free 
sphere, not as an attempt to argue that the differentiation between violent and nonviolent 
resistance is hypocritical or meaningless, but rather, to take seriously the grey areas and blurry 
definitional lines between them. This is first introduced in the beginning of the project as an attempt 
to move away from purist conceptions of nonviolent resistance. The thesis starts with a review of 
the current nonviolence literature, focusing on these definitional questions, but also on how and 
why nonviolence works. It examines the history of nonviolence, in particular a certain popular 
narrative of this history, and discusses the concept of violence in more depth than what is usually 
found in nonviolence literature. This discussion is crucial to the overall project, because it allows for 
more nuanced and varied understandings of violence to be incorporated into the discussion of what 
it is nonviolence does not do (or tries to not do). For example, the arguments that private violence 
is political, that violence can be systemic and structural, and that non-material harm may count as 
violence, are used in the thesis to broaden the scope of what nonviolence might mean. Following 
from this, the project looks at three different concrete ways in which violence, and definitions of 
violence, impact nonviolent resistance: violence that opponents use towards nonviolent 
movements; violence that can happen within nonviolent movements; and violence in and around 
collective identity formation processes in nonviolent movements. These three are by no means the 
only ways in which the project highlights that violence impacts nonviolent resistance, but a starting 
point for these discussions. The thesis asks whether it is possible to conceive of nonviolence not as 
a check-list of actions or techniques, but an aspiration of being against violence in all forms and 
venues. This is not, of course, a call to do all of that all the time, but rather to treat the definition of 
nonviolent resistance as a dynamic and open process in which it is not pre-determined which forms 






At the risk of seeming too self-indulgent, I actually want to say first off here that I’m really proud of 
myself for writing this thesis. A PhD is, for better and worse, a fairly unique process, and for me 
there have definitely been a good amount of “worse”. But as someone who has always had a hard 
time giving myself credit or thinking that what I do is good enough, it might be my favourite thing 
about doing this PhD that I am here at the end feeling genuinely proud of what I’ve achieved – not 
only getting through the really bad parts and persevering, but perhaps especially that I did so while 
learning to recognise my own needs and limitations, and work with those instead of against them. 
Having said that, neither that kind of personal growth, or the actual thesis, would have been possible 
without a lot of great people around me and a huge amount of aroha, guidance, and help.  
I would like to thank the Marsden Fund Te Pūtea Rangahau a Marsden, for their financial 
support, which provided the most basic and necessary of things, a PhD scholarship so I could eat, 
pay rent and tuition, and cover all the other needs that don’t go away just because you’re pursuing 
knowledge and doing research that you’re passionate about.  
I of course want to thank my supervisor, Dr. Jeremy Moses, for help and supervision without 
which I would have never finished this project – or started it for that matter, so I’m doubly grateful 
for that. Thank you for your excellent reviews of drafts which always paid attention to the details 
while also often spotting where I was going with my argument before I had myself. And especially 
thank you for your belief in me this past year when I finally committed to finishing this project, and 
to make the changes I needed to be able to. I think few supervisors would have been quite so 
trusting of my commitment, at that point in time. Even fewer would have adapted so much as a 
supervisor to what their student needed to make progress, and treat a supervisory relationship as 
one in which both supervisor and student might learn new things and grow along the way – I’m 
really very grateful for and inspired by that!  
I would like to thank Professor Richard Jackson, who supervised my project from a distance 
at the University of Otago. Thank you Richard for very useful and constructive feedback on my work, 




Rongomaraeroa. I had an incredible time meeting other postgraduate students there, which led to 
challenging and inspiring conversations both then and afterwards.  
Although she was never my official supervisor, I want to thank Dr. Pascale Hatcher, who 
might as well have been for the amount of time and effort she spent giving advice and 
encouragement. I (and other students too) am very grateful for your dedication to supporting and 
uplifting struggling students through work opportunities, pep talks, other talks, and if all that fails, 
surprise chocolate. It means a lot!  
I also want to thank the administration in the Political Science and International Relations 
department, who do so much to make every practical aspect of our studies run smoothly, and do it 
with kindness and a genuine interest in the students who pass through the department. Especially 
thank you to Lea, who was there for the entire time I was, for your work and the good chats.  
I was lucky enough to share an office with a number of fantastic colleagues. I want to 
especially thank Dr. Geoff Ford, who stuck with me the longest and really became one of the most 
important influences in the process. Thank you for being more generally amazing company, always 
wise when it came to the topic of PhD struggles and lack of motivation, and a kind and fun friend. 
And of course Becci Louise, currently rocking the world of natural protection work, for the late-night 
sessions and frankly just amazing personality and being.  
Also studying for a PhD at the same time (although clearly a little ahead of me) was Dr. Jeff 
Willis who I want to thank for friendship, encouragement, and the best deep talks. And Dr. Anastasia 
Yuchshenko for the best combination of sarcasm and sincerity I have ever met.  
Of course my parents should be mentioned here as well, who encouraged me to explore 
both the world and whatever subject I was most passionate about – even if they were confused 
about what I “would be” at the end of it, and probably still are. Thank you to my dad, Henrik, for 
teaching dedication to work balanced with a healthy respect for the importance of other interests. 
And to my mum, Vibeke (a “real”, i.e., medical, doctor), for telling me that I didn’t have to finish this 
PhD right when I needed to hear that the most.  
I want to thank Alison, Dave, and Max for allowing me the best break imaginable from 




playing music with me – but I’m so grateful you did anyway! And of course, especially thank you to 
Ryan, for bringing us all together in the first place – what a gift! Also, obviously, for bringing LoPan. 
To Tabitha, thank you for teaching me to knit (another excellent distraction/therapeutic 
activity) and for many, many good talks both when things were difficult and when they were great 
– and for usually making me laugh at both. To Sam for listening to all that, for wise and empathetic 
perspectives, and for often providing cake or food at the same time. To Liz, for much needed writing 
sessions and just for being awesome. To Paul, who gave me the amazing gift of the best and most 
comfortable home for the last part of my time in Aotearoa. I know we paid rent and all, but still… 
And thank you for trusting us with Half-Row and Frostbite.  
And to Gabby (Dr. Watson), who doesn’t like clichés, so I’ll refrain from saying that I don’t 
know where to start, or that I don’t have the words. Instead, I’ll start by saying thank you for the 
countless meals, snacks, and cups of coffee brought, for being very patient when I needed 
encouragement or just to rant, for looking after everything so I could look after myself, and for even 







Abstract .......................................................................................................................... ii 
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................ iii 
Contents ........................................................................................................................ vi 
Chapter One: Introduction .......................................................................................... - 1 - 
Nonviolence as a hurrah-word .................................................................................................... - 2 - 
Nonviolence as purity politics ...................................................................................................... - 4 - 
Key research questions and methods .......................................................................................... - 8 - 
Overview of the thesis ............................................................................................................... - 12 - 
Chapter Two: Nonviolence Literature Review ............................................................ - 16 - 
Introduction to the field ............................................................................................................. - 18 - 
Observation-based methodologies: the power of example ................................................................ - 19 - 
Principled and strategic nonviolence ......................................................................................... - 23 - 
Principled nonviolence/pacifism ......................................................................................................... - 24 - 
Strategic nonviolence .......................................................................................................................... - 26 - 
Intersections ........................................................................................................................................ - 29 - 
Definitional strategies ................................................................................................................ - 31 - 
Negative definition.............................................................................................................................. - 32 - 
Working definition .............................................................................................................................. - 33 - 
Listing tactics ...................................................................................................................................... - 35 - 
Categorisation ..................................................................................................................................... - 36 - 
Emerging conceptual approach .......................................................................................................... - 37 - 
Closing remarks ................................................................................................................................... - 41 - 




Greater participation .......................................................................................................................... - 42 - 
Diversity of tactics ............................................................................................................................... - 45 - 
Backfire effect ..................................................................................................................................... - 47 - 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. - 48 - 
Chapter Three: The History of Nonviolence ............................................................... - 51 - 
Mahatma Gandhi and the anti-colonial struggle in India .......................................................... - 54 - 
Nelson Mandela and the anti-apartheid struggle ...................................................................... - 58 - 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil rights movement .......................................................................... - 64 - 
Violence and pragmatism .......................................................................................................... - 71 - 
Lone male hero syndrome ......................................................................................................... - 75 - 
Specificity versus universalism ................................................................................................... - 80 - 
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................. - 82 - 
Chapter Four: The Concept of Violence ...................................................................... - 86 - 
Material and non-material definitions of violence .................................................................... - 89 - 
Justification as a definitional boundary ..................................................................................... - 89 - 
Interpersonal, systemic, and structural violence ....................................................................... - 91 - 
Interpersonal violence ......................................................................................................................... - 92 - 
Private violence ................................................................................................................................... - 93 - 
Systemic violence ................................................................................................................................ - 94 - 
Structural violence .............................................................................................................................. - 96 - 
Political violence ......................................................................................................................- 101 - 
State violence ...........................................................................................................................- 103 - 
Property damage......................................................................................................................- 107 - 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................- 111 - 




When violence is part of movement success ..........................................................................- 118 - 
Inequalities of risk ....................................................................................................................- 120 - 
A pacifist legacy: how principles are still at the heart of the backfire dynamic ......................- 123 - 
Proving your dedication and commitment ....................................................................................... - 126 - 
Inviting sympathy .............................................................................................................................. - 127 - 
Making heroes and martyrs .............................................................................................................. - 127 - 
The glorification of (certain forms of) suffering ......................................................................- 129 - 
The power of sympathy – romantic narratives of shared humanity .......................................- 131 - 
A pass to a world of equality: challenging sacrifice as democratic excellence .......................- 139 - 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................- 142 - 
Chapter Six: Violence Within Movements ................................................................ - 146 - 
The personal is political: contestations of a narrow nonviolence ...........................................- 149 - 
Not everyone’s streets: violence in protest spaces .................................................................- 152 - 
Are we all equal here? .............................................................................................................- 159 - 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................- 165 - 
Chapter Seven: Violence and Collective Identity Formation ..................................... - 167 - 
ACAB or “space for everyone”? The issue of police violence ..................................................- 169 - 
Peace and love for all? Universalism and apolitical narratives ...............................................- 181 - 
Conclusion ................................................................................................................................- 194 - 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion ....................................................................................... - 196 - 
Bibliography ............................................................................................................ - 202 - 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
- 1 - 
 
Chapter One: Introduction 
This thesis explores the role that violence plays in nonviolent resistance theory and movements; or 
rather, it explores some of the many different roles that violence plays. Although this premise can 
seem contradictory on an intuitive level – it is, after all, called nonviolent resistance – I argue that 
definitions of violence, and the actual occurrence of forms of violence, are in fact core parts of the 
understanding and practice of nonviolent resistance, despite the fact that the concept of violence 
has been largely overlooked or pushed to the margins within the literature. The title, “isn’t all 
violence bad, though?” has two meanings depending on where emphasis is placed, both of which 
speak to this topic. I heard the phrase during a talk with feminist author Clementine Ford in 2017, 
in which she used it sarcastically to suggest that actually no, not all violence is (at least equally) bad 
(Ford, 2017). Ford explained that “isn’t all violence bad” is an often-used response, mostly by men, 
as a counter to her sympathising with women who react, or want to react, to sexual harassment 
and violence with slapping or kicking the harasser. Essentially, in this context, “isn’t all violence bad, 
though?” expresses an equalising of the single instance of direct violence against a harasser on the 
one side, and the structural and systemic violence of sexism and patriarchy on the other.  
This co-optation of nonviolence is not uncommon, and is found also in statements which 
equally condemn “peaceful” protests “turning violent” and the often much greater violence and 
repression which the protests are responding to in the first place (e.g. Duchess of Sussex, 2020; 
Butler, 2020, 2-3, also discusses a very similar co-optation of nonviolence), and shares with them an 
ignoring of differences in harm caused, as well as inequalities in available options for acting without 
violence for different actors. Such framings tend to favour the status quo and “peacefulness” over 
resisting or fighting oppression and violence, if this resistance comes with any occurrence of 
obvious, direct violence. This is one of the themes of this project and is particularly visible through 
the critiques of purist narratives of nonviolent resistance that the project puts forward. The phrase 
can also be taken without sarcasm, however, and still speak to the research theme: if nonviolence 
is about rejecting violence, then isn’t all violence bad? Should nonviolence theory and work not at 
least acknowledge all forms of violence, attempt to understand them and their relationship with 
nonviolence work, and try to work against them? And what happens if it does? These are some 
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examples of the less formal questions which form the basis of this research project, and which later 
in this chapter become the key research questions for this thesis.   
Nonviolence as a hurrah-word 
The first part of this thesis examines and reviews the history of and literature on nonviolent 
resistance, focusing especially on tracing the emergence of a popular conception of nonviolence as 
unproblematically “not violent”, i.e. clearly without violence. This narrative has, I argue, turned the 
concept of nonviolent civil resistance into what in Danish is called a “hurrah-word”. A hurrah-word 
is a word that most people use in a positive sense, because it is assumed to be universally good and 
universally understood. It is a word that makes speakers and listeners alike react instinctively with 
an inner “hurrah” because of these assumptions, or is sometimes described as “engendering a warm 
glow and drawing people to them” (Dinham, 2007, 181). Danish Communications scholar Leif Becker 
Jensen (2003, 149, my translation) argues that although hurrah-words are known as concepts which 
lead to an instinctive “hurrah”, they can at the same time elicit very vague or uncommitted 
reactions, precisely because they are so “obviously right and correct that no one would dream to 
object to them”. The reason for these two, sometimes simultaneous, reactions, is that terms that 
are hurrah-words are “at the top of the linguistic abstraction-ladder”, meaning that they have no 
clear substance (ibid). This makes any communication using hurrah-words sound uncontroversial 
and unifying despite underlying disagreements and tensions, “because we can pour our own ideas 
into the concept and believe that we agree – even when we disagree” (ibid, 150). Jensen (ibid, 151) 
uses the example of asking: what does it mean for a company to state that “loyalty” is a central 
value? Is this loyalty to “the boss, the colleagues, the customers”, all of which could easily be 
contending principles? (ibid). Other examples could be terms such as “creativity”, “leadership”, 
“participation” and “fairness” (Dinham, 2007, 181; Griffiths, 2009, 86). 
Classic examples of political hurrah-words are words such as “freedom” and “democracy”, 
which are widely agreed on as positives, but are also somewhat vague and empty if not qualified in 
any way. For example, what does it mean to “fight for freedom” or “strengthen democracy”? It can 
mean a number of things, but this will not have to be investigated in order to gain a positive reaction 
and support for a cause. Importantly, then, hurrah-words are not necessarily bad things dressed up 
to be good – in fact, they are often good things in some sense, but by being so universally assumed 
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to be the very best thing, or perfect, or infallible, they lose their substance, and through that, some 
of their power for change. Griffiths (2009, 86) describes hurrah-words as “terms which attract 
general approval”, but which “mean different things to different people, depending on their various 
political and moral commitments”.  
In her discussion of the concept of nonviolent resistance, Judith Stiehm (1968, 29) describes 
a parallel between the concepts of “democracy” and “nonviolent resistance” which fits well with 
describing these as hurrah-words. She notes that:  
The supporters of each [concept] are confused as to whether they are 1) advocating a 
technique which is inherently good and to be used regardless of result, or whether they are 
2) conditionally urging their technique because it is sure to bring the best possible result, or 
whether they are 3) devoted to a principle which is an end and one so desirable as to justify 
the use of its negation in order to win it (i.e. violence can be used to achieve nonviolence or 
war to win peace, and authority to create democracy) (Stiehm, 1968, 29).  
This discussion illustrates how an agreement of support between different people may 
disguise central and important differences in the reasoning for this support; differences which will 
likely change how actions are approached, what arguments and tactics are used, and ultimately, 
what the end goal actually is for different actors. Within the context of this thesis, attempts to move 
away from a hurrah-word treatment of nonviolent resistance would mean to begin asking questions 
such as: What does it mean if it is a central part of nonviolent resistance to be against, or at least 
strategically renounce the use of, violence? Violence against who? And what counts as violence? 
Who is prioritised if some violence in some form is inevitable? In this way, this thesis aims to 
interrogate more thoroughly what is meant by “nonviolent resistance”, and complicate its meaning. 
This is not done with the aim of weakening or reject the idea of nonviolence resistance because it is 
less than perfect or universally agreed on, but the exact opposite: the aim here is to strengthen the 
conception and understanding of nonviolence through this complication of meaning and the further 
exploration springing from this.   
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Nonviolence as purity politics 
These characteristics of our understanding of nonviolent resistance can also usefully be placed in a 
framework of “purity politics” as developed by Alexis Shotwell (2016). Although Shotwell’s 
particular frame of analysis has not, to my knowledge, been applied to the field of nonviolence 
before, the idea of linking violence and nonviolence to concepts such as purity or other ethically 
loaded terms is not new. Vinthagen (2015, 65) even demonstrates that ethical connotations (rather 
than an instrumental or consequentialist definition of violence) are at the root of the term 
“violence”, when in early Christianity the term “evil” would be used instead of violent. Given this 
early Christian fusion of “evil” and “violent”, it is perhaps unsurprising that an early critique of purist 
tendencies within pacifism are Reinhold Niebuhr’s critiques of religious pacifism from the late 1920s 
onwards. Although at different times during his life Niebuhr was a declared pacifist, he eventually 
abandoned the label and provided a powerful and renowned critique of pacifism instead (Childress, 
1974, 468). This critique is symptomatic of Niebuhr’s wider preoccupation within political theory in 
which he focused on “the impossibility of realizing certain ideals ... and the conflicts between various 
norms which complicate the moral life” (ibid, 470). Fundamentally, Niebuhr argues against the view 
that violence is “intrinsically evil”, because only the motive or intention of an act can be intrinsically 
evil (ibid, 469). Although Niebuhr was then critical of purist theories of pacifism or nonviolence, 
because this was described by him as both impossible and overly simplistic, he was also critical of  
so-called pragmatic pacifism, or the version of pacifism which seeks to provide a political alternative 
to war, force, and coercion (ibid, 473-474). Both the “religious absolutis[t]” and pragmatic strands 
of pacifism are critiqued by Niebuhr as, in essence, ignoring the realities and complexities of a 
political world of “relative justice” (ibid, 475).  
The tension or discussion around ideas of “purity”, or pure pacifism or nonviolence is also 
seen from early on in nonviolent movements, such as in Isserman’s (1986) discussion of the 
American pacifist movement in the 1950s and 1960s. In the essay, Isserman (1986, 53-54) traces the 
tension between individual activists’ quest for actions which would show their personal conviction 
even at the cost of “effective political influence” on the one hand, and a search for methods which 
would build the movement, recruit members, and increase the effectiveness of tactics on the other. 
This tension is also relevant to a number of discussions within this thesis, such as the discussion of 
self-sacrifice as a nonviolent resistance tactic. Isserman (ibid, 54) summarises this tension as one 
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between “absolute moral purity and political expediency”. This intense focus on personal 
commitment and sacrifice was in the beginning focused on the idea of “moral witness”; that is, 
attracting attention to a certain problematic or harmful action or issue (for example nuclear 
weapons production), but later developed to also aim at obstruction such as disrupting military 
actions, building projects and so on (ibid). The “irony” which the essay points to is that this intensely 
individualistic, purist outlook which led to individuals putting their own bodies on the line for the 
cause, was part of the “spirit” of individual risk and sacrifice as the ultimate form of activism which 
later led to choices of violent tactics (ibid, 61-62). Another purist element of this early American 
pacifism which can be problematised within the themes of this thesis is the view that the projects 
these early pacifists were trying to obstruct were a matter of “sin and repentance: workers were 
accomplices to murder as long as they contributed their labor to building missile bases and 
submarines” (ibid, 58). This “othering” of workers, and simplistic view of the individual worker as an 
accomplice and responsible for the overall consequences, instead of people with few other choices 
for making a living, is another example of the co-opting of the basic argument that all violence is 
bad.  
Stiehm (1968, 24) also points to the “urge to attain or maintain moral purity” as central to 
pacifism and particularly to individuals’ commitment to this. She writes further that:  
this form of nonviolent theory sees the individual either as an isolate with his duty chiefly 
owing to God, or as a being equally bound to all other humans. Either assumption helps to 
make theory tidy but poorly reflects the complixities of life as it is lived ... The resultant mood 
of conscientious nonviolence is too often one of perfectionism, chiliasm, and anarchistic 
individualism (Stiehm, 1968, 25).  
While these earlier examples of purist approaches to nonviolence are primarily related to 
the principled strand of nonviolence, or pacifism, this thesis will demonstrate at various points that 
a purist outlook is also prevalent in strategic nonviolence discussions and literature, although often 
with different reasons given for the need for purity and mostly framing it as the more normatively 
neutral-sounding “nonviolent discipline” (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 146; Sharp and 
Finkelstein, 1973, 587-588). Further, a purist framework can be identified in strategic nonviolence 
studies in the literature’s approach to the occurrence of small amounts of violence in campaigns 
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classified as nonviolent. As Case (2018, 20) writes, nonviolence research shows overwhelmingly that 
a “purely” nonviolent struggle is extremely rare, but after acknowledging this, most nonviolence 
research goes on to virtually ignore the violent actions and tactics that did form a part of the 
nonviolent campaign, thereby in reality treating complicated and mixed cases as pure nonviolence.  
More recent research indicates that this association of violence meaning “evil” or “bad” is 
still prevalent. For example, Triplett et al. (2016, 332, 340-345) outline the various meanings that 
violence can hold, and found in their empirical study that although there are significant variations 
in how individuals perceive violence when asked about a specific situation, individual perceptions 
of what counts as violence are overwhelmingly tied to ideas of “bad” and “good”, rather than 
defining all instances of physical force or harm as violence. This association is perhaps a factor in 
explaining the prevalence of purist tendencies and aims within nonviolent movements and 
literature. If violence is defined by being “bad”, rather than as a specific form of physical force, then 
an instinctive reaction away from thinking about or associating with violence makes sense, as does 
a reverse assumption that nonviolence must then be inherently “good”. This theme forms part of 
the underlying framework for conceptualising thinking on nonviolence throughout this thesis.  
Alexis Shotwell’s 2016 book Against Purity: Living Ethically in Compromised Times provides 
an excellent framework for understanding the purist aspects of present understandings of 
nonviolence. The book argues that the growth of what Shotwell names “purity politics” means the 
rise of a search for, and idea of, a “pure” state of living and acting, both personally and politically. 
By this, Shotwell means a state in which an individual is free of “toxic” or “harmful” parts of human 
society (Shotwell, 2016, 8-9). She describes purity politics or purism as:  
One bad but common approach to devastation in all its forms. It is a common approach for 
anyone who attempts to meet and control a complex situation that is fundamentally outside 
our control. It is a bad approach because it shuts down precisely the field of possibility that 
might allow us to take better collective action against the destruction of the world in all its 
strange, delightful, impure frolic. Purism is a de-collectivizing, de-mobilizing, paradoxical 
politics of despair (Shotwell, 2016, 8-9).  
This emphasis on purity politics as “de-collectivizing” is an immediate contrast to the topic 
of this thesis, which is precisely about mobilisation of large collectives into nonviolent action. 
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However, purity politics is still a highly relevant framework with which to understand much of the 
thinking and acting within nonviolent resistance today. An obvious example is the concept of 
“voluntary suffering”, discussed later in this thesis, which is a highly individualistic conception of the 
consequence of violence, by arguing that by risking violence, imprisonment, or even death, a 
nonviolent protester is only risking harm to themselves, thus ignoring bonds of family, community, 
love, dependence etc. which all work to spread the consequences of the suffering to the people 
with which the voluntary sufferer is connected. This highly individualistic and isolationist outlook is 
not, however, only relevant in terms of individual activists. It is to also applicable to nonviolence 
theory  in the sense that purity politics does not only create individuals with “pure” lives, but also 
“pure” groups, by working “to delineate an inside and an outside” (Shotwell, 2016, 13), a new way 
of framing and creating an “us” and a “them”. In this sense, then, a purist view of nonviolence can 
work against mobilisation and the building of collectives, since only “pure” resisters can be let in to 
the collective.  
 Instead of a purist approach, Shotwell (ibid, 5) suggests rejecting the very idea of a “pure” 
natural state as the starting point for assessing individual and collective action, and instead starting 
from a place of culpability and complicity and building political theories of social change from there. 
If this starting point is used for thinking about nonviolent ways of creating social change, this 
becomes in part about moving away from thinking of violence versus nonviolence as a black-and-
white case of purity or impurity, good or bad. As her call to action from this point of compromise 
and complicity, Shotwell argues that:  
What’s needed, instead of a pretence to purity that is impossible in the actually existing 
world, is something else. We need to shape better practices of responsibility and memory 
for our placement in relation to the past, our implication in the present, and our potential 
creation of different futures (Shotwell, 2016, 7-8).  
To view present conceptions of nonviolence through the lens of purity politics, and to reject 
this purist aspiration and assumption, is a promising way of reckoning with the fact that violence 
does play a role in nonviolent actions, movements, politics, and theory, without risking a 
problematically equalising narrative of every action and tactic for social change being equally bad 
because they all involve violence in some way. As Shotwell (ibid, 6-7) writes, “[w]e’re hypocrites, 
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maybe, but that doesn’t encompass the nature of the problem that complexity poses for us” 
because “[i]f hypocrisy were the problem, really it wouldn’t be much of a problem; at least on the 
surface, it is something we could give up”. In other words, and in the context of this project, the fact 
that violence plays a role, and that nonviolent activists and advocates are themselves violent in 
different ways, could perhaps be construed as an attempt to brand them as hypocrites when 
claiming and identifying with the nonviolence label. That, however, is not the argument here, and 
again, if it was, it would be a lot less complicated than the pictures painted in the following chapters.  
Key research questions and methods 
The key research questions for this project came from the idea of formulating a non-purist version 
of nonviolence theory, and an interest in the contested and contestable, messy, undefined, grey-
area, complicit and compromised aspects of nonviolent civil resistance. Looking closely at the role 
of violence, and differing definitions of violence, is one way to do so, and it is the focus for this 
project. This presents two key research questions for the thesis:  
1: What are the present assumptions around the definition of violence and the definitional 
line(s) between violence and nonviolence in the field, and what are the implications of this? 
2: What are some ways in which violence occurs in nonviolent civil resistance and how does 
nonviolence theory start to make sense of this?  
This thesis is a theoretical research project, which spends significant time examining and 
interrogating concepts and lines of argument in order to shed light on these two questions. The 
reasons for this are described throughout the thesis, but primarily in Chapter Two, where the 
question of the importance of methodology to understanding the field of nonviolence studies is 
discussed. It is, however, an attempt to produce theoretical analysis with practical implications; that 
is, the aim is to speak about and to issues that are directly relevant in the practice of nonviolent 
resistance. This attempt fits into what Bevington and Dixon (2005, 186) call “movement-relevant 
theory”, an approach which responds to the problem in social movement theory that activists do 
not read the dominant theories and writings in social movement studies, or if they do, do not find 
them relevant. Rather than trying to strengthen the link between practice and research by relying 
almost exclusively on observation-based methodologies, Bevington and Dixon (ibid, 189) look to the 
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product of the research rather than the data in order to describe movement-relevant theory, which 
is centred around the requirement that theory has relevance and produces “useable knowledge” 
for activists and practitioners. Movement-centred theory “seeks to draw out useful information 
from a variety of contexts and translate it into a form that is more readily applicable by movements 
to new situations – i.e. theory” (ibid). Although this particular thesis does not necessarily produce 
useable information for movements in the form of ready-made tricks, procedures, or training 
manuals for activists, I would argue that the questions raised here, and the arguments and theories 
that spring from them, are, in fact, useful and important for activists. The fact that the divisions and 
tensions discussed here have already been the cause of contention and conflict within activist 
communities, as will be demonstrated throughout this thesis, speaks in itself to the fact that the 
issues are not invented for the sake of abstract debates, but already existing ones. The aim of this 
thesis is to start developing ways of understanding these tensions and possible avenues for solving 
or addressing them.     
To complement the theoretical and conceptual analysis of the thesis, a number of 
movements are examined as cases illustrating the questions and tensions that are brought up. 
Although case study methodologies have been “the primary mode of inquiry in political science”, 
they have been declining in popularity (Crasnow, 2019, 40). Instead, statistical, quantitative, and 
experimental approaches have are increasingly dominating the field (ibid, 41). This has arguably also 
been seen in nonviolence literature with the rising popularity and prominence of statistical analysis, 
notably Chenoweth and Stephan and the various NAVCO datasets (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011; 
Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis, 2018).  
Crasnow (2019, 40) describes case study analysis as “the close examination of a case” in 
order to “seek explanations of a variety of phenomena”, focusing on a certain “narrative 
presentation of the details relevant” to the “aims of the research”. Case study examination can add 
to social science research in a number of ways, such as:  
the investigation of rare events; research design; providing evidence for (or against) 
hypothesized causal mechanisms; identification of confounders or omitted variables; 
revealing the limits of general causal claims; informing decisions about implementing policy; 
and teaching sensitivity to context (Crasnow, 2019, 44).  
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Within this thesis, case studies are primarily used to reveal and examine “the limits of 
general causal claims” (Crasnow, 2019, 44) through looking at both the ways in which these causal 
mechanisms may not work as reliably as suggested in the literature, but also at unintended and/or 
unexplored consequences of these mechanisms. This project also maintains that a focus on the 
context of a given campaign is crucial to keep in mind, and that the narrative that nonviolence 
knowledge is transferable across time and contexts with no qualification is problematic. As Stanko 
argues while introducing a research project on the meanings of violence and violence in the United 
Kingdom: 
it is essential for researchers, policy makers and front-line workers to take the context of 
violence seriously. Understanding the context of violence mans that we specify what 
happened, when, where and between whom as the beginning in our search to challenge the 
use of violence … All o these elements combine to create a message from the meaning of 
violence. Not everyone will hear the message in the same way – and the message may be 
the spark for a challenge (Stanko, 2003, 11).  
In this way, the case studies in this project also fulfil the function of “teaching sensitivity to 
context” which is an underlying focus in this thesis (Crasnow, 219, 44).  
Through the combination of a close, narrative analysis of cases and a conceptual and 
theoretical argument, this thesis draws on central parts of the hermeneutic tradition. In the 
literature review of this thesis, nonviolence literature will be described as predominantly influenced 
by naturalist views of concepts and the social world. In contrast, Bevir and Kedar (2008, 505) 
describe the hermeneutic tradition as the most clear and consistent anti-naturalist methodology. 
Some core tenets of hermeneutic analysis in the social sciences were articulated by Max Weber, 
who “insisted that causal explanation in social science relied in large part on verstehen (interpretive 
understanding) [and] on the singularity of such causal explanation”, that is, on explanations that 
take into consideration context and particularity (ibid). This particular outlook is, I argue, particularly 
well suited to the task of movement-relevant theory. This is because an anti-naturalist and/or 
hermeneutic approach rejects the naturalist “unidirectional subject-object relationship” in which 
the social scientist is seen “as the only agent involved in crafting explanations” while the object – 
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nonviolent campaigns and movements – are left to be “passive objects to be studied” (ibid, 507). As 
Bevir and Kedar write:  
In contrast, anti-naturalists often conceive of explanation as the product of a kind of dialogue 
between social scientists and those they study. Social science generally involves a subject-
subject interaction in which the scholar responds to the interpretations or meanings of the 
relevant social actors. It involves a ‘fusion of horizons,’ that is, a process of reaching some 
kind of shared interpretation in which the social scientists own views are often transformed. 
An encounter with the beliefs or meanings of social actors always has the potential to send 
out ripples through a scholars own beliefs, altering their understanding of, say, their research 
agendas, the traditions in which they work, or their normative commitments (Bevir and 
Kedar, 2008, 507).  
The recognition and conceptualisation of this two-way relationship is useful for creating 
movement-relevant theory, because the influence of practitioners’ views, concerns, and 
conceptualisations on those of the social scientist is seen as an integral part of doing social science, 
rather than as an obstacle to be overcome or explained away. This is evident in this thesis in, for 
example, the discussion of property damage in the chapter on violence definitions: this topic is 
included mainly because many activists disagree with or question the way in which property damage 
is most often described as violence within the literature. These influences are, however, more or 
less subtle and conscious, and therefore affect research in a number of ways.   
The cases used for examples are mainly well-known and thoroughly described ones. In 
choosing the cases for the historical overview of nonviolence this was entirely intentional, since the 
aim was to illustrate a popular and wide-spread narrative of nonviolent history. For more 
contemporary cases, choosing examples with plenty of materials written about them – both 
academic and journalistic – allowed me to go deeper in the analysis and find more points of 
discussion than less studied cases, which would on the other hand perhaps have been a better 
choice for a project based on empirical and field research. Further, the fact that the contemporary 
cases analysed are resistance campaigns in liberal democracies provides one specific (although 
major) aspect of the importance of context, a point which is explored throughout this thesis. The 
importance of context here is that although nonviolence literature is used by organisers in liberal 
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democracies, the literature itself is based overwhelmingly on resistance campaigns against or within 
authoritarian regimes. This means that some of the mechanisms and dynamics explained in the 
literature may have to be adapted to a significantly different context, or may simply not work. This 
argument appears at different points in the thesis while discussing the case studies.  
This research project is, then, a theoretical or conceptual exploration of nonviolent 
resistance, focusing on the way that the occurrence of violence, and definitions (or the lack thereof) 
of violence impacts nonviolent resistance. The thesis draws on hermeneutic approaches to 
understand nonviolent resistance through case studies and discourses, both in the academic 
literature and in the popular narrative of the history of nonviolent resistance. Despite this move into 
theories, arguments, and concepts, the aim is to produce research and writing which is movement-
centred in the sense that it speaks to issues and concerns that impact actual organising and 
practicing of nonviolent resistance.   
Overview of the thesis 
The following section will briefly outline the main content and arguments of the rest of the thesis, 
as well as how they relate to the two key research questions. Overall, this thesis can be described 
as consisting of two major parts: the first part, chapters two to four, lays the foundation for the 
thesis argument, by illustrating how the research questions are relevant and can be answered using 
present nonviolence literature, looking at the history of nonviolent resistance, and starting to 
establish an overview of possible conceptions and definitions of violence. The second part, 
consisting of chapters five to seven looks at concrete “issues” or ways in which violence, and 
definitions of violence, actually do play a role in the practice of nonviolent resistance. This part 
makes use of more recent and contemporary nonviolent resistance movements in order to illustrate 
and illuminate this further.  
Chapter Two is a review of the main nonviolence literature and addresses the first research 
question. The chapter introduces the field of nonviolent resistance literature and the main theorists 
within it. The distinction between strategic and principled nonviolence is introduced as important 
within the general field, although for the purposes of this particular project, it will be argued that 
the distinction is not crucial, since most of the issues raised will apply to both strands in some way. 
The literature review does not attempt to reach a single definition of nonviolent resistance, but 
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focuses precisely on the diversity of conceptions and definitions, and on the definitional strategies 
employed in different pieces of literature in order to define or conceptualise what nonviolent civil 
resistance is. Finally, the chapter provides an overview of some of the key dynamics and mechanisms 
of nonviolent resistance, or, as it is often phrased, why and how nonviolence works.  
Chapter Three provides a fairly brief history of nonviolent resistance, focusing on three of 
the main heroes of popular narratives of nonviolence: Mahatma Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and 
Martin Luther King, Jr. While the chapter focuses, especially in the first part, on the most well-known 
and popular aspects and narratives of these three leaders and the resistance movements they were 
part of, the second part starts to touch on the complications and less “pure” aspects of these 
struggles and leaders. The history chapter shows and discusses different ways in which both a highly 
pragmatic approach to methods, and the occurrence of violence, played a role in the movements, 
problematises the “lone male hero” version of nonviolent struggle which the popular narrative puts 
forward, and investigates the tension between specificity and universalism in the struggles and their 
ideals. In this way, the history chapter addresses the first question by demonstrating the lack of 
focus on definitional questions around violence and nonviolence within the popular narrative of 
nonviolence history, despite the blurry nature of these lines and the importance of them; but also 
the second, by demonstrating that even in these iconic movements, violence played a crucial role 
in a number of ways.  
Chapter Four follows from the establishment in the previous two chapters of the 
complicated and contested nature of the concept of violence, as well as its importance to 
understanding the field of nonviolence. To add to this argument, Chapter Four looks more closely 
at the concept of violence itself. The chapter draws on several academic disciplines, including 
political theory, sociology, criminology, psychology, philosophy, and of course nonviolence theory, 
to discuss a number of different conceptions of violence, different groups of definitions, and 
different definitional lines used to mark the limits around the concept of violence. The discussion 
also touches on the rhetorical weight that the term violence holds, that is, the way in which violence 
is used to mark clearly what actions are “good” or “bad,” or what people or groups of people are 
“good” or “bad”, by branding these as either violent or not violent (often using the term “force” 
instead of violence). The different discussions and definitions covered in the chapter are tools for 
the research project to argue its case that violence is not a simple, static phenomenon, and that 
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therefore, discussing and looking at violence as a part of nonviolence theory is an ongoing and 
dynamic process. However, despite the seemingly never-ending potential discussion, it is crucially 
important for the field of nonviolence theory and practice to continue to do so, because not only 
does violence play a role, how violence is defined by different actors has important implications, 
and is at the core of a number of conflicts and contestations within and towards nonviolent activism.  
Chapter Five is the first of the three “issue” chapters, which look at different ways in which 
violence and definitions of violence impact nonviolent resistance. The chapter looks at the 
occurrence of violence against nonviolent protesters by their opponent. This occurrence of violence 
is the basis of a central and famous dynamic of nonviolent civil resistance, the backfire effect. In this 
dynamic, very public and at times extreme acts of violence become a potential catalyst for 
movement success or progress through a rise in sympathy and condemnation of the opponent. The 
integrity of violence to this process has not, however, led to much questioning of whether these 
scenarios weaken or complicate claims that a campaign is nonviolent. While the chapter does not 
attempt to argue against this classification, it does try to take seriously the normative issues that 
arise with this occurrence of violence, such as the role of suffering and sacrifice that are at the heart 
of theories of backfire, the assumptions made about the universality of sympathetic reactions, and 
the tendency to expect the performance of a narrow, specific form of respectability from protesters 
in order to achieve sympathy.  
 Chapter Six looks at the occurrence of different forms of violence within nonviolent 
movements. These forms of violence include both physical and non-physical harm, and draws on a 
number of the violence definitions from Chapter Four. The chapter begins by examining occurrences 
of violence that are widely agreed on as being violent, such as the sexual assaults and gendered 
violence that happened in Occupy camps in 2011, and the discussions and reactions following this. 
While these incidents are then widely recognised as violent, the question of the extent to which this 
violence “mattered” to the core of Occupy’s work, or to the idea of nonviolent resistance, was more 
controversial. The chapter aims to demonstrate, however, that these occurrences of violence should 
matter to research and thinking on nonviolent resistance. The chapter spans both research 
questions, since it also looks at controversy and debates over definitional lines around violence. The 
chapter therefore also examines wider understandings of violence, such as the masking and 
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entrenchment of inequalities and hierarchies within movements, which can be enabled by an 
assumption of equality between members when this is not the case.   
Chapter Seven focuses on collective identity, the process of collective identity formation, 
and issues of violence, marginalisation, and repression that come with this. The focus on collective 
identity formation means that the chapter looks at the ways in which this process can lead to 
silencing or exclusion of contestations of violence, especially looking at aspects of expressed 
collective identities such as universal and apolitical messaging, and the classic nonviolent doctrine 
of respecting and including everyone without recognising that this is rarely practically possible. This 
leads to an exploration of competing meanings of concepts such as inclusion and diversity and 
examines the ways in which some interpretations of these further marginalise groups or 
communities that are already marginalised. In this way, appeals to universal love and tolerance as 
a simple and self-evident thing – a hurrah-word, if you will – are critiqued and rejected, and the 
importance of acknowledging and acting on intersecting forms of violence is emphasised.  
Chapter Eight draws on the insights from the previous chapters to present a conclusion of 
this work and potential paths for future investigations. The conclusion chapter also acknowledges 
and discusses that this thesis presents a potentially huge challenge to nonviolent resistance by 
widening the scope of what forms of violence and repression are argued to be integral to the 
nonviolence label. However, the chapter also argues that this is not an attempt to argue that all of 
this is possible at all times, but rather to open the space of nonviolence theory and research up for 
discussion and contestation of this, and to not accept pre-defined and implied definitional 
boundaries of what can and cannot be discussed or cared about as part of what it means to be a 
nonviolent movement.
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Chapter Two: Nonviolence Literature Review 
In 2018 a new nonviolent climate movement appeared in the UK and quickly spread to other 
countries. The group, Extinction Rebellion (XR), was launched in October 2018 and attracted 
attention for its tactics of highly disruptive, mass civil disobedience (Gunningham, 2019, 197-198 ; 
Slaven and Heydon, 2020, 59; Westwell and Bunting, 2020, 546). Although the emergence of 
Extinction Rebellion seemed sudden to spectators, and the movement grew unusually fast in the 
public eye, the launch of Extinction Rebellion was the result of discussion and planning between the 
founders since at least 2016 (Extinction Rebellion UK, 2020). Extinction Rebellion has been labelled 
one of “the two most important grass-roots climate organisations that have emerged to date” 
(Gunningham, 2019, 195-196), signifying the enormous attention that the group has already 
attracted. In April 2019, Extinction Rebellion launched another series of actions in various locations, 
during which it was estimated that around 6000 people took part in London alone, blocking major 
bridges, gluing themselves to trains, and causing disruption through a host of other actions 
attracting both national and international attention (Gunningham, 2019, 197-198; Westwell and 
Bunting, 2020, 546). Extinction Rebellion UK was launched with three pre-determined key demands 
to the UK government: “it must ‘tell the truth’ about the global climate crisis and declare a climate 
emergency; commit to net-zero carbon emissions by 2025; and establish a citizens assembly to 
oversee the transition towards climate justice” (Westwell and Bunting, 2020, 546). 
What is noteworthy about Extinction Rebellion, especially in the present context, is their 
intense focus on using science and academic knowledge as a form of social and political capital to 
raise the status and urgency of their arguments, and of the movement. That is, the group used 
climate change science extensively in their communication of the urgency of the problem, but also 
used social science in a similar way to make their argument that their particular version of 
nonviolent resistance was “the right way” to achieve radical changes towards sustainability. The XR 
founders stated in materials produced by themselves as well as media interviews that they had been 
“directly inspired by [Erica Chenoweth’s] findings” (Robson, 2019; Farrell et al., 2019, 126), 
particularly Chenoweth’s arguments that amongst the campaigns that formed their dataset, 
“[t]here weren’t any campaigns that had failed after they had achieved 3.5% participation during a 
peak event”, the so-called “3.5% rule” (Robson, 2019; Case, 2018, 25). In the Extinction Rebellion 
handbook one of the founding members, Sam Knights, describes the creation of Extinction Rebellion 
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beginning with “fifteen people who had studied and researched the way to achieve radical social 
change” (Farrell et al., 2019, 9, my emphasis). Another founding member, Roger Hallam, also 
expressed a sense of significant difference (and arguably superiority) to other social movements, 
writing that “[u]nlike many of the spontaneous social-media-fuelled rebellions and uprisings in 
recent years, Extinction Rebellion has been carefully planned. For several years a group of academics 
and activists have been working” and researching approaches and models for social change which 
would avoid the “failed” attempts so far (ibid, 99). After establishing the group, the fifteen founders 
toured the UK giving talks to build a movement, talks described by themselves as “clear, 
straightforward and led by science. We walked people through the facts and then, at the end of the 
presentation, provided a necessary and rational response: mass civil disobedience” (ibid, 10). While 
Extinction Rebellion then used their extensive research to raise their own legitimacy, Chenoweth 
also passed legitimacy to the group through an “expert” endorsement, saying to the BBC in 2019: 
They are up against a lot of inertia … But I think that they have an incredibly thoughtful and 
strategic core. And they seem to have all the right instincts about how to develop and teach 
through a nonviolent resistance campaign (Robson, 2019).   
Although Extinction Rebellion were unusually direct in referencing their use of nonviolent 
resistance research, it was not the first time that this area of academic study had a clear impact on 
the conduct and tactical choices of resistance movements. For example, influential nonviolence 
scholar Gene Sharp is widely seen as having inspired a number of uprisings in the Arab Spring in 
2011 (Walters, 2018) and nonviolence training centres around the world use the research produced 
in universities to train grass-roots activists and organisers (CANVAS 2020a; CANVAS 2020b; ICNC 
2020).    
This demonstrates that nonviolent resistance theory is incredibly important in shaping 
activist and organiser decisions about how to start and conduct resistance campaigns, and how to 
fundamentally think about nonviolent civil resistance, or, indeed resistance altogether – that is, 
whether to choose violent or nonviolent tactics in the first place. However, it is less clear in popular 
narratives what exactly nonviolent resistance is, what its relationship to violence is, and what 
implications arise from this relationship. This literature review will demonstrate that this lack of 
clarity is to some extent also a feature of the research and academic literature on nonviolent 
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resistance.     
This chapter will introduce the field of nonviolent resistance literature and its main theorists. 
It will do so by firstly providing a brief overview of the field, its methodology, and the importance of 
remembering context when looking at an analysis of a given nonviolent campaign or tactic. After 
that, arguably the greatest divide within the field - between strategic and principled nonviolence - 
will be discussed, and the two strands will be briefly introduced, followed by arguments in favour of 
viewing the two strands not as separate, but as different parts or sides to the same concept of 
nonviolence. Following this, the chapter will outline different strategies used in the literature to 
define or conceptualise nonviolent resistance and discuss the implications of these strategies. The 
last part of the chapter will look a little closer at the dynamics of nonviolent resistance, or, as the 
literature frequently phrases it, why and how nonviolence works. This section provides a further 
understanding of how nonviolent resistance is conceptualised and understood - in the absence of 
clear and coherent definitions - within the literature.   
It should be noted that for the purposes of this thesis, a number of different terms are used 
interchangeably to describe the field covered, such as civil resistance, nonviolent resistance, 
nonviolent social movement, nonviolent struggles etc. The use of these terms as describing 
essentially the same concept is also seen in key literature in the area (for example Bartkowski ed, 
2013, 4; Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013, 273).   
Introduction to the field 
The field of nonviolence studies, or nonviolent civil resistance studies, is relatively new, but rapidly 
growing (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 15). Carter (2009, 25), for example, notes the “growing awareness” 
and increasing use of nonviolent civil resistance in recent decades, although the method has been 
analysed and described theoretically “since the 1930s”.  
Although peace movements had existed for much longer, and Gandhi had practiced and 
promoted systematic thought and practice of nonviolence before this, the academic study of 
nonviolence is most often attributed to the three scholars Richard Gregg, Gene Sharp, and Johan 
Galtung, starting from the 1950s and 1960s with the establishment of academic programs, 
institutes, and journals (Baldoli, 2019, 11; Cortright, 2008, 2). Since these writers, the field of 
nonviolence studies has continued to grow, both with the establishment of more research centres 
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and academic programs, but also through nonviolence training centres for activists and organisers 
to learn nonviolent resistance skills (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 223-225; CANVAS, 2020a; INCN 
2020). With the growth of nonviolence studies has also come a call from nonviolence scholars to 
have this area of study recognised in more traditional fields such as security and conflict studies (e.g. 
Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 5), which will be discussed further as part of the strategic 
nonviolence branch of nonviolence studies.   
It is important when discussing nonviolent action and nonviolence literature to remember 
that not all forms of political action that are done without the use of violence are included in the 
concept of nonviolent resistance. Nonviolent action does not include all politically motivated actions 
that do not use violence, but rather, actions that fall outside of institutional and commonly agreed 
on channels (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 12; Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013, 271-273; 
Sharp, 1959, 45). That is to say, actions such as voting, being a member of a political party to 
influence the choosing of candidates, lobbying, etc are not considered ‘nonviolent resistance’. Many 
nonviolent resistance methods are also illegal actions (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 12).  
Another definition employed by some nonviolence authors is that of a “nonviolent 
campaign” rather than simply nonviolent actions more vaguely. This is defined as: 
a series of observable, continual tactics in pursuit of a political objective. A campaign can last 
anywhere from days to years. Campaigns have discernible leadership and often have names, 
distinguishing them from random riots or spontaneous mass acts. Usually campaigns have 
distinguishable beginning and end points (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 14).  
Thus, although individual political events may be one of the nonviolent tactics included in 
nonviolence literature, one event will not necessarily be counted in the literature as a nonviolent 
campaign, but rather, a campaign would involve the use of several tactics over a period of time 
(Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013, 273). 
Observation-based methodologies: the power of example 
Since early studies of nonviolence such as Richard Gregg’s writings on Gandhi, the field of 
nonviolence studies has been closely connected with the practice of nonviolent resistance (Gregg, 
1936; Martin, 2015, 162). This connection is an important part of understanding the field of 
nonviolence literature. The connection is a two-way one, in which nonviolence theory also responds 
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to calls for “movement relevant theory” as described by Bevington and Dixon (2005). For example, 
the online journal Interface explicitly describes itself as a way for nonviolence academics to 
communicate their knowledge to activists, and with a focus on what activists and organisers need 
to know more about (Interface, 2020). Another example is the “tradition of scholar-activists”, a 
concept which promotes the idea that scholarship can direct and participate in advocacy work 
(Romero, 2020, 10). Although the concept of the scholar-activist does not stem from, or is exclusive 
to, the field of nonviolent resistance, it is prominent in the field (Borpujari, 2014; Kurtz and Smithey, 
2018, 15). Finally, as Martin (2015, 158) points out, nonviolence literature is often willing to “take 
sides” in its use of language, when for example naming an event a “protest” rather than the more 
negatively loaded term “riot”. Martin (in Kurtz and Smithey, 2018, xx) later argues that “[m]any 
social analysts would like their studies to be useful to activists”. 
Apart from this close connection to practice and observation, the field of civil resistance 
studies can be understood as strongly influenced by naturalist assumptions and aims, that is, “the 
idea that the human sciences should strive to develop predictive and causal explanations akin to 
those found in the natural sciences” (Bevir and Kedar, 2008, 504). What this means is that a field of 
human or social science, such as civil resistance research, is based on an assumption that it is 
possible to “study fixed objects of inquiry that possess observable and, at least to some extent, 
measurable properties, such that they are amenable to explanations in terms of general laws” (Bevir 
and Kedar, 2008, 504). While these naturalist views are perhaps especially obvious in the more 
recent statistically based nonviolence literature such as the NAVCO datasets (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011; Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis, 2018), the influence 
is clear on a number of other nonviolence studies, including Sharp’s descriptions of different 
nonviolent techniques and tactics (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973) and even qualitative studies (Bevir 
and Kedar, 2008, 514). For example, the classification of different nonviolent actions as being the 
same technique with identifiable properties and dynamics across a number of contexts is an attempt 
to “point toward classifications, correlations, or other regularities that hold across various cases” 
and to overcome the “obstacles” of “historical contingency and contextual specificity … in the search 
for cross-temporal and cross-cultural regularities”, a strongly naturalist methodology (Bevir and 
Kedar, 2008, 506).  
These two factors - a close connection to practice and naturalist assumptions - mean that 
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defining “nonviolent resistance” tends to spring from observations of campaigns and actions that 
are deemed nonviolent, and from this collection of different manifestations, a more or less vague 
idea of the concept of nonviolent resistance as such springs. Further, authors such as Carter (2009, 
25) emphasise that one of the main arguments for nonviolent civil resistance - that it is effective - 
stems not from theory, but mainly from “the power of example”. Authors such as Brian Martin 
(2015, 162) suggest that this approach will continue in the future of nonviolence literature, but 
Martin does argue that more “ambiguous” and “less visible” cases of nonviolence, rather than the 
major, successful cases that have been the main focus so far, should be incorporated more in the 
field to improve research. This close monitoring of nonviolent campaigns as a central way to 
understand nonviolence better is demonstrated for example when Carter (2009, 40-41) discusses 
more recent uprisings and writes that “[t]he books on civil resistance have not however had time to 
catch up with Nepal 2006, or the recent wave of protest against rigged elections in post-communist 
regimes”, and describes an image of a protest as “[e]vents in Nepal marching ahead of the 
literature”. These phrasings are an indication of how important it is perceived within the literature 
to be constantly updating as new events unfold. This is of course not surprising for observation-
based research, or necessarily an issue in itself; however, it is important to keep this in mind when 
thinking of the extent to which nonviolence literature is a useful prescriptive tool for what should 
be done in future nonviolent resistance, and which options and tactics are available for nonviolent 
campaigns.  
Basing nonviolence literature on observations rather than theoretical concepts or categories 
also means that this area of research is often interdisciplinary, both in terms of drawing on different 
academic disciplines, and attempting to speak to, or work within, several fields (Bartkowski ed, 
2013, 6; Martin, 2015, 162). The comparative method is important in civil resistance literature (e.g. 
Kurt Schock’s 2015 book Civil Resistance: Comparative Perspectives on Nonviolent Struggles), which 
is once again compatible with a strong focus on observation-based methodologies, and is used to 
attempt to explain why outcomes of nonviolent campaigns can be drastically different (Carter, 2009, 
34), and why nonviolent campaigns sometimes fail, or why they succeed more often than violent 
ones (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011). 
Another way in which naturalist tendencies are visible is the tendency towards essentialism 
in the understanding of the concept of nonviolence. Essentialism in concept formation can be 
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understood to occur “whenever social science concepts are defined in ways that ignore the 
historical specificity of the various objects to which they refer” (Bevir and Kedar, 2008, 507). This 
means that an essentialist theory of nonviolence could be argued to be one which attempts to 
describe rules, dynamics, and success rates for nonviolent campaigns across contexts of time, 
culture, society, etc. in order to “postulate cross-temporal and cross-cultural regularities” (Bevir and 
Kedar, 2008, 507).  
While analysis of nonviolent resistance campaigns mostly pays some degree of attention to 
the context of the given campaign, civil resistance literature does aim to be able to draw conclusions 
and generalisations across contexts and countries (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 16, 221; 
Sommier et al., 2019, 221). This thesis promotes a degree of scepticism and critique of this aim and 
argues that the context of a specific campaign is important to the specific tactics and options 
available. For example, although Chenoweth and Stephan’s 2011 book How Civil Resistance Works: 
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict has been used as an inspiration for nonviolent movements 
operating within liberal democracies (e.g. Extinction Rebellion, see Robson, 2019), the majority of 
the cases studied in the book are campaigns against highly repressive regimes (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011, 88, 233-236). While the book states that based on the findings, it can be shown that 
“[n]onviolent campaigns succeed against democracies and non-democracies, weak and powerful 
opponents, conciliatory and repressive regimes”, it highlights that there are different mechanisms 
and dynamics depending on the context and aim of a campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 7-
10, 221). This matters not only for the planning of future campaigns, but also for statistical research 
on the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 7-10). Therefore, the 
treatment of civil resistance campaigns as “a stable set of practices” and “a single and unified 
category of action” which can be “compared over time, and between politico-cultural contexts” is 
an oversimplification of the phenomenon (Sommier et al., 2019, 221).  
An example of the importance of context to understanding nonviolent resistance can be 
found in the book Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles (Bartkowski 
ed, 2013, 343) and the discussion on the specific context of independence struggles and resistance 
against foreign rule and occupation in nonviolence studies. In the discussion, several differences 
between this form of struggle and resistance against a domestic authoritarian ruler are brought up 
as central to understanding the dynamics of this type of nonviolent resistance (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 
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343). The example demonstrates that even “core” nonviolent tactics do not necessarily travel across 
contexts to work in all cases.       
The focus on arguments around nonviolent campaigns within highly repressive settings is an 
engagement with the “common misconception” that nonviolent resistance is exclusively or more 
often successful in liberal democracies, which Chenoweth and Stephan state is not supported by 
“the empirical record” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 19). Kurt Schock (2003, 706) writes that 
looking at the data, nonviolent resistance has been “effective in brutally repressive contexts” and 
“ineffective in open democratic societies”. This particular argument has become important to 
nonviolence literature, since the objection that nonviolent resistance was no match to dictators and 
authoritarianism became a main argument against nonviolence and pacifism during the Cold War 
(Baldoli, 2019, 5; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 221). In response to this, Galtung and Sharp 
amongst others examined nonviolent resistance to Nazism during the Second World War (Baldoli, 
2019, 5; Carter, 2009, 29; Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 5).   
However, challenges were also made to the idea of “extra-constitutional” (Sharp, 1959, 45) 
nonviolent action within democracies. With these arguments, a discussion around the legitimacy of 
civil disobedience in democracies “entered the mainstream of political theory in the 1960s and 
1970s”, following from discussions on this during the civil rights and peace campaigns in liberal 
states (Carter, 2009, 29). Stiehm (1968, 26) comments on this by writing that nonviolent political 
campaigns will see themselves as “part of the democratic process” because the victory “will usually 
go to the side with the largest number of supporters; thus, the majority rules”.  
Principled and strategic nonviolence 
A main dividing line within nonviolence theory and practice is that between principled nonviolence, 
or pacifism, and strategic nonviolence. The following section will discuss this division, briefly outline 
the two perspectives, introduce perspectives which argue for a united meaning of nonviolence, and 
then explain why this thesis discusses both strategic and principled nonviolence without too much 
attention on the dividing line between them.  
The division was first articulated by theorists in the 1960s including Gene Sharp, Johan 
Galtung, and Judith Stiehm (Baldoli, 2019, 5-6; Satha-Anand, 2015, 297; Stiehm, 1968, 23). The 
division created by Sharp and Galtung, and especially the popularity of Sharp’s works on strategic 
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nonviolence, are “at the basis of the recent success of the concept of nonviolence” (Baldoli, 2019, 
5-6). However, more recent defences of the importance of a principled commitment to nonviolence 
have emerged, as have arguments that the separation between the two is not practically possible 
or recommendable. This section will discuss first the history and main arguments of principled 
nonviolence; then do the same about strategic nonviolence; summarise the main differences 
described between the two strands within various theories of nonviolence; and finally discuss 
theories and arguments for combining the two strands into one conception of nonviolence.  
Principled nonviolence/pacifism 
Principled nonviolence, or pacifism, is a much older tradition than strategic nonviolence, with roots 
in religious and moral traditions (Cortright, 2008, 2-3, 8; Isserman, 1986, 47). Within Christianity, a 
famous example of a pacifist group is that of the Quakers, or Society of Friends (Friends Publishing 
Corporation, 2020). Along with these religious connotations, pacifism is also presented as a moral 
theory and argument (for example Farmer, 2011, who frames pacifism as humanism), which is once 
again a significant difference to purely strategic visions of nonviolence.   
Stiehm (1968, 23) defines “conscientious” nonviolence, or pacifism, as “a religious or ethical 
belief which categorically prohibits injury of other”, while Sharp (1959, 44) defines that pacifism “as 
a minimum” is against “participation in all international or civil wars or violent revolutions”. These 
two definitions depict the spectrum of different versions of pacifism well.     
Perhaps the most extreme, or restrictive, form of pacifism, the doctrine of “non-resistance”, 
is closely related to certain branches of Christianity. Non-resistance is a principle which rejects using 
physical violence or force, even for self-defence, and emphasises the virtue of enduring suffering, 
as well as staying outside perceived evil or violent situations and systems rather than engaging to 
work against the violence (Cortright, 2008, 8; Sharp, 1959, 46-47). This version of pacifism is then 
an obvious example of a purist conception of nonviolence, where the aim is to avoid implication in 
violence at all cost, even the cost of not attempting to work against violence (see for example 
Farmer, 2011, 42 for an example of the absurdity of this argument within an ideology that is against 
violence). Non-resistance, or passivity, is also the version of pacifism most often referred to in 
critiques of pacifism, which tend to argue that it is an unrealistic ideology, and a version of pacifism 
which is increasingly moved away from in pacifist literature and arguments (Benjamin, 1973, 196-
197; Farmer, 2011, 43-44).  
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Other versions of pacifism may allow for self-defence and resistance, but argue against the 
use of coercion as a method to get an opponent to change their behaviour, and may even object to 
the idea that there is an “opponent” as such, rather than a lack of clear communication between 
different actors with ultimately compatible interests (Stiehm, 1968, 25). This focus on “conversion” 
over coercion is an often highlighted difference between principled and strategic nonviolence. 
Conversion entails reforming the opposing side’s character, or changing their mind, through a belief 
in the good in every person, and often an appeal to their conscience through self-sacrificial actions 
(Isserman, 1986, 47; Stiehm, 1968, 24-25). Another example of a purist approach to nonviolence 
within this version of pacifism can be found in nonviolent liberation activist Bill Sutherland’s account 
of interactions with American pacifist movements over the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa 
(Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 153). Bill Sutherland explains that: 
One issue that came up during my time with AFSC [American Friends Service Committee] 
was the concern by some on the AFSC’s Board that I was making use of the organization to 
support armed struggle. It seemed that if I said it looks like violence is inevitable in a 
particular situation in South Africa, I would be accused of advocating violence … There was 
an influential and affluent group with the AFSC with the conscious or unconscious feeling 
that they could maintain the status quo in South Africa and give it a human face, or make it 
less violent. It was my conviction that the people must overthrow a system based on greed 
and racism … I identify with any people’s struggle to get a boot off their necks and it’s up to 
them to decide their methods. I couldn’t tell the ANC [African National Congress] or PAC [Pan 
Africanist Congress] to wait until my nonviolent experiment works (Sutherland and Meyer, 
2000, 153).  
In this way, a commitment to pacifism or nonviolence was seen by the AFSC to mean putting 
off fighting injustice if the alternative was to fight with violent means, a clearly purist conception of 
nonviolent political work.  
Another common version of pacifism is the anti-war movement, which rather than targeting 
all violence, targets international warfare, and at times even more narrowly nuclear weapons and 
warfare (Benjamin, 1973, 197-199; Cortright, 2008, 3-6; Isserman, 1986, 47-49). The anti-war 
movement has a rich history, and has, evidently, been strongly impacted by world events, such as 
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the two world wars (Isserman, 1986, 48). For example, the Second World War and its aftermath was 
challenging for the pacifist movement because the term - especially in the U.S. - came to be 
associated with support for the Soviet Union, and through that a pacifist would risk being branded 
a “potential traitor” (ibid). Thus, the apolitical character that had appealed to pacifists after the First 
World War - an idea which is still held with regards to both pacifism and strategic nonviolence 
(Baldoli, 2019, 7; Benjamin, 1973, 211; Richards, 1991, 60; Weber, 2003, 260) - was temporarily 
undermined by political developments which forced the peace movement to think about political 
positions. Although the position of “peace above all else” was then challenged at the time, pacifist 
arguments have since held on to this position, arguing that avoiding widespread death or 
destruction (as nuclear warfare especially would create) has to come before other political struggles 
or causes (Benjamin, 1973, 211). This sense of a hierarchy of causes - or forms of violence to be 
fought – is revisited at different points in this thesis.    
More recently, a branch of so-called “pragmatic” pacifism has been articulated, which is 
closely aligned with just war theory (Farmer, 2011, 46; Cortright, 2008, 14-16). This has been, in 
part, in response to the rising popularity of both strategic nonviolence, but especially arguments 
that pacifism as it is commonly understood (a rejection of all violence, and a purist, passive 
approach) is simply unrealistic and naive. Pragmatic, or conditional, pacifism, then goes against the 
absolute rejection of physical violence and warfare, and in its place suggests a pacifism which 
“oppose[s] war in principle but accept[s] the possibility of using force for self-defense or the 
protection of the vulnerable” (Cortright, 2008, 8). What unites the relatively wide range of positions 
that fall under this definition is a constant presumption “against the use of force and in favor of 
settling differences without violence” (ibid, 14-15). Another strategy for making pacifism 
“pragmatic” is to focus on arguments that demonstrate that violence may not be likely to achieve 
desired ends, especially in the cases of state militarism and nuclear weapons (Benjamin, 1973, 196-
199), an approach which is very close, if not similar, to strategic nonviolence arguments.  
Strategic nonviolence 
As mentioned, strategic nonviolence is a newer strand of nonviolence than pacifism, and was first 
articulated in the 1950s and 1960s by theorists such as Gene Sharp, Johan Galtung, Richard Gregg, 
and the less well-known Judith Stiehm. Unlike pacifism, which views conflict as a failure of 
communication, and potentially avoidable, strategic nonviolence is centred around an acceptance 
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of political conflict “viewed as a relationship between antagonists with incompatible interests”, and 
with a goal to “defeat the opponent” (Weber, 2003, 258; Stiehm, 1968, 25). Unlike other areas of 
conflict studies, however, the focus is on defeating the opponent without the use of direct violence, 
and unlike pacifism, the nonviolent actor is most often a group or social movement rather than an 
individual (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 64; Stiehm, 1968, 24, 26). 
Strategic nonviolence, that is, using nonviolent resistance methods without a moral or 
religious commitment to avoiding violence, is today widely seen as the most prominent form of 
nonviolence, and the attitude most often found in nonviolent resistance campaigns and movements 
(Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013, 273; Satha-Anand, 2015, 290). Although the field of 
nonviolence theory is rapidly growing, the work of Sharp in particular is still widely used by both 
academics and activists across the world, and especially the 1973 book The Politics of Nonviolent 
Action remains a seminal work in the field of nonviolence literature, activist training, and knowledge 
formation (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 225; Nepstad, 2015, 123; Walters, 2018; Weber, 2003, 
251).  
Described as the “preeminent theorist” of strategic nonviolence (Weber, 2003, 250), Sharp’s 
work is at the centre of strategic nonviolence as a field, and most writings on strategic nonviolence 
will refer back to Sharp at some point. Sharp embraced a military-style approach to nonviolent 
strategy, to function as an alternative “weapons system” (Carter, 2009, 31; Sharp and Finkelstein, 
1973, 67, 110-112; Weber, 2003, 258). Following in this line of thinking about nonviolence, research 
on nonviolent struggle today aims to achieve higher recognition of this form of conflict within 
traditionally influential academic fields such as security and conflict studies, and tries to achieve this 
precisely by emphasising strategic rather than moral arguments for the use of nonviolent tactics and 
“conceptualizing civil resistance as a form of unconventional warfare” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 
2011, 16-18; Chenoweth and Cunningham, 2013, 272). This growing link is further strengthened by 
“a number of former military officers who have engaged with non-violent resistance” and acted at 
times as advisers for nonviolent campaigns (Carter, 2009, 38). Like Richard Gregg, Sharp was initially 
a student and follower of Gandhi, and both authors aimed to produce more systematic and scientific 
accounts of nonviolence based on Gandhi’s actions and teachings - as opposed to Gandhi’s own 
writings which were often unclear and confusing (Kosek, 2005, 1320-1324; Weber, 2003, 250-256). 
In later works, however, Sharp moved fully away from any principled commitment to nonviolence 
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and what he saw as naive pacifist proposals for alternatives to armed struggle (and with that away 
from Gandhi as an inspiration for nonviolence), and aimed to describe only the techniques of 
nonviolence (Weber, 2003, 254-257).   
The main claim of strategic nonviolence is, then, that nonviolent campaigns are as effective, 
or more effective, than violent insurgencies, and that this is because of nonviolent coercion and 
leverage rather than trying to change the mind of the opponent through morally superior actions 
and sacrifice (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 19, 221; Martin, 2015, 149; Stiehm, 1968, 26). 
Although the argument is strategic here, it is nevertheless important to note that a certain degree 
of purity politics, as described by Shotwell (2016) is still seen, in that authors will argue against 
claims that violent resistance may at times be necessary or strategically prudent (e.g. Chenoweth 
and Stephan, 2011, 227). Chenoweth and Stephan (ibid, 43) further argue that claims that violent 
flanks, or threats of a campaign turning violent, can be a strategic advantage and increase the 
leverage of a nonviolent campaign, are incorrect - or in other words, the authors claim that violent 
and nonviolent campaigns cannot exist symbiotically, but that a purely nonviolent campaign is 
mostly strategically superior. Another seminal work in the field of nonviolence literature is the 2011 
book Why Civil Resistance Works: The strategic logic of nonviolent conflict by Erika Chenoweth and 
Maria Stephan, which consists of a thorough statistical study of the relative effectiveness of violent 
and nonviolent campaigns, further developed with the updated datasets NAVCO 2.0 and NAVCO 3.0 
(Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013; Chenoweth, Pinckney, and Lewis, 2018). The NAVCO data set 
examines 323 violent and nonviolent resistance campaigns from 1900 to 2006, and shows that 
nonviolent campaigns are increasing in frequency, as well as in success rate (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011, 6, 17). In contrast, violent struggles have seen a decline in success, and were almost 
half as likely to succeed or partially succeed as nonviolent campaigns (ibid, 7). In addition, Why Civil 
Resistance Works (ibid, 11) supports the statistics of the NAVCO dataset with qualitative material 
from case studies, which explore the dynamics of how nonviolent resistance works as described 
later in this chapter.  
Although the strategic approach to nonviolence has been hugely successful, the approach 
also meets criticism. A major critique is the argument that by removing values, morals, and ideology, 
there is a risk that strategic nonviolence can be used by oppressive groups or leaders to gain 
leverage and power, or can in fact lead to more harm to others than what is commonly 
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acknowledged in the theory (for example Baldoli, 2019, 7; Richards, 1991, 60; Weber, 2003, 260). 
Others such as Burrowes critique that besides the risk of harmful consequences, the removal of 
what they see as the “core” of nonviolence, which is the “idea of the sanctity of life”, also removes 
the opportunity to “radically transform human relationships”, which is what makes nonviolence 
“unique as a method of political action” (quoted in Weber, 2003, 262). Perhaps in response to this, 
arguments for combining the two strands of nonviolence are made.   
Intersections 
Before discussing whether the two strands of nonviolence can in fact be meaningfully combined in 
one concept of nonviolence, it is useful to summarise the main differences often highlighted 
between strategic and principled nonviolence.  
First, and somewhat obviously, the two strands are different in their reasons for not using 
violence. Where principled nonviolence makes an ethical or religious objection to the use of violence 
as such, strategic nonviolence argues that nonviolent resistance is more effective, and more likely 
to achieve the goals aimed for.  
Second, the core mechanism for changing the behaviour of the opponent is described as that 
of conversion or coercion respectively. That is, while principled nonviolence aims to convert the 
opponent, strategic nonviolence entails tactics to increase leverage, and thereby coerce the 
opponent into changing their behaviour (e.g. Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 42-46).  
Third, as Stiehm (1968, 24-25) especially points out, principled nonviolence is highly 
individualistic, and describes behaviours which an individual should practice at all times. In contrast, 
strategic nonviolence is usually carried out by groups, and this means new questions for nonviolence 
theory and organising, such as “recruiting and selecting leaders and members … [and] problems of 
responsibility and of morale maintenance” (ibid, 26). Further, the collective nature of strategic 
nonviolence means that understanding this form of action becomes not only a question for 
psychology (as pacifism is also), but also sociology (ibid, 28).  
Fourth, the assumptions about the occurrence and value of conflict in society are different 
between the two strands of nonviolence. Strategic nonviolence is explicitly based on the acceptance 
of conflict and aims to change how conflict is dealt with. Pacifism, on the other hand, is at its root 
against conflict, and “assumes that social conflict represents no more than a failure of 
communication between individuals and their consciences” (Stiehm, 1968, 24).  
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These significant differences, as well as the many discussions of this definitional division and 
the “widespread acceptance of it” does, as Baldoli (2019, 13) also argues, suggest that the division 
“does actually contain something important”.  
Across the two branches of nonviolence, a different spectrum of conceptions can be 
observed, with regards to how wide-reaching the focus on violence is. That is, how broadly is 
violence conceptualised, and what occurrences of violence are seen as “mattering” to the 
nonviolence theory? In pacifism, this spectrum was described with non-resistance theories at the 
one end (in which violence should be avoided in all situations), and pacifism as specifically anti-
nuclear activism at the other (in which a highly specific form of violence is fought). This question, or 
spectrum, is part of the foundation of many of the questions that make up the second part of this 
thesis on different impacts of violence on nonviolent resistance.  
As mentioned, critiques have been articulated recently of the strict division between 
strategic and principled nonviolence, and the division between different nonviolent groups and 
movements instead of cooperation which has sometimes followed from this separation (e.g. Baldoli, 
2019, 6; Satha-Anand, 2015, 290). Baldoli (2019, 7-8) for example attempts to create a 
“reconstructed” concept of nonviolence, which is “neither a principle nor a technique of action”, 
but rather “two schools belonging to the same praxis, which reinterprets and shapes current 
practices in society, as well as introduce new ones”.  
However, the recognition that the two distinct forms of nonviolence are perhaps not so 
strictly separate is not all new. Stiehm (1968, 24, 28) even notes, in an article with the main purpose 
of understanding the differences between the two approaches, that they are still similar in a number 
of ways, such as “their disavowal of violence, in many of their choices of action techniques, in their 
capacity to inspire martyrdom, in their goals chosen for action, and in their rhetoric” and that the 
relationship between the two is not antagonistic, but symbiotic. Even Sharp’s writings, suggest some 
overlapping of the two approaches (Satha-Anand, 2015, 295). Satha-Anand (ibid, 297) argues that 
“Sharp’s nonviolence has some of the qualities of someone who practices nonviolence as a way of 
life, especially in its strong and strict commitment to use only nonviolent methods, not to harm 
others, and to try not to hate the opponents”. The purist attitude that nonviolence is only 
characterised as such by a complete denial of using direct violence, rather than a preference for 
nonviolent methods while actively fighting violence, is then shared by strategic and principled 
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nonviolence. Satha-Anand (ibid, 298), again, confirms the importance of the purity of nonviolent 
methods, writing that “[p]ragmatic nonviolent strategists cannot claim to be nonviolent or work 
effectively for nonviolent social change if the language of nonviolence is not consistently used, or if 
they do not commit to the use of nonviolent action without reservation”. 
Further, a significant number of organisers and leaders hailed as central to the history and 
canon of nonviolence represent a combination of the two forms of nonviolence, and that the two 
forms of nonviolence “do live together” in practices and discussions of nonviolence (Stiehm, 1968, 
28). Benjamin (1973, 197), for example, talks of the names “closely connected” with pacifism such 
as Gandhi and Martin Luther King, Jr., both of which are also studied extensively within strategic 
nonviolence literature (e.g. Satha-Anand, 2015, 298; Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, e.g. 5, 82, 111). 
Gandhi is especially often mentioned as an inspiration for both strands of nonviolence, given that 
his concept of satyagraha was “both a strategy for nonviolent direct action by a mass movement 
and an ethical system for the individual” (Isserman, 1986, 48). The next chapter on the history of 
nonviolent resistance will further demonstrate this argument.     
Finally, within the context of this thesis, the two strands of nonviolence are both being 
referred to without distinction when the project talks of ‘nonviolent resistance’ or other terms with 
the same meaning. This is in part in reference to the arguments about this combination discussed 
above, but in particular it is because the questions and arguments raised in this thesis are relevant 
to both of these areas - although strategic nonviolence literature is used more than pacifist 
literature. This focus is because of the prominence of strategic nonviolence, especially within social 
movements and nonviolent campaigns, as discussed earlier. However, both strands of nonviolence 
share the issue that the role of violence in these movements and movement dynamics is 
insufficiently discussed, defined, and reckoned with, in part because of a purity politics approach to 
nonviolence within both strands. As such, the distinction between the two strands is not one that 
needs specific acknowledgement for later parts of the thesis, although it is as shown here an 
important distinction to understand in order to comprehend the conceptualisation of nonviolent 
resistance in the literature.  
Definitional strategies 
It is probably then already clear that nonviolent resistance is a difficult concept to define precisely. 
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Sharp (1959, 41) amongst others, talks of the “widespread confusion” over the meaning of the term, 
and Stiehm (1968, 23) argues that the term, “like all general terms, suffers from the fact that it 
encompasses a wide variety of actions … as well as a number of philosophical positions”. While it is 
then generally accepted within the field both that the concept is difficult to define, and that it needs 
some form of definition in order to be discussed and analysed, the approach to this task varies 
greatly. The following section will outline some major approaches to the task - or definitional 
strategies - as well as the definitions or conceptualisations of nonviolence that follow from these 
strategies. While some authors provide a clearly marked “working definition” as a sufficient starting 
point, others use definitional strategies such as listing possible tactics; categorising forms of 
nonviolence; or defining nonviolence in relation to the concept of violence. More recently, a more 
conceptual approach to nonviolence studies, in which the concept of nonviolence as such is 
examined in detail, can be seen within the field. It is only with this recent increase in focus on the 
concept of nonviolence as such that an interest in thoroughly examining the definitional line(s) 
between violence and nonviolence has also arisen. While Sharp (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 64-65) 
argues - echoing Gandhi - that the issue of defining violence and nonviolence is not the important 
distinction for the purposes of understanding nonviolent action, but rather the distinction between 
action and inaction is, it should be clear that this thesis disagrees with that. Although the aim here 
is not to establish clear and universal definitions of violence and nonviolence, or the line(s) between 
them, the thesis aims to demonstrate that these questions are still fundamentally important, and 
have a strong impact on the practical work of nonviolent action.  
Negative definition 
The most immediate approach to defining nonviolence is to define it negatively with reference to 
violence, that is, nonviolence as simply meaning ‘not violence’ or ‘without violence’. An example of 
this is provided by Brian Martin (2015, 147) who defines nonviolence as “social action that does not 
involve physical violence”, without however discussing what “violence” then is, or what the 
specification of “physical” violence indicates. This definition is based on a premise that the concept 
of violence is well understood and agreed on, and therefore usable as a common reference point 
for definitions of related concepts. Gene Sharp (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 64) makes use of a 
similar negative definition of nonviolence, and also, as Martin, mentions specifically the refusal to 
use “physical” violence without discussing what that is, or the idea of non-physical violence. 
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However, Sharp (1959, 41) argues in an earlier piece of writing that although it may seem as though 
“not violence” is a coherent concept, it would be a mistake to fail “to discern the very real 
differences among the various types of ‘non-violence’”, making classification of different kinds of 
nonviolence an important task.  
Baldoli (2019, 2), who is part of a recent interest in a more conceptual analysis of the term 
nonviolence, critiques this strategy and argues that it stems in part from the “dominion” of the 
concept of violence, which has until recently not had an opposite concept at all. However, viewing 
nonviolence as the opposite to violence becomes problematic also because “[v]iolence is an 
extremely vague word” and this means “that finding its exact opposite is an act of desperation” 
(ibid). Arguably, the same can be said for defining nonviolence, if not as the opposite of violence, 
then the exclusion or lack of violence, which is still a definition which depends for its clarity on the 
clarity of the concept of violence. As an alternative, Baldoli (ibid, 8-9) argues that constructing from 
scratch a concept of nonviolence independently of that of violence allows for a more accurate and 
precise definition.   
Working definition 
While the writings of Stellan Vinthagen represent part of the emerging conceptual approach 
mentioned above, Vinthagen does, in fact, argue in favour of the value of working definitions, 
writing that definitions should be seen as “tools” rather than attempts to agree on one “correct” 
definition (Vinthagen, 2015, 69). With this argument, Vinthagen describes nonviolence as a wide 
field of different forms of nonviolence, organised in a framework of “minimal” to “maximal” 
meanings of nonviolence (ibid, 68-69). He further argues that any examination of nonviolence will 
look only at certain forms or types of nonviolence, and the purpose of a definition is exactly to make 
it clear which form of nonviolence is being examined, rather than define the object of examination 
as the only form of nonviolence (ibid). The working definition of nonviolence is therefore one that 
aims only to clarify the object of a specific study, research, or in more practical terms, movement or 
campaign, and through that add to a larger, not quite defined, concept of nonviolence.  
In A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How civil resistance works, Vinthagen does then provide 
the working definition for the book that with “nonviolence”:  
I include only those movements that view ‘we’ as at least both their own group and other 
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parties acting in a conflict (’the enemy’, ‘opponents’, ‘third parties’ and so on), define 
‘violence’ as at least the causing of permanent physical injury, and consider nonviolence to 
at least partially combine without violence and against violence (Vinthagen, 2015, 69).  
and clarifies in relation to other nonviolence literature that “my purpose is to investigate a 
kind of ‘nonviolence’ that is more ambitious than the conventional type”. While this is a clear 
example of the idea of a working definition as simply a tool to provide clarity for the discussion at 
hand, it also illustrates the fact that even discussions that seemingly accept the lack of a clear overall 
definition of the concept of nonviolence do, to some extent, rely on an assumption that such clarity 
exists, and that the reader is familiar with it. By referring to the “conventional type” of nonviolence, 
Vinthagen is invoking an image and an understanding of a vague and undefined entity as though it 
is in fact clear and carries a similar meaning to different readers.  
Another example of the use of working definitions, that is, the acknowledgement when 
discussing the definition of nonviolence that a final or complete definition is not being provided, is 
seen in Chenoweth and Stephan’s 2011 book Why Civil Resistance Works: The strategic logic of 
nonviolent conflict. In the book, the authors discuss firstly the distinction between violent and 
nonviolent campaigns, acknowledging the “difficulties with labeling one campaign as violent and 
another as nonviolent” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 12). While the line between violence and 
nonviolence is then seemingly discussed here, it is not the concepts of violence and nonviolence as 
such, or the often blurry lines separating them, but rather, how much undefined violence is 
considered below the threshold of what makes a campaign violent. In a later article, Chenoweth and 
Cunningham (2013, 273) also recognise this difficulty of distinguishing between violence and 
nonviolence, but treat this as a “practical” difficulty rather than an important and fundamental 
discussion of the core of the meaning of nonviolence. Following this approach, Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011, 12) then write that it is “possible to characterize a campaign as principally nonviolent 
based on the primacy of nonviolent resistance methods and the nature of the participation in that 
form of resistance”. In other words, if the tactics used in a campaign are primarily nonviolent - 
whatever that may mean - then the campaign is classed by the authors as a nonviolent campaign. 
Campaigns in which “a significant amount of violence occurred”, are categorised as violent 
campaigns (ibid, 12-13). A similar approach is taken by Sutherland and Meyer (2000, 152) when 
classifying the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa as nonviolent, arguing both that nonviolent 
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tactics were the most used, and that “[t]hough eventually and occasionally some rocks and bottles 
may have been thrown, this type of activity - stones thrown against tanks that are leveling 
communities - is much closer to the Palestinian Intifada, also predominantly nonviolent, than to a 
real armed confrontation”.   
Listing tactics 
A common way of illustrating or conceptualising what is meant by the vague term of nonviolent 
resistance is that of listing examples of different, often very common, nonviolent tactics. Arguably, 
the premise of one of the most famous works on nonviolent action, Gene Sharp’s 1973 book The 
Politics of Nonviolent Action, is this definitional strategy. In the book, Sharp presents and discusses 
198 nonviolent tactics (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 119-433). The definitional strategy of listing 
different forms of nonviolent action is seen in several other prominent works in the field, such as 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 12), Bartkowski (ed, 2013, 4), Chenoweth and Cunningham (2013, 
271), and Martin (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018, xiv). Stiehm (1968, 23) builds on the strategy of listing 
tactics to conceptualise nonviolence, and describes a spectrum of nonviolent actions, “from self-
immolation to a carefully conceived consumer boycott”, and of nonviolent schools of thought, “from 
that of the Friends to that of CORE activists”. An added dimension of the list strategy can be to list 
violent tactics as well, as a way of describing what nonviolent resistance is not. Chenoweth and 
Stephan (2011, 12-13) provide an example of this, writing that “[v]iolent tactics include bombings, 
shootings, kidnappings, physical sabotage such as the destruction of infrastructure, and other types 
of physical harm of people and property”.  
What is not made clear when using a list of nonviolent tactics to suggest an understanding 
of nonviolence as such is whether the list is exhaustive, or merely listing the most important 
nonviolent tactics, or even random tactics in no particular order, and, perhaps most importantly, 
how the examples listed are chosen and defined as being nonviolent resistance. This definitional 
strategy seems to fit well with the methodology of nonviolence literature, in that it is based on 
observation of actual protests and campaigns, and from those creates a vocabulary and 
classification system of nonviolent tactics, rather than looking for examples of theoretical types of 
political action in practical politics.  
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Categorisation 
From these lists of nonviolent tactics, when building an understanding of nonviolence as such, some 
authors go a step further and divide the nonviolent tactics into larger blocks, or categories of 
nonviolent action. Gene Sharp is again a famous example of this. In Sharp’s work on nonviolent 
resistance, three main categories of nonviolent tactics are described, and the act of classifying 
different forms of nonviolence is described as crucial to a “scientific” analysis of nonviolent 
resistance (Sharp, 1959, 41). Sharp describes these as: 
methods of resistance and direct action without physical violence in which the members of 
the nonviolent group commit either (1)acts of omission – that is, they refuse to perform acts 
which they usually perform and are expected by custom to perform or are required by law 
or regulation to perform – or (2) acts of commission – that is, they insist on performing acts 
which they usually do not perform, are not expected by custom to perform, or are forbidden 
by law or regulation from performing – or (3) both (Sharp, 1959, 44-45).  
In The Politics of Nonviolent Action (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973), Sharp groups the 198 
different methods into six categories: 1) Protest and Persuasion (pp. 117-182); 2) Social 
Noncooperation (pp. 183-218); 3) Economic Noncooperation (Boycotts) (pp. 219-256); 4) Economic 
Noncooperation (Strikes) (pp. 257-284); 5) Political Noncooperation (pp. 285-356); and 6) 
Nonviolent Intervention (pp. 357-448). In a further categorisation process, the book introduces six 
stages of the “dynamics of nonviolent action” (Martin, 2015, 150). These are: “laying the 
groundwork, challenge that leads to repression, maintaining solidarity and nonviolent discipline, 
political jiu-jitsu, three modes of success, and the redistribution of power” (ibid). Martin (ibid, 162) 
writes that although the final stage of the dynamics, “redistribution of power” is “crucially important 
for the success of campaigns”, it is much less articulated in Sharp’s theory than the other stages. 
This leads for example to campaigns which have effectively overthrown a leader or government, but 
failed to implement structural change, making the change more “symbolic than substantive” (ibid).  
In another example of categorisation as a strategy to describe or define nonviolence as such, 
Bartkowski (ed, 2013, 15-19) distinguish between direct and indirect nonviolent struggles. They see 
indirect struggle as what is also at times referred to as “everyday forms of resistance”, or “existence 
is resistance”, i.e. forms of resistance that simply include still living on certain land, maintaining 
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language and culture despite oppression, and so on (ibid, 16-17). In contrast, direct resistance is 
described as more “forceful actions in order to put more overt pressure on the authorities. These 
more confrontational engagements often [involve] ever-growing participation of wider swathes of 
the society who directly and immediately [challenge] the authorities and their control over land and 
population” (ibid, 19). These two forms of resistance are often both employed by resistance 
movements (ibid).  
Similarly, Vinthagen (2015, 63) defines the two categories of “nonviolent construction” and 
“nonviolent resistance” and uses these categories to define nonviolence as such as the sum of these 
two categories. In addition, each of these have their own sub-categories (ibid, 71-74). Vinthagen’s 
conception of nonviolence is one that is inherently multidimensional, and therefore, the approach 
emphasises the importance of using a range of tactics not only to be less predictable for the 
opponent, but also to address violence in its different dimensions and roles (ibid, 64-66). Despite 
then describing these two sides of nonviolence as integrally linked, Vinthagen also states that this 
conception of nonviolence is “intrinsically strained” and has “two convergent meanings, the 
consequences and common significance of which cannot be fully realised”, which leads to 
movements usually stressing one aspect over the other (ibid, 67). This, perhaps, suggests that 
although a wide range of tactics is a strength of nonviolent movements, it can also lead to tension 
and contradictions within these movements that are not often explored in the theory and literature 
on nonviolence.  
Baldoli (2019, 13), who is discussed in the next section on the more conceptual analysis of 
nonviolence, critiques categorisation as a strategy for conceptualising or defining nonviolence, 
arguing that “it is doubtful that a new categorisation would help the research on nonviolence. It 
would only make the literature more chaotic”.  
Emerging conceptual approach 
Although writers such as Sharp (1959, 41) and Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 12) do then recognise 
difficulties both with defining nonviolent resistance as such, and distinguishing violent and 
nonviolent resistance, this is, as shown, seen as being more of an issue with the overlapping of 
tactics or difficulty of quantifying and measuring nonviolent methods; i.e. a practical issue, rather 
than one concerned with the importance and difficulty of defining the concept of nonviolence as 
such in a clear and consistent manner. As discussed, this problem is often dealt with through some 
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idea of a working definition rather than a final one, although the working definitions still often end 
up referring to vague concepts as though they have a clear and universal meaning.  
However, a number of works on nonviolence are starting to appear which do seek to provide 
a more conceptual and in-depth analysis of what nonviolence as such is, what its relationship to the 
concept of violence is, and how these questions shape the actual ‘doing’ of nonviolent resistance.  
Vinthagen’s book A Theory of Nonviolent Action: How civil resistance works (2015) provides 
an expansive discussion and conceptualisation of both nonviolence and violence. The focus on the 
concept of violence is in part because Vinthagen (2015, 66) defines nonviolence as being not simply 
not using violence, but also working against violence, while at the same time recognising that 
nonviolence is not fully free from violence. Vinthagen argues that this is especially the case “if 
resistance is to mean resistance against ‘violence’ and not just against the violence of others” (ibid, 
67), a claim which is particularly relevant in the context of later chapters of this thesis. This definition 
of being both without and against violence is one which bridges a central dividing line within the 
field of nonviolence literature, that between strategic and principled nonviolence. While much of 
the literature discussed so far falls within the strategic nonviolence field (being about resistance 
movements that refrain from using violence), being against violence is the core of the classic and 
most influential version of principled nonviolence, pacifism.   
Another recent attempt at defining or discussing the concept of nonviolence as such is 
Roberto Baldoli’s 2019 book Reconstructing Nonviolence: A New Theory and Practice for a Post-
Secular Society. In it, Baldoli (2019, 6) argues that because nonviolence literature has not worked 
with an overarching conception of nonviolence, nonviolence has instead become “a sub-field in 
many areas of study”. To remedy this, and unify the field of nonviolence as an independent, 
“reunited and thus progressive” area of research and political action, Baldoli (ibid, 6-7) aims to 
“reunite” nonviolence by creating a new, “pluralistic” conception, “both analytical and normative, 
which is able to include the variety of manifestations of nonviolence, while at the same time 
providing a direction and new practices in a different historical environment”. Baldoli (ibid) does 
explicitly criticise a more observation-based approach to defining and understanding nonviolence, 
writing that there is a risk that an observation-based theory fails to be open to new forms of 
nonviolence, to “fall into a regressive field of research, in which there is no actual understanding of 
a changing reality and the construction of a new project”. In other words, defining nonviolent action 
Chapter Two: Nonviolence Literature Review  
- 39 - 
 
by the nonviolent actions that have already happened and been observed risks that the field of 
nonviolence studies is limited in its understanding of nonviolence, rather than exploring new or 
alternative manifestations of the concept.  
In his book, Vinthagen (2015, 69) provides an examination of the concepts of violence and 
nonviolence, while also making an argument for the value of adopting working definitions, and 
allowing different definitions and manifestations of nonviolence to add up to create the overall field 
of nonviolence. In contrast, Baldoli (2019, 6) is explicitly critical of this strategy of “fragmentation” 
when constructing an idea of what nonviolence means. Baldoli (ibid) writes that this is a problem 
because fragmentation “creates a degenerative, regressive, and repressive field of research” in 
which opportunities may be created for “worrying uses of the term, such as ‘nonviolent crimes’, 
‘nonviolent extremism’, ‘nonviolent terrorism’ or ‘nonviolent fundamentalism’”. Rather, the aim of 
a theory of nonviolence should be to “find a unique and more progressive conception, which is able 
to explain actual discrepancies with a core unifying interpretation, framework, platform; to include 
existing uses of the term as corollaries, as contextualised instances of that concept; and to foster 
new uses and research” (ibid).   
Another recent work on nonviolence which takes a more conceptual and theoretical 
approach is the work of Judith Butler. Starting from arguments around the unequal distribution of 
“grievability” (Butler, 2004, 19-50) attributed to human life in their 2004 work Precarious Life, and 
arguments about the inseparability of violence and nonviolence in public lectures (Butler, 2016) and 
their 2010 book Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? (Schneider, 2011), Butler published The 
Force of Non-Violence: An Ethico-Political Bind in 2020. In The Force of Non-Violence, Butler places 
the violence-nonviolence definitional relationship within a framework of dispute and interpretation 
(Butler, 2020, 1-5). Butler (ibid, 5) also points to another impact that definitions of violence have on 
nonviolence resistance, by discussing the instrumentality of violence definitions, writing about: 
a political situation where the power to attribute violence to the opposition itself becomes 
an instrument to enhance state power, to discredit the aims of the opposition, or even to 
justify their radical disenfranchisement, imprisonment, and murder (Butler, 2020, 5).  
In this way, Butler also demonstrates why articulations of the violence/nonviolence 
definitional boundary are not politically neutral, a line of argument which is inherent to a number 
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of the discussions and themes in this thesis as well. This leaves the task of defining nonviolence as 
inherently political, because: 
To argue for or against nonviolence requires that we establish the difference between 
violence and nonviolence, if we can. But there is no quick way to arrive at a stable semantic 
distinction between the two when that distinction is so often exploited for the purposes of 
concealing and extending violent aims and practices (Butler, 2020, 6).    
The overriding aim in The Force of Non-Violence is to formulate a normative claim for 
nonviolence which is not, as other principled nonviolence arguments are, based on individual 
conscience or conviction, but precisely on the rejection of individualism and a suggestion instead to 
base the concept of nonviolence on the social bonds between people (Butler, 2020, 15). Butler (ibid, 
9, 15) formulates an ethics of nonviolence which instead of focusing on “individual morality” seeks 
to “take the lead in waging a critique of individualism as the basis of ethics and politics alike” and 
define “a social philosophy of living and sustainable bonds”. This can be described in a number of 
ways as a rejection of purist conceptions of nonviolence, most notably in its direct rejection of 
individualism – a central part of purity politics (Shotwell, 2016, 8-9)  – but also because a focus on 
“bonds” between people must entail not only the well-intentioned bonds of care and love, but also 
bonds of exploitation, dependence, hierarchies, and so on. This leads to a definition of nonviolence 
not as a: 
moral position adopted by individuals in relation to a field of possible action [but] as a social 
and political practice undertaken in concert, culminating in a form of resistance to systemic 
forms of destruction coupled with a commitment to world building that honors global 
interdependency of the kind that embodies ideals of economic, social and political freedom 
and equality (Butler, 2020, 20-21).  
In a further move away from purist ideas of nonviolence, Butler (2020, 22-23) argues in the 
book that “nonviolence is an ideal that cannot always be fully honored in the practice” and that 
“there is no practice of nonviolence that does not negotiate fundamental ethical and political 
ambiguities, which means that ‘nonviolence’ is not an absolute principle, but the name of an 
ongoing struggle”.  
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Closing remarks 
The section discussing definitional strategies provides an overview of different ways that theorists 
have tried to get around the difficulty of defining the concept of nonviolence. The aim has not been 
to argue that nonviolent resistance is, in fact, easily definable, and that the literature fails by not 
doing so. It is rather an argument that this difficulty of definition - and the various methods 
employed to still conceptualise, or define, nonviolence - is an important part of understanding the 
field of nonviolence literature, as well as the practice of nonviolence. In keeping with the anti-
naturalist approach of this project’s conceptualisation of nonviolence, it is also an argument that 
this “empirical diversity” is not “an obstacle to concept formation, but on the contrary, a 
fundamental aspect of social reality” (Bevir and Kedar, 2008, 508) which creates a task for 
nonviolence theory of reflecting this diversity rather than attempting to overcome it with an all-
encompassing definition. The vague definitions and the blurry line(s) between violence and 
nonviolence are an important part of nonviolence as such. Another argument in this literature 
review is that even when definitions are acknowledged to be limited working definitions, they often 
operate with an assumption of some common reference point which is understood by readers, 
whether that is the concept of nonviolence, or that of violence. The assumption that this reference 
point is universally agreed on and understood, even if impossible to put into so many words, is not 
realistic - and in the case of the concept of violence, this will be further illustrated in Chapter Four. 
Hence, this unclarity, this lack of agreement or a clear definition, is important in some sense, and 
has real impact on both the study and practice of nonviolence. That ambiguity, and the result of 
either acknowledging and discussing this, or ignoring it, is the overall theme of this thesis. The 
argument is that it is important to pay attention to the ambiguity, and to whether and how 
discussions of this take place.     
How and why nonviolence works 
While the previous section on definitions and conceptualisations of nonviolence has introduced - to 
some extent - what nonviolence is, an important part of understanding nonviolent resistance, and 
the literature about it, is to understand how nonviolence works, and why it works well. Already in 
1968, Stiehm (1968, 26) posed questions about this, arguing that since strategic nonviolence “bases 
its claim to support on its effectiveness in producing results at least the equivalent of those which 
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would have been produced by the use of violence, it has the responsibility of proving its claim”. This 
proof could be provided either by showing statistically that nonviolent resistance campaigns have 
historically been as successful or more successful than violent ones (as done notably by Chenoweth 
and Stephan, 2011), or through a “well developed explanatory theory” (Stiehm, 1968, 26-27), that 
is, the mechanisms that cause nonviolent resistance to be effective.  
This next section will introduce the main answers to this second question which are: 
nonviolence works better than violence because it allows for more (and more diverse) people to 
participate; nonviolence works better than violence because the of the wide range of tactics within 
nonviolent resistance; and nonviolence works well because repression of nonviolent campaigns has 
a high chance of working in the campaign’s favour rather than in their opponent’s. In different ways, 
each of these arguments will be addressed and discussed further in each of the issue chapters of 
this thesis. Chapter Five is specifically about the role of regime repression, and the so-called backfire 
technique, and will examine potential problems and pitfalls in relying on this mechanism without 
criticism. Chapter Six and 7 will discuss, each in their own way, whether nonviolent campaigns are 
as inclusive and open to broad participation as they are seen to be, and what can potentially be 
done to improve accessibility and actively work against entrenched systems of violence, repression, 
and domination.  
Greater participation 
Nonviolence literature argues that nonviolent campaigns invite and allow for significantly greater 
numbers and more diverse participation than violent resistance does (Chenoweth and Stephan, 
2011, 32-33; Martin, 2015, 160). This is important to the relative effectiveness of nonviolent 
campaigns, both as a major difference in itself (although “numbers alone do not guarantee victory 
in resistance campaigns”), and also as the foundation for a number of other dynamics within 
nonviolent movements that make them more effective than violent ones (Chenoweth and Stephan, 
2011, 30, 39). 
Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 30, 34) argue that this difference in participation is because 
violent struggle presents physical, informational, and moral barriers to participation, meaning that 
the main actors in violent campaigns will be young, able-bodied men. In contrast, nonviolent 
campaigns are open to, and dependent on the participation of “women, men, children, youth, 
adults, elders, and people from diverse sectors of society” (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 340; Chenoweth 
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and Stephan, 2011, 10, 34). However, this claim does have a limitation in that participation in a 
violent campaign is by the authors only counted as active fighters in a campaign, whereas actions 
such as “providing sanctuary, food, and supplies to guerrillas, raising funds, communicating 
messages, acting as informants, or refusing to cooperate with government attempts to apprehend 
insurgents” are all excluded from the count of participants of the insurgency (Chenoweth and 
Stephan, 2011, 31). These higher and widened participation levels increase the chance of success 
through mechanisms such as “enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical innovation, 
expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), 
and loyalty shifts involving the opponent’s erstwhile supporters, including members of the security 
forces” (ibid, 10). It is emphasised that especially women and elders can participate more easily in 
nonviolent campaigns than violent ones (ibid, 35), an argument which is especially relevant to the 
discussion of the participation argument in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
The phrasing of “informational difficulties” refers to the fact that although there is an 
element of secrecy to both nonviolent and violent campaigns, nonviolent campaigns are able to 
publicise their activities to a larger extent than violent ones, and that this publicity is essential to 
recruitment (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 35). Chenoweth and Stephan (ibid, 36) argue that apart 
from simply an increased ease of information about how to join or support a movement, increased 
visibility can also lead to a different perception of risk, which will be seen as lower in a more visible 
resistance movement.    
Moral barriers, meanwhile, are lower for participating in nonviolent campaigns than violent 
ones according to nonviolence research, because the use of direct violence to defeat a political 
opponent is a “moral dimension” in itself, even within complicated moral questions of political 
conflict (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 37). Because a certain part of the population will be against 
the use of violence, they will often choose not to support a violent campaign, even if they support 
their aims, whereas a nonviolent campaign “can potentially mobilize the entire aggrieved 
population without the need to face moral barriers” (ibid). What is not addressed here in terms of 
participation and moral barriers is whether a purist nonviolent campaign which would refuse 
supporters of violent methods an active or significant role in the nonviolent movement would 
present a different kind of moral barrier to participation – that of passing the purity test for 
membership, so to speak.   
Chapter Two: Nonviolence Literature Review  
- 44 - 
 
The two mechanisms of greater participation and a wider range of tactics are connected in 
a positive feedback loop. That is, the wider range of nonviolent tactics is a central reason for the 
lower physical barriers which allow for greater participation, since these tactics range in their level 
of risk, required physical endurance, etc. (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 35). At the same time, the 
authors (ibid, 40) argue that through greater participation will increase tactical innovation, which 
further expands the range of strategies available to a campaign. Resilience and longevity are two 
further mechanisms that are stronger in a resistance movement if participation is larger, and 
therefore where nonviolent campaigns have an advantage (ibid, 57-58).     
Finally, the literature argues that nonviolent campaigns are open to participation by people 
with different levels of commitment, because of the wider range of tactics, whereas participation in 
a violent campaign will typically require a high level of commitment for training, as well as the risks 
associated with armed struggle (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 37). This argument does however 
seem to ignore the forms of support for a violent insurgency - such as providing food and shelter, 
or refusing to cooperate with authorities looking for insurgents - referenced above, which are not 
seen as being a way to participate in violent campaigns in the NAVCO dataset (ibid, 31).  
Greater participation adds to the success of nonviolent resistance in a number of other ways. 
Among these are the argument that loyalty shifts among regime supporters are more likely when 
the resistance to the regime is through “mass noncooperation”, because, it is argued, “most people 
want to survive and to be on the winning side of a conflict” (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 220). 
This mechanism also includes the likelihood of successful negotiations with opponent elites, even if 
these elites do not fully defect, since nonviolent protesters “are more likely to appear as credible 
negotiating partners than are violent insurgents, thereby increasing the chance of winning 
concessions” (ibid, 11). Although it could certainly be questioned by which standards resistance 
movements are seen as credible or not credible depending on their use of violent methods, when 
the opposing side judging this “credibility” is often a highly repressive and wrongfully violent regime, 
the analysis in nonviolence literature does not critique this process, thereby confirming in a sense 
that nonviolent resisters simply are more credible. Further, the backfire effect of repression is more 
likely to work, the greater the number of participants is in a resistance campaign (ibid, 220). The 
larger civilian participation a campaign has, the more likely the campaign is to attract international 
support, and for their opponent to lose it, another factor which can contribute to the success of a 
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campaign (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 220-221; Martin, 2015, 160). This creates a potential for 
further complicating the role that violence plays in nonviolent resistance, since, as Stiehm (1968, 
26) points out, “it is not clear that the use of force by others on one’s behalf is renounced since the 
resisters frequently call for police or judicial intervention, or warn that others may be tempted to 
riot if their demands are not met”. This question of the potential role of violence can also be 
extended to the role of violent international interventions in support of nonviolent resistance 
campaigns. However, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 10) state at the same time that while 
nonviolent campaigns are more likely to gain external allies because of their greater numbers, 
nonviolent campaigns are also less likely to depend strongly on this external support, again because 
of their greater participation.     
Diversity of tactics 
A part of the growth of the field of nonviolence literature has been the growth in the number of 
nonviolent tactics described; these are typically described as tactics not available to armed 
campaigns (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 11). This diversity of tactics is, as shown above, another 
central argument for why nonviolent resistance works, and is more effective than violent resistance. 
This has led not only to longs lists of different nonviolent tactics, but also the development of 
different categories of nonviolent resistance (e.g. Bartkowski ed, 2013, 15-19).  
On the relation between greater participation and greater diversity of tactics, Chenoweth 
and Stephan (2011, 56) argue that “tactical innovation occurs on the fringes of a movement” and 
therefore, campaigns with greater participation “and consequently wider margins, are more likely 
to produce tactical innovations”. However, this argument does require that the “fringes” of a 
movement has, or achieves, a degree of influence on strategic planning and decisions in order to 
actually be able to contribute their innovation. This is not a given, and is, to some extent, further 
discussed in Chapters 6 and 7. 
A further assumption within this argument which is worth noting is that this diverse range 
of nonviolent tactics are available exclusively, or most effectively, for purely nonviolent campaigns, 
rather than also tactics a violent insurgency could employ. For example, Satha-Anand (2015, 297) 
demonstrates this, writing that “a committed adherence to nonviolent struggle will also enhance 
the strategists’ ability to optimize the complete range of available nonviolent alternatives”. 
However, it is not explained why that is, and why a partly violent campaign would not be able to 
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make full use of some nonviolent tactics as well.   
A slightly different version of this division between violent campaigns as comprising almost 
exclusively of violent fighting, and nonviolent campaigns as being made up of a number of different 
tactics that share a lack of the direct use of violence, is the view that if any nonviolent tactics were 
used in a resistance movement, then this is an indication that a separate “nonviolent campaign” 
took place, underneath or alongside a violent one, rather than those tactics being an indication that 
a violent campaign may encompass a wide range of tactics as well, such as community building, 
education, etc. An example of this is the book on nonviolent independence struggles by Bartkowski 
(ed, 2013), which traces this history also in countries and struggles in which the dominant (or for 
the authors seemingly dominant) mode of struggle was armed (e.g. Bartkowski ed, 2013, 9-10 on 
Mozambique and Algeria). Another example of this assumption is the narrative of the nonviolent 
resistance to the Nazi invasion in Norway during the Second World War, which is used as an example 
of nonviolent civilian resistance to foreign occupation, or civilian defence (e.g. Benjamin, 1973, 198; 
Wehr, 1984). However, as Norwegian historian Magne Skodvin (quoted in Benjamin, 1973, 205) 
pointed out, “non-violent resistance was, at least in part, simply the most viable form of struggle for 
those who had no opportunity to use arms and had to find other ways of fighting the enemy”, and 
the Norwegian resistance consisted of violent and nonviolent resistance running parallel, with both 
being significant (Gilmour and Stephenson, 2013, 92-94). Thus, the Norwegian resistance movement 
is arguably a strong example of how violent campaigns can very well incorporate nonviolent tactics 
as part of their resistance, rather than an example of the strength of nonviolent resistance as 
opposed to violence.  
Similarly, if a campaign is widely seen as nonviolent - through using mainly nonviolent 
methods most of the time - Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 12) claim that any existence of violence 
or violent groups is then because “members of fringe groups … are acting independently, or in 
defiance of, the central leadership; or they are agent provocateurs used by the adversary to provoke 
the unarmed resistance to adopt violence”. Although the existence of so-called ‘mixed’ conflicts, in 
which “nonviolent and violent campaigns exist simultaneously among competing groups” is 
acknowledged (Bartkowski ed,2013; Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 12), again, this is viewed as a 
mix of nonviolent and violent conflict, rather than some of these tactics being also just part of violent 
conflict, or one single campaign being both violent and nonviolent (i.e., lacking a clear-cut division). 
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The following chapter of this thesis, on the history of nonviolence, will challenge this assumption 
through the case of the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa. Presbey (2006, 147), who writes 
about the South African struggle, critiques this division as well, arguing that many of the 
mechanisms which are said to make nonviolence such an effective strategy - such as noncooperation 
- could feasibly work equally well with the inclusion of violence, even for a campaign with inferior 
means of armed struggle to their opponent. They write that “it seems the crucial point here is not 
that the means chosen be nonviolent ones, but simply that the millions do something (anything) to 
noncooperate rather than cooperate” (ibid).  
Backfire effect 
The final central mechanism in the effectiveness of nonviolent campaigns is that of regime 
repression backfiring, a phenomenon which has been known by a number of terms within 
nonviolence literature. The argument is, simply, that if a nonviolent campaign is met with violent 
repression, then it may not defeat the resistance, but rather work against the regime or opponent 
instead (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 11, 226). This is in part determined by how well the 
resistance campaign responds to and makes use of the violence aimed at its participants 
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 226; Martin, 2015, 154). Given the prominence that this particular 
dynamic is often given when explaining the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance, it is perhaps 
contradictory that nonviolent resistance is at the same time promoted as entailing considerably less 
risk for participants than armed struggle (for example Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 38).  
The idea of the backfire dynamic lies at the centre of one of the main differences outlined 
between principled and strategic nonviolence - that of conversion and coercion. While the first 
versions of this dynamic, the concept of self-sacrifice, was a highly purist and religious idea of 
convincing an opponent of their wrong through stoic voluntary suffering at their hands (Isserman, 
1986, 47; Stiehm, 1968, 24), more recent discussions of the dynamic focus on increasing leverage 
to coerce an opponent through an increase in support by making good strategic decisions in the 
aftermath of violent repression of a campaign (e.g. Martin, 2015, 154). The backfiring may have the 
effect of creating stronger support - a central goal for resistance struggles - for a campaign within 
the general population, amongst external actors such as other countries, or by leading to loyalty 
shifts within the regime’s own ranks (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 50, 220; Martin, 2015, 160). 
An important, and arguably problematic, part of this argument is that repression backfire will only, 
Chapter Two: Nonviolence Literature Review  
- 48 - 
 
or much more likely, work if a resistance campaign is nonviolent (and does not react with violence 
to the repression) than if it is violent, because violence against violent campaigns is (more) justifiable 
(Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 50-51; Martin, 2015, 160).  
Conclusion 
The literature review chapter has provided an overview of the history and main arguments of 
nonviolence literature. The following chapter will, in turn, give an overview of three nonviolent 
resistance campaigns which are part of the history of nonviolent resistance, focusing especially on 
important parts of a popular narrative of nonviolent resistance. As shown throughout this thesis, 
these two components – the research literature and the popular history – are highly influential in 
shaping present-day and recent nonviolent movements in their symbolism, framing of narrative, 
strategic choices, mobilisation methods, and so on.  
The literature review argued firstly that it is important to understand the fundamental role 
that observation-based and naturalist methodologies hold within the field of nonviolent resistance. 
That is, the concepts, categories, and arguments within the field are overwhelmingly based on 
observations of concrete examples, with relatively little theoretical or conceptual analysis on its 
own, and characterised by an aim of articulating regularities and dynamics that cross temporal and 
cultural boundaries. An important effect of this is that concepts and definitional lines tend to be 
based on clear cases, rather than more ambiguous ones, and this means that the grey areas of 
concepts and definitional lines are often overlooked or only briefly mentioned. Further, the chapter 
argued that it is important to take note of the context of a given campaign, despite a tendency for 
nonviolent resistance to be viewed as a comparable unit of analysis across different times and 
contexts. A clear example of this is the use of nonviolence theory derived from anti-authoritarian 
campaigns in liberal democracies without considering fully the fact that there are aspects and 
mechanisms that will not work the same against a government which holds democratic legitimacy 
and wide-spread public support.  
After this, the two strands of principled and strategic nonviolence were defined and 
discussed. While there are clear differences between the two approaches, the literature review also 
covered arguments that the two strands cannot be fully separated – that principles and normative 
preferences will have an effect on strategic deliberations and that even the most principled 
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movement will also be making choices with an eye on strategy – and that for the purposes of this 
thesis topic, they do not need to be kept strictly separate. This is because the argument that violence 
and violence definitions affect nonviolence applies to both principled and strategic nonviolence, 
although it will at times be emphasised that they will affect nonviolence in different ways, 
depending on whether principles or strategy is the overriding concern.  
The literature review does not attempt to arrive at one overriding definition or conception 
of nonviolent resistance; this is based on the argument that the literature on nonviolent resistance 
does not allow an overall definition which will encompass the range of campaigns and literature, 
while at the same time not being so vague that it means almost nothing. It is also based on the 
argument that the concept of nonviolent resistance is inherently complex, blurry, and multi-
dimensional. Instead, the literature review approaches the question of definition by providing an 
overview of the range of definitions, and importantly, the definitional strategies employed in the 
literature. These strategies provide a better understanding of not only the different definitions and 
conceptions of nonviolence, but also of the approach and methodology of the research, which is an 
important aspect of understanding the field.  
Finally, this chapter provides a brief overview of the main mechanisms that make nonviolent 
resistance effective and sometimes successful. The basis of all these is an ability to mobilise more 
and more diverse participants in a nonviolent campaign, compared to violent uprisings. While this 
is an advantage simply in terms of numbers, the greater participation also allows for a more diverse 
range of tactics and can help strengthen the backfire effect. While the backfire effect is the subject 
of the first of this thesis’ “issue” chapters, which discusses in depth the impact that violence against 
protesters can have, the participation argument is also discussed in further chapters. In this way, 
this project seeks to add to present nonviolence theory and understanding by demonstrating ways 
in which access to participation is limited for certain people and arguing that if this were to be 
addressed and access improved, this would further strengthen a major dynamic of nonviolent 
resistance.   
The following chapter will discuss the history of nonviolent resistance, in particular a certain 
popular narrative of this which tends to be centred around leaders of movements and often purist 
framings of the movements as clearly and uncomplicatedly nonviolent. While this history of course 
raises its own questions around the relationship between violence and nonviolent resistance, some 
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of the tensions and issues that spring from the literature review will also appear again. This is 
important in part because it is both the stories told of past and great nonviolent movements, and 
recent research on nonviolent resistance techniques and dynamics, which influence movement 
choices and collective identities shaped around the labelling of one’s movement as “nonviolent”.  
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Chapter Three: The History of Nonviolence 
In May 2016, the global climate grassroots movement 350.org launched a campaign named Break 
Free, aimed at financial organisations that invest in fossil fuels. Break Free was specifically named a 
“nonviolent direct action”, and the nonviolent aspect was heavily emphasised in materials published 
both before and after the event (350 Christchurch, 2016). As 350.org stated in a press release, the 
planned actions were “[i]nspired by the peaceful civil-disobedience of Te Whiti o Rongomai, Martin 
Luther King Jr, Gandhi and Rosa Parks” (350 Aotearoa, 2016a). A blog post by 350 Aotearoa 
reiterated this narrative of being part of a long and coherent tradition of nonviolent protesting, 
quoting blockades such as the 1981 Springbok Tour protest in Hamilton and the 1964 sit-in in San 
Francisco by the US civil rights movement as inspirations for the planned blockades of ANZ banks in 
New Zealand, and argued that these protests “always … go down in history as being just and 
necessary, despite the complaints of people at the time” (350 Aotearoa, 2016b). The blog post 
claimed that Break Free 2016 “has been deemed the largest global civil disobedience that has ever 
occurred against fossil fuels”, and that each action that was part of the campaign “was informed by 
the decades of prior civil disobedience that shaped the history of social justice. Break Free 
represents one of the many successful legacies of historical civil disobedience campaigns” (350 
Aotearoa, 2016b).   
The Break Free campaign is only one out of a growing number of campaigns throughout the 
world that are specifically labelled as “nonviolent”. This particular trend illustrates a narrative of a 
long and coherent tradition of nonviolence, in which nonviolence is assumed to be an unproblematic 
and easily defined term. Following this it can also be assumed that nonviolent campaigns can be 
undertaken following a checklist of actions which is transferred from one context to another without 
much thought or reflection. An illustrative example of this is provided by Rev. John Dear, a staff 
member at Campaign Nonviolence. In Waging Nonviolence, an important online resource for 
nonviolent and social justice activism, Dear describes a 2018 week of action carried out by Campaign 
Nonviolence (Dear, 2018). Dear writes of one particular action, in which he participated and “risked 
arrest” as a “modest, Gandhian campaign”, with influences also of “Kingian nonviolence” (ibid). 
During the march, Dear describes how: 
[w]e lined up two by two, and walked off in silence. At the Lincoln Memorial, we knelt down 
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in silence for a minute, as King did during the Birmingham marches … Each one of us held a 
blue sign with a quote by Gandhi or King, and we called out, ‘Abolish war, poverty, racism, 
nuclear weapons and environmental destruction! We want a culture of nonviolence!’ (Dear, 
2018)  
What a “culture of nonviolence” would mean is left very vague, with the strongest focal 
points being exactly the figures of Gandhi and King, rather than specific aims or goals for the action 
in question. This illustrates well how this narrative of nonviolence sees nonviolence as a unifying 
principle in and of itself, of both people and causes. In this framing, nonviolent resistance becomes 
not simply a specific choice of which resistance tactics to not use (violent ones), but also “a site of 
the repeated performance of a specific activist identity” (Sommier et al., 2019, 243).  
The importance of narrative is a recurring theme in this chapter’s treatment of the 
independence movement in India, the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, and the civil rights 
movement in the US, as narratives become important to “make sense of” experiences (Farmer, 
2011, 40). The march illustrates the performative aspect of the narrative, i.e. the idea that 
nonviolence can be copied and performed. However, even the idea of “copying” can be complicated 
by a focus on narrative processes, because the perception of what is copied is not necessarily 
universal or objective. As Farmer (ibid, 41) argues, “the world does not narrate itself to me. Rather, 
I narrate the world”. At the end of the March, Dear describes how the protesters  
had crossed the line into the no-protest zone. The police eventually approached, cleared an 
area around us on the sidewalk, and told us we would soon be arrested if we did not 
disperse. We thanked them and stayed put. So began our stand off, or our stand for peace. 
Nearly two hours later, we were still there, and realized that, in fact, the police were not 
going to arrest us. We ended our witness, gathered in a circle for a closing prayer, and 
promised one another to keep building up this movement of nonviolent resistance (Dear, 
2018)  
What this particular story of “risking arrest” - or arguably of trying to be arrested but failing 
to be -  also illustrates, is the issue with taking actions from one context to another without thinking 
about how the different contexts might affect the outcome. The situation of trying to provoke an 
arrest, in order to demonstrate a conflict and a sense of resistance, with police or security personnel 
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realising the potential value of simply letting the protesters be, is not unknown (Wight, 2013). 
However, actions such as this, or the comparisons in the Break Free campaign to actions that 
presented a significantly higher risk to protesters1, still occur. The narrative is, however, that 
“nonviolent struggles” are carried on through this performative idea of “Gandhian”, “Kingian” etc. 
nonviolence.    
The special status that the independence movement in India, the anti-apartheid movement 
in South Africa, and the civil rights struggle in the US hold in popular narratives and imagination of 
a unified and coherent history and practice of nonviolence is the reason why this chapter focuses 
on those three. Further, since they are often seen as almost defined by the leaders, Mahatma 
Gandhi, Nelson Mandela, and Martin Luther King, Jr., these three characters are central to the 
history laid out in the chapter. While this chapter will question and nuance some of the assumptions 
of coherence and universal applicability which are often made about these three movements, they 
are, of course, connected in different ways. For example, according to Fredrickson (1995, 225-226), 
the three nonviolent cases covered here – anti-colonial struggle in India under Gandhi, anti-
apartheid struggle in South Africa under Nelson Mandela and civil rights struggles in the US under 
Martin Luther King, Jr. – have in common an anti-colonial outlook. Fredrickson argues that for the 
black protesters in the US and South Africa during the 1940s and 1950s, “nonviolence was not 
merely a set of abstract propositions and possibilities; it was also a form of resistance against white 
or European domination” (ibid, 226), in the same way that Gandhi’s nonviolence was not merely an 
idea of nonviolence being morally or practically superior, but also a meaningful way to resist British 
thinking and norms in and of itself. Further, the cases are at times directly connected through central 
actors learning from each other, or commenting on each other, such as when King spoke against the 
choice of embracing violent struggle in South Africa (Presbey, 2006, 159); however, the movements 
in South Africa and the US were also connected through arguments for violent resistance, since 
some of the influential voices from the US in South Africa “were voices which advocated violence” 
(Presbey, 2006, 159).  
 
1 When discussing the risk of certain actions, it is important to be aware that the risk will often vary for different 
protesters, even at the same action. Thus, when arguing that Break Free actions in Aotearoa New Zealand are low-risk 
because of the culture of policing there, this does not account for the massively heightened risk of arrest that the Māori 
population, as well as other communities of colour, faces. This is, however, still a less repressive and violent situation 
than that of an authoritarian regime or the British colonial power in India. These different levels of risk and their 
implications for nonviolent resistance are discussed at more length in later chapters of this thesis.   
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This chapter will start by providing a brief overview of each struggle, centred around its 
perceived central protagonist. After this, it will show and discuss different ways in which both a 
pragmatism of methods, and violence, played a role in these movements, followed by a discussion 
of two other possible themes that can be drawn out from these histories: that of charismatic 
leadership or “lone male hero” of nonviolence, and the tension between specificity and 
universalism. Finally, a conclusion will draw together the arguments of the chapter and point to 
where these will be explored more fully in the rest of the thesis.  
Mahatma Gandhi and the anti-colonial struggle in India 
Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, or Mahatma Gandhi, remains a hugely important figure and 
popular cultural reference point in the area of nonviolence. Gandhi takes his place in the narrative 
mainly through his leading role in the Indian independence movement against British colonial rule 
and for his many writings on the topic of nonviolent resistance (Baldoli, 2019, 4; Chakrabarty, 2006, 
75; Martin, 2015, 147; Terchek, 2000, 1). He is associated with a strong image as an icon “sitting 
beside a spinning wheel pouring scorn on science and modernity” conveying simple, universal truths 
about a better way of life (Mishra, 2018; Shillam, 2018), used in popular culture, on T-shirts, 
anarchist imagery, and in advertisements. Gandhi is credited as both an influential advocate of the 
moral reasons for choosing nonviolence, as well as with building the strategic thinking about it by 
taking spontaneous, untrained nonviolent resistance and turning it into a highly disciplined method 
of struggle (Fredrickson, 1995, 227-228; Martin, 2015,147). However, as Gandhi was a highly 
unsystematic writer, and as uncertainty remains about his exact practices, his conception of 
nonviolence is not clear and can be misunderstood (Baldoli, 2019, 2, 4) 
Gandhi started to develop his theory and practice of nonviolent resistance while living in 
another British colony, South Africa, between 1893 and 1914 (McLaughlan, 2016, 431). While 
practicing as a lawyer in South Africa, he witnessed the inequality and oppression that the Indian 
population there was placed under, and this had a “radicalising effect” on him (ibid). During this 
period Gandhi wrote Hind Swaraj, a key work in nonviolence literature and the first time that Gandhi 
presented his theory of an alternative to violent resistance to British colonial rule (ibid, 432). This 
theory would later be extensively elaborated on in various other writings, largely Indian newspapers 
(Gandhi, 2007/1909, 111; Martin, 2015, 147).  
Chapter Three: The History of Nonviolence 
- 55 - 
 
The central concept in Gandhi’s thinking is satyagraha, which has become an important idea 
in the nonviolence literature. Satyagraha translates roughly to “truth force” or “soul force” (Gandhi 
and Parel, 1997, 85; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 17; Terchek, 2000, 180) and uses the power of 
numbers to withdraw consent to be governed (Gandhi and Parel, 1997, 85, 94). When Gandhi was 
first developing his theories in South Africa, he referred to this as “passive resistance” instead of the 
later satyagraha. He defines it as: 
a method of securing rights by personal suffering; it is the reverse of resistance by arms. 
When I refuse to do a thing that is repugnant to my conscience, I use soul-force. For instance, 
the government of the day has passed a law which is applicable to me. I do not like it. If, by 
using violence, I force the government to repeal the law, I am employing what may be 
termed body-force. If I do not obey the law, and accept my penalty for its breach, I use soul-
force. It involves sacrifice of self (Gandhi and Parel, 1997, 90).  
The importance of the concept of personal suffering is emphasised in this quote, and is one 
that will be explored in different parts of this thesis as an important aspect of Gandhi’s nonviolence, 
as well as later developments of the concept.  
In 1914, Gandhi left South Africa after “limited” success there to return to India, where he 
was already a well known figure (Parekh, 1997, 6). He was returning to India with a plan ready for 
the “regeneration” of the country through nonviolent means. At this time, he was still maintaining 
his support for the British empire, and so independence was not part of this plan (Baldoli, 2019, 9-
10; Parekh, 1997, 6). Upon arrival in India, Gandhi travelled throughout the country to listen to the 
concerns of the population, and concluded from this that the people wanted better representation 
and a less oppressive colonial rule (Sharma, 2013, 72-73). During the next few years, Gandhi listened 
to the concerns and hopes of the population, built a team of helpers, developed further his strategy 
for mobilisation, and solidifed his status as a national leader and a symbol of a different way of life 
built on the revival of “Indian civilisation” ( Parekh, 1997, 7). In 1919, after the passing of further 
restrictive laws banning “revolutionary conspiracies”, Gandhi launched his first national satyagraha, 
however, the campaign suffered from instances of violence, leading Gandhi to cancel the campaign 
again (Parekh, 1997, 12).  
In 1919, a large group of protesters in Amritsar were shot at by police while in a confined 
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square and it soon emerged that many protesters were shot while trying to run away (Presbey, 
2006, 153). The event became an embarrasment for Britain, since the British commander at 
Amritsar could not provide justification for why the soldiers kept shooting at defenseless protesters 
who were trying to escape (ibid). It was also the defining factor in Gandhi’s decision to seek full 
Indian independence, although he did not formally call for this for another 11 years (Sharma, 2013, 
73). Although the Amritsar massacre was horrifying and led to the death of  nearly 400 protesters 
and over 1000 wounded (Gandhi, 1970, 188), this did not decrease support for nonviolence within 
the movement, or in Gandhi (Presbey, 2006, 153). Rather, Gandhi used the massacre to emphasise 
the importance of training and discipline, writing: 
If the message of non-violence had reached [the protesters], they would have been expected 
when fire was opened on them to march towards it with bare breasts and die rejoicing in 
the belief that it meant the freedom of their country ... We played into General Dyer’s hands 
because we acted as he had expected. He wanted us to run away from his fire, he wanted 
us to crawl on our bellies and to draw lines with our noses ... The might of the tyrant recoils 
upon himself when it meets with no response (quoted in Presbey, 2006, 154).  
Gandhi was, as Presbey (2006, 154) also argues, asking “an enormous amount” of the 
protesters by declaring that they should simply walk towards soldiers shooting into the crowd. But 
the theme of strengthening one’s mind and body to be able to practice satyagraha is one that 
Gandhi discusses several times, and this discussion is therefore an example of a wider theme in 
Gandhi’s conception of nonviolence (see for example Gandhi and Parel, 1997, 96).  
In 1920, Gandhi launched a “Non-cooperation Movement” which lasted for about two years, 
based on the idea of taking power away from the colonial state by simply refusing to cooperate with 
it (Parekh, 1997, 12). In March 1922, Gandhi was arrested and put on trial for his leadership of the 
movement. During the trial, he demonstrated a central part of nonviolent civil disobedience, by 
pleading guilty to the charge, but using the trial to put forward political arguments for why the 
disobedience was justified and necessary (ibid, 13). Although the British judge was “deeply moved” 
by the arguments, Gandhi was nevertheless sentenced to six years in prison, but was released early 
due to his health (ibid). Although the Non-cooperation Movement did not last long, it raised support 
for the goal of political independence and drew a large number of Indians into the resistance 
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movement (ibid, 14). From the mid-1920s, political unrest and violence were both growing in India, 
and Gandhi, concerned about this, thought that civil disobedience would be necessary to stop the 
unrest and to prevent an armed rebellion. It was this set of circumstances that led him to launch his 
campaign against the establishment of a tax on salt in India (ibid, 15).   
The “Salt March” of 1930 would become the most famous of Gandhi’s campaigns in India. It 
was a protest march intended to challenge British laws which gave the colonial rulers a monopoly 
on salt production (Martin, 2015, 147-148). The thoroughly planned march lasted for 24 days, with 
the aim of mobilising supporters and securing media attention along the way, and ended with an 
act of civil disobedience – the production of sea salt – as well as an attempt to enter a salt 
manufacturing facility in Dharasana (Martin, 2015, 148, 151). Gandhi and several other protesters 
were arrested while trying to produce salt, while the march on the salt factory was “a classic 
confrontation between peceful protesters and armed police”, as the protesters walked calmly 
towards the entrance while being beaten by police trying to block them (Martin, 2015, 148). The 
protest and violence at Dharasana also clearly demonstrates one of the ways discussed in this thesis 
in which violence plays a role in nonviolent protesting, through the potential for backfire effect 
(Martin, 2015, 149). Although the event immediately seemed to be a victory for the police, since 
the action had to be called off due to the number of injured protesters, the action mobilised a great 
deal of new support for the Indian independence movement both domestically and internationally, 
and unified the movement within India (Martin, 2015, 148).  
In 1934 Gandhi left the Indian National Congress Party after leading it since the 1920s in 
order to focus on more community- and grassroots-focused activities such as village economics, 
“communal unity, hand spinning, weaving, and the abolition of untouchabiity as prerequisites for 
independence” (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 167; Sharma, 2013, 85; Wolpert, 2001, 252). Despite 
the importance that Gandhi assigned to these issues and strategies as part of satyagraha, the more 
“commonly known” tactics of direct, confrontational civil disobedience continue to be more well-
known and emulated (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 17). India became independent from the British 
empire in August 1947, amidst growing violence between communities in the country (Wolpert, 
2001, 344). During the last years of his life, Gandhi struggled with the increasing occurrence of 
violence in India, and the aftermath of the partition of the country (Sharma, 2013, 94; Wolpert, 
2002, 21). Gandhi embarked on a fast and a pilgrimage to the northern regions where the violence 
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was worst, to listen to people’s concerns, but also to argue against partition and nationalism 
(Sharma, 2013, 94-97; Wolpert, 2002, 342). Gandhi was assassinated on the 30th of January 1948, 
after increasing violence in India, as well as increasing threats against Gandhi himself (Sharma, 2013, 
97). He left behind an image and legacy as India’s Mahatma, “Great Soul”, and as one of the 
founding figures of the tradition of nonviolent resistance (Chakrabarty, 2006, 75; Martin, 2015, 147; 
Terchek, 2000, 1; Wolpert, 2002, 18). 
Nelson Mandela and the anti-apartheid struggle 
The South African anti-apartheid struggle is an important example for nonviolent movements and 
theory, with Nelson Mandela and Desmond Tutu in particular standing out as two heroes of 
nonviolence in popular narratives. While the long struggle for political freedom in South Africa used 
a wide range of tactics, including violent ones (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 15), it is nevertheless 
used by a number of nonviolent movements as an example of their inspiration for nonviolence (e.g. 
Extinction Rebellion UK, 2020). Nelson Mandela is known for his leading role in both the African 
National Congress (ANC) and their armed wing Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), and becoming the first 
democratically elected President of South Africa in 1994 (Boehmer, 2008, 10, 45, 53) . Desmond 
Tutu is known for his involvement with the ANC, and especially for his leading role in South Africa’s 
Truth and Reconcilliation Commission, established in 1996 (Chasi, 2018, 232-233).  
Further, the occurrence of some violent struggle has made the anti-apartheid struggle 
central to nonviolence theory as an important point of debate, with a number of arguments all 
centred around the line between violent and nonviolent campaigns. Examples of these include 
arguments that even limited violence undermines the effectiveness of nonviolent resistance 
(Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 151; Zunes, 1999, 139-140); that violence and nonviolence can at 
times work together and strengthen one another, or can simply be nearly impossible to distinguish 
(Seidman, 2000; Presbey, 2006); and that South Africa was simply “nonviolent enough” to count as 
a nonviolent campaign because the struggle was principally nonviolent, and the violence used 
mainly “symbolic” (Presbey, 2006, 141; Steele to Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 168). This final 
argument echoes a definition of nonviolent struggle as struggles that are mainly nonviolent, and 
where violent factions are principally symbols of resistance, put forward by Chenoweth and Stephan 
(2011, 4).  
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The anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa is also featured as an example of nonviolent 
campaigns in some of the nonviolence literature, including by Ackerman and DuVal’s A Force More 
Powerful (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 22), and Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011, 79, 234-235) 
Why Civil Resistance Works, in which they class the anti-apartheid struggle as two separate 
nonviolent campaigns, from the 1950s to the 1960s, and from 1984-1994. However, in the present 
discussion the entire struggle is seen as one campaign, which combined violent and nonviolent 
methods at different times, but which nonetheless is clearly influential to thinking about nonviolent 
history and methods, and therefore appropriate in this chapter and thesis.   
In 1948, the Afrikaner Nationalist party won the election, and their government started to 
establish the apartheid system, a “grand design” for South African society to separate the country’s 
citizens according to race and maintain white supremacy in the country (Fredrickson, 1995, 244). 
This meant that although the situation for Black South Africans had already been one of economic 
and legal inequality, the situation was growing worse (Fredrickson, 1995, 237-238). During the 
1940s and early 1950s support for mass nonviolent action for racial justice grew in South Africa and 
became the prime mode of struggle against apartheid in an attempt “to imitate Gandhi’s success in 
India” (Fredrickson, 1995, 237; Seidman, 2000, 162). While the 1950s were then dominated by the 
occurrence of classic nonviolent actions such as “bus boycotts, demonstrations, petitions, pass-
burning campaigns”, the government response to this was violent and repressive (Seidman, 2000, 
162). The main action of this period, and the major nonviolent anti-apartheid campaign of South 
African history, was the Defiance Campaign in 1952-1953, a Gandhian-inspired substantive 
campaign of nonviolent civil disobedience (Fredrickson, 1995, 241; Presbey, 2006, 150; Seidman, 
2000, 162-163; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 148). It was especially the newly established ANC 
Youth League, with Nelson Mandela as a member, which pushed for more confrontational 
opposition to apartheid, as opposed to petitioning and trying to convince white politicians to 
provide more equality (Fredrickson, 1995, 246; Presbey, 2006, 151; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 
149). Although the campaign did not succeed in terms of achieving legal and policy changes, a hugely 
ambitious goal in any case (Fredrickson, 1995, 246), it was highly successful in terms of mass 
mobilisation and a rapidly growing membership of the ANC (Seidman, 2000, 162). The South African 
government responded with significant repression and violence, passing increasingly draconian 
laws, targeting leaders and so on (Seidman, 2000, 162). In 1953, after failing to have the protested 
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laws repealed, the Defiance Campaign turned substantially more violent, and this was followed by 
a number of repressive laws banning even nonviolent civil disobedience (Fredrickson, 1995, 247; 
Presbey, 2006, 151). Following the end of the Defiance Campaign, the ANC remained active on a 
smaller scale, holding congresses and defining policy; however, leading activists were continuing to 
be targeted by the government through arrests and lengthy court cases for treason (Sutherland and 
Meyer, 2000, 161).  
Although the court case against ANC leaders produced some publicity for the ANC and their 
goals (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 161), it took another event of major violence to gain widespread 
attention to the anti-apartheid movement. The demonstration and police violence in the township 
of Sharpeville in March 1960 is perhaps the most famous single event in the anti-apartheid struggle, 
and became a major symbol of “the government’s refusal to permit any kind of peaceful protest” 
(Seidman, 2000, 162). The protest in Sharpeville was not organised by the ANC, but by another 
Gandhian-inspired organisation which did not focus on training protesters before actions (Presbey, 
2006, 153; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 162). As about 5000 people arrived at the police station in 
Sharpeville to turn in their registration passes and be arrested, police were surprised and had no 
plan of action, since the crowd was too large to arrest everyone (Presbey, 2006, 153). After some 
minor fighting broke out, police opened fire, killing 69 people and wounding 180 – almost all shot 
in the back as they were trying to run away from the scene (Presbey, 2006, 153; Seidman, 2000, 
162; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 2). The event was a turning point for the anti-apartheid 
movement, leading to widespread conviction among Black South Africans that “nonviolence, as a 
tactic, had been tried and failed” (Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 150). As with the change to 
confrontational nonviolent methods, it was especially the younger ANC members, including 
Mandela, who insisted on departing from strict nonviolence (Fredrickson, 1995, 241; Presbey, 2006, 
155). Following the Sharpeville massacre and the reaction to it, even more repressive laws were 
established, both the ANC and other resistance groups were banned, and 18,000 people were 
detained (Presbey, 2006, 153; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 151).  
These developments led to an effective repression of public protest in South Africa by the 
early 1960s (Seidman, 2000, 164). Following this, Mandela and other reistance leaders went 
underground and began organising Umkonto we Sizwe (MK), the armed wing of the ANC, with 
Mandela as its first commander (Presbey, 2006, 155; Seidman, 2000, 164). In 1961, the MK carried 
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out their first bombings, and produced their manifesto which argued that the anti-apartheid 
movement now only had the options of “submit or fight”, with the commitment to fighting limited 
by a “strong moral restraint and [emphasis on] minimizing the loss of life” (Presbey, 2006, 156; 
Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 163). As Seidman (2000, 164) points out, this limitation is worth 
noticing, since the extreme segregation of South African society meant that if the MK had aimed at 
killing or harming white South Africans, this would have been easy, as “potential targets could be 
found everywhere”.  The MK continued this campaign of sabotage and property destruction until 
the discovery of MK headquarters in 1963 and the arrest of several leaders including Nelson 
Mandela (Presbey, 2006, 157). The trial took place during 1964, and the MK leaders were found 
guilty of treason and sentenced to over 25 years in prison (ibid).  
During the imprisonment, Amnesty International did not add the ANC members to their list 
of prisoners of conscience, despite pressure to do so (Seidman, 2000, 164). This was because 
Amnesty International classified the ANC as an organisation as violent because of the armed wing, 
and therefore, an ANC member would automatically be excluded from the classification, even if the 
prisoner in question had only participated in nonviolent actions, although this policy was partially 
amended in the 1980s (ibid, 164, 166 footnote 3). However, the United Nations maintained their 
support for the liberation movement despite the turn to armed struggle (Presbey, 2006, 143; 
Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 147). This, once again, demonstrates that the case of the anti-
apartheid struggle is an example of the complications and vagueness of the definitions of violent 
and nonviolent struggle. At the trial, Mandela had defended the tactics used by listing the 
nonviolent measures that had been tried and met with heavy repression and violence, as well as the 
commitment of all the defendants to avoiding loss of life with MK actions (Presbey, 2006, 157). 
Throughout imprisonment, he maintained a conviction of the morality of turning to armed struggle 
and rejected offers from the government to be released in return for renouncing the ANC armed 
struggle (Seidman, 2000, 164). From around the mid-1970s, while Nelson Mandela was still 
imprisoned, new tactics reflecting increasing urbanisation were developed in the anti-apartheid 
movement, which started to consider, for example, student strikes in urban centres, workers strikes, 
and the demands for better urban services by black communities. This was also the start of the Black 
Consciousness Movement (Seidman, 2000, 164; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 152).  
In 1976, another famous South African protest occurred, when students of all ages in the 
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township of Soweto boycotted classes to protest the segregation of schools and inferior education 
for Black students. The protest provoked “extraordinary police repression” (Presbey, 2006, 160; 
Seidman, 2000, 165). Many students were subjected to extreme violence, including one of the 
leaders Steven Biko who died in police detention (Presbey, 2006, 160). The repression sparked an 
urban uprising, as well as strong international reactions (Presbey, 2006, 160; Seidman, 2000, 165). 
Although the Soweto uprising was not organised by the ANC, the organisation, as well as the MK, 
benefitted from it, since youths who had been expelled from school joined the MK in other 
countries, where the MK was now able to establish camps to teach specialised resistance tactics as 
well as political education (Presbey, 2006, 160). The MK then carried on the commitment that the 
ANC had consistently emphasised to educate and train grassroots before actions were carried out. 
Although the MK remained active in this period, the strategy of principled military and economic 
sabotage was not successful in seriously putting the apartheid government under pressure 
(Seidman, 2000, 164). This was partly why instructions changed to focus attacks on “symbols of 
apartheid” as a form of “armed propaganda”, emphasising the often symbolic nature of armed 
resistance in South Africa (Presbey, 2006, 161; Seidman, 2000, 164; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 
152, 168). Although the activities of the MK were then limited in this period, and never became “full 
guerrilla or people’s warfare”, these attacts nevertheless produced considerable visibility for the 
MK and ANC (Seidman, 2000, 164; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 152).   
The 1980s saw an escalation of activity and increased range of targets from the MK, the 
ANC’s armed wing, which led to an ANC spokesperson declaring that the safety of civilians could no 
longer be guaranteed, although the MK would not be targeting them (Presbey, 2006, 161). However, 
in 1985, this was changed in a major policy change during an ANC conference in Zambia, at which 
white civilians were included as possible targets (ibid). The ANC did, however, still decide to focus 
on sabotage (ibid). In response, the South African government called a State of Emergency, which 
vastly increased the powers of the government, and between 1985 and 1987, more than 10,000 
activists were detained (Presbey, 2006, 161; Seidman, 2000, 165). Despite these changes, very few 
of the MK attacks during these years involved civilian deaths, and most of the ones that did were 
carried out by “rogue” ANC guerrillas “cut off from their lines of communication or desperate over 
the level of repression” (Seidman, 2000, 164). By the late 1980s, nonviolent mass actions such as 
student boycotts were disrupting black high schools and universitites so often that there were 
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official concerns about shortages of skilled workers in the future. Township “civic associations” were 
also increasingly active (ibid, 165). The strength of these disruptive actions was their focus on 
“methods of dispersion”, by disrupting the functioning of apartheid “without exposing individual 
leaders to arrest, or provoking immediate police attacks”, thereby protecting participants better 
than other more concentrated tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 56; Seidman, 2000, 164).  
The importance of the international solidarity movement’s consumer boycotts of South 
Africa, as well as pressure from other states, in securing Mandela’s release from prison and the end 
of apartheid, is well known and narrated in the history of the anti-apartheid movement and research 
on nonviolent tactics (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 223). Although not much came of it at the 
time, Martin Luther King Jr. had in 1964 called for international support through economic sanctions 
as part of his call for South Africans to return to fully nonviolent struggle (Presbey, 2006, 159). This 
was, arguably, the start of “an international version of nonviolent action which had not yet been 
tried” (ibid). However, it was a long struggle for anti-apartheid activists to secure this international 
support.  
In 1985 when Bishop Desmond Tutu won the Nobel Peace Prize, as previous ANC President 
Albert Luthuli had in 1961, Tutu’s speech echoed “Luthuli’s appeals [in 1961] for international 
pressure as a way to prevent violence” (Seidman, 2000, 162). In 1985, this support was still not 
forthcoming, largely due to vetoing by Britain and the United States against UN resolutons imposing 
such sanctions (ibid). Luthuli and Tutu were seemingly right in their predictions, since the effect of 
the 1984 “mild economic sanctions” and the refusal by international banks to extend loans, was 
immediate in undermining support for apartheid in the white population and putting pressure on 
the government which was highly dependent on trade relations to maintain the economy (Presbey, 
2006, 162; Seidman, 2000, 162).  
Following in the footsteps of the 1952 Defiance Campaign, a new campaign of the same 
name was launched in 1989 (Presbey, 2006, 162). The new Defiance Campaign was even further 
away from the Gandhian ideal of disciplined and controlled nonviolence, but the mass nonviolent 
demonstrations nevertheless pressured the government into negotiations, marking “the beginning 
of the end of apartheid” (ibid). However, in  1992, as the conditions in South Africa were looking like 
they were improving after Nelson Mandela’s release, the unbanning of the ANC, and the start of 
negotiations, another event of violence against protesters occurred. A group of anti-apartheid 
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activists, inspired by the popular mass actions in Eastern Europe at the time, called on volunteers to 
meet and protest in the small town of Bisho (Seidman, 2000, 161). The guards at the stadium on 
which the protest descended panicked and started shooting at the protesters, killing 28 and 
wounding more than 200 (ibid).  
In 1994, South Africa held its first open election, electing Nelson Mandela as President 
(Boehmer, 2008, 76). The process of building peace and increasing equality after the conflict is 
another famous aspect of South African history. The establishment and work of the 1996 Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was based on an ANC proposal after they had investigated, and 
confirmed, human rights violations in some of their training camps (Verdoolaege, 2007, 7). The 
proposed goal for the commission was to investigate “all violations of human rights since 1948” 
(ibid). The commission’s post-conflict work is hailed as a unique manifestation of transitional justice 
ideas, which are a possible avenue for emerging democracies (Sitze, 2013, 1). The commission was 
established through the TRC act, which stated that the commission’s purpose was to “promote 
national unity and reconciliation in a spirit of understanding which transcends the conflicts and 
divisions of the past” (Verdoolaege, 2007, 8), thus emphasising a sense of forgiveness, although one 
that only came through the taking of responsibility by the perpetrator through telling the truth of 
their actions (Tutu in Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, xi-xii).  
Martin Luther King Jr.’s civil rights movement 
The figure of Martin Luther King Jr. has become a major part of not only the idea of nonviolent 
resistance, but also of American political history and identity. King’s image, speeches and writing, 
and materials and anthems from the civil rights struggle are used around the world by nonviolent 
resistance movements (Finley et al, 2015, 6). His image and story have however also been used by 
various political actors on both the right and the left in the US as “a convenient icon” often “used to 
whitewash [America’s] blood-stained racial history” to make progress towards racial equality seem 
invetiable rather than a continuing battle (Dyson, 2001, XV-XVI, 3).  
Segregation in the Southern states of the United States was a legal, social, and enforced 
system of maintaining white supremacy (often referred to as “Jim Crow”) that ran from the late 19th 
century to the middle of the 20th century (Berrey, 2015, 2). The Jim Crow system was famous for 
images of toilets, water fountains, and restaurants being signed for “Whites Only” or “Blacks Only”, 
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but consisted, apart from the segregation of spaces, of “racial discrimination, disfranchisement, and 
lynching”, all functioning together to “solidify and extend white political and economic power” (ibid, 
3). The struggle against segregation and for racial justice, including through nonviolent resistance, 
therefore pre-dates the more famous period of 1955-1965, and the 1950s saw a number of 
improvements, especially in the legal system (Fredrickson, 1995, 235-236). The culmination of the 
legal battles for civil rights came with a 1954 Supreme Court Ruling making segregation of schools 
unlawful (Fredrickson, 1995, 237). However, even with the banning of racial segregation in schools, 
this was at times only able to be enforced through the use of state arms, as in Little Rock in 1957 
where federal troops had to escort black students into their school (Nimtz, 2016, 4). In addition to 
this limitation on the practical effects of legal victories, the “apparent success” of the legal strategy 
also worked to convince moderate Black leaders and white liberals that “mass protest and direct 
action were unnecessary” and might even work against further progress (Fredrickson, 1995, 236).  
For King, 1955-1965 was a defining decade, which saw not only the start of his engagement 
with the civil rights struggle, but also the establishment of the Southern Christian Leadership 
Conference (SCLC), and the development and solidification of their unique model for nonviolent civil 
rights struggle (Kirk, 2004, 89; Nimtz, 2016, 3). This important period started with the Montgomery 
bus boycott in 1955 as the first major civil disobedience campaign against Jim Crow laws, and ended 
with the 1965 march from Selma to Montgomery as the last of these (Kirk, 2004, 89; Nimtz, 2016, 
3).  Along with the civil disobedience actions led by the SCLC and King, a number of other famous 
civil rights campaigns took place in this period, including the college student-led lunch counter sit-
ins and the Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) Freedom Rides (Nimtz, 2016, 6). The civil rights 
struggle was receiving increasing national and international attention in this period, in part due to 
the extreme violence used against protesters (Fredrickson, 1995, 264; Nimtz, 2016, 3, 6). Because 
of this massive attention, as well as the culmination of the passing of the Civil Rights Act in 1964 and 
the Voting Rights Act in 1965, this period is the main foundation of the narrative around Martin 
Luther King Jr. and his role in the civil rights struggle (Fredrickson, 1995, 263-265).     
As stated above, the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955 was the first of the major civil rights 
campaigns involving the SCLC and King and launched the specific mode of struggle which made the 
civil rights movement an iconic case of nonviolent resistance (Finley et al., 2015, x; Nimtz, 2016, 3). 
The campaign started in 1955, when Rosa Parks famously refused to move away from her bus seat, 
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as segregation laws mandated she do (Finley et al., 2015, x). While Parks is often portrayed as a kind 
of accidental maker of history, she was in fact a seasoned member of women’s rights organisations 
– who had already discussed a bus boycott – and the National Association for the Advancement of 
Colored People (NAACP), and had already tried to resist public transportation segregation several 
times (Dyson, 2001, 203; Fredrickson, 1995, 254). After Parks’ arrest, the Montgomery Women’s 
Political Council responded quickly to organise a boycott (Dyson, 2001, 203). King became involved 
through his leadership of another local association which ended up carrying out the campaign, and 
has since been given most of the credit in narratives of the boycott, reinforced by King’s own 
statements (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 6; Dyson, 2001, 203-204). The Montgomery 
bus boycott launched a “meteoric rise to leadership” for King, but after the campaign ended, he fell 
behind the wider civil rights movement and their high-profile civil disobedience actions, had 
different opinions to many other civil rights leaders on the importance of appealing to the 
conscience of white people, and on whether nonviolent direct action was needed if voting rights 
could be secured (Dyson, 2001, 33; Kirk, 2004, 37).   
The possibility of a campaign in Albany, Georgia, in 1961 was an opportunity to raise King’s 
profile and influence again; however, the Albany campaign was a failure for King and the newly 
formed SCLC (Kirk, 2004, 63). The SCLC was set up by King following the success in Montgomery. At 
the end of 1963, Albany’s police chief boasted that “Albany is as segregated as ever”, while the 
NAACP executive secretary concluded that “[d]irect action, for all the exhileration it had produced 
in Montgomery, with the sit-ins and the Freedom Rides, had suddenly come up against a hard, 
unmoving rock” (both quoted in Kirk, 2004, 77). Despite this failure, King and the SCLC did learn a 
number of lessons there, including the effects of fighting with other civil rights groups, especially 
with the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) who were continuously sceptical of 
King’s involvement in campaigns started by others (ibid, 90-91), the importance of advance 
planning, and, most importantly, the potential for clever and restrained policing to undermine the 
effectiveness of nonviolent action. In other words, the last lesson learned was the importance of 
being able to show excessive police violence against civil rights protesters in order to gain national 
attention and support. This last lesson would become a major part of the specific mode of 
nonviolent struggle practiced by King and the civil rights movement (Kirk, 2004, 89; Nimtz, 2016, 2; 
Satha-Anand, 2015, 294-295).   
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Following the failure in Albany, the 1963 campaign in Birmingham, Alabama would turn out 
to be an important victory for King and the SCLC which was struggling at the time (Calloway-Thomas 
and Lucaites eds, 2005, 36, 48). In 1963, King produced some of his most famous work, including 
the Letter from Birmingham Jail at the height of the Birmingham campaign, and the I Have a Dream 
speech during the March on Washington in August of that year, both statements which are 
“premised on the goodness of” others, including opponents, as the foundation for social change 
(Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 34). This aspect of King’s rhetoric has been particularly 
important in the making of the narrative of King as both a lone genius and a unifying figure in 
American political history, as expanded on later in this chapter (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 
2005, 36, 40-41, 98-99). I Have a Dream has become especially famous as one of the most iconic 
moments of not only King’s career but the civil rights struggle (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 
2005, 1, 76). The speech and letter, as King’s rhetoric in general, made heavy use of religious 
rhetoric, style, and basic moral foundations (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 72-73).  
Having learned the importance of planning ahead during the Albany campaign, the choice of 
Birmingham for their next campaign was highly deliberate, and made for a number of reasons, 
including an existing invitation from a local civil rights leader, the reputation of Birmingham as one 
of the most violent and racist cities in the US, and concerns within the white business community of 
losing customers because of this, which opened up a possibility for pressure and negotiation (Kirk, 
2004, 78; Nimtz, 2016, 6). The campaign made use of a wide range of tactics, with the aim of 
provoking a violent reaction from local law enforcement in order to attract national attention 
(Nimtz, 2016, 6). When this initially failed due to police restraint and less local support than 
expected, what has since been named the “children’s crusade” was launched, an action in which 
black high school students and younger children were mobilised for protest (Kirk, 2004, 81, 84-85; 
Nimtz, 2016, 6-7). Although the decision to place children and young adults at the front lines of the 
struggle was and remains controversial and criticised by figures such as Malcolm X and the (NAACP), 
it did lead to a rise in mobilisation of black adults, and subsequently the images of violent repression 
needed to attract attention from the Kennedy administration (Kirk, 2004, 85; Nimtz, 2016, 7-8). 
Although the situation in Birmingham was at times close to escalating out of control for the SCLC, 
the campaign resulted in a negotiated deal to desegregate the city, which was eventually backed by 
the federal government as well (Kirk, 2004, 88; Nimtz, 2016, 8).   
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The campaign in Selma, Alabama, and the three attempts at marching from Selma to the 
state capital of Montgomery became the culmination of the SCLC’s era of mass civil disobedience 
actions, and a major victory in the civil rights struggle (Finley et al., 2015, 4). Once again, the SCLC 
and King worked with the SNCC and local activists in Selma – a carefully chosen target because of 
its extreme voter suppression and violent local sheriff – to carry out a number of nonviolent direct 
actions for voting rights (Kirk, 2001, 122-123). Many of these actions led to clashes with law 
enforcement and violence against protesters, and reports and images of this violence were 
important for raising national attention and support (Nimtz, 2016, 16-18). King was arrested during 
the Selma campaign, in part by design in order to escalate the campaign.  Despite his incarceration, 
he insisted on being consulted on major decisions to maintain personal control of the campaign 
(Dyson, 2001, 30; Kirk, 2004, 126). During the Selma campaign, support from local courts, as well as 
President Johnson, led to tension over whether to escalate or slow down the campaign, with King 
strongly in favour of keeping protests going (Kirk, 2004, 126-127). When King left prison, he 
advocated publicly for national support and met with President Johnson who assured him that voter 
protection legislation was being prepared (ibid, 127). Meanwhile in Selma, locals had been pushed 
to their limit, and tensions grew over tactics while confrontations with police turned increasingly 
violent (ibid). While these issues and the prompting of federal action led King and the SCLC to decide 
to declare the Selma campaign a success and move to nearby counties, the plan was interrupted 
when a young Black man at a protest was shot by police (ibid, 128-129).  
It was in response to this that King came up with the idea to organise a protest from Selma 
to Montgomery, and although the plan was thought risky and unlikely to succeed, planning went 
ahead (Kirk, 2004, 128-129). The SNCC did not support the march, which they thought put locals 
through unnecessary risk, but let their members march since they also did not want to abandon the 
locals they had worked with. Meanwhile, the SCLC decided that King would not be marching since 
they wanted him in Wasthington as a lobbyist rather than in prison (Kirk, 2004, 130). The first 
attempted march ended with a violent attack on protesters by state troopers blocking a bridge, after 
King had instructed organisers not to change the route (Nimtz, 2016, 18). The event was later named 
“Bloody Sunday”, and received nationwide attention due to the footage on national news of the 
extreme violence used against the protesters (Kirk, 2004, 131-132). The second attempt at marching 
to Montgomery was less successful in attracting support for the civil rights movement. In what 
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became known as King’s “Tuesday Turnaround”, state troopers managed to humiliate King and the 
march by breaking an agreement that they would block the bridge, but not attack protesters as the 
march would turn back. Instead, the troopers moved aside and invited the march to continue, but 
King still turned back and was seen as losing face and selling out local movements not only by doing 
so, but also by having made an agreement with state authorities, and for being reluctant to admit 
to this fully (ibid, 132-134).  
Despite this, the mood across the US remained in favour of the civil rights struggle, both 
amongst the population, from Congress members, and President Johnson (Kirk, 2004, 134). Court 
hearings about the Selma march were taking place, and the judge echoed President Johnson’s 
support by upholding the movement’s right to peaceful assembly, with an order to the state of 
Alabama to adequately protect the new march proposed by SCLC (ibid, 136). Subsequently, a third 
attempt was announced, and federal protection provided when the Alabama Governor failed to 
provide this, making the march “a victory parade rather than a demonstration” and a “homecoming 
of sorts” for King, who lead the march and spoke to the crowd in Montgomery (ibid, 136). This march 
also represented a change in atmosphere and tactics in the civil rights movement, sensed for 
example by Rosa Parks who joined the marched but felt “alienated from a new generation of 
activists who were more vocal and angry and full of rage and curse words”, and was pushed out of 
the march because she was not wearing the right colour clothes (Dyson, 2001, 310). For King, this 
change in atmosphere would become influential in the direction of the last few years of his life 
(Finley et al., 2016, ix-x).    
After effectively gaining federal legal responses to their two major demands with the passing 
of the Civil Rights and Voting Rights act, a significant change in focus took place for both King and 
the wider civil rights movement (Finley et al., 2015, ix; Kirk, 2004, 137). The experience of moving 
to the northern US and attempting to do social work there, along with a number of riots in urban 
centres over racial injustice significantly changed King’s view on racism and sparked his work to start 
a northern-based campaign (Dyson, 2001, 37; Kirk, 2004, 122). King chose to move to a ghetto in 
Chicago with his family in 1965 because he had concluded that his nonviolent strategies would be 
effective at fighting racial and economic inequality (Dyson, 2001, 37-38; Finley et al., 2015, xi). Here 
the SCLC started the Chicago Freedom movement in 1965 with a local Chicago group, with a goal of 
ending the slums in Chicago (Finley et al., 2015, 3). Starting a campaign in the North proved difficult, 
Chapter Three: The History of Nonviolence 
- 70 - 
 
however, in part because northern racism was less visible and more intricate, and because this part 
of the US saw itself as already free from racism (Dyson, 2001, 36-38; Finley et al., 2015, xi). Reactions 
to actions organised by the SCLC were seen by King as the most “hostile and hateful” shows of racism 
he had seen, and he suffered a number of small set-backs during this campaign. Overall, the 
combination of “Northern racism and black demorilization brought out the worst in King’s 
strategies, bitterly reversing the usual success of his campaigns” (Dyson, 2001, 37-38).  
Following this, King “accused Northern Whites of practicing ‘psychological and spiritual 
genocide’” and “cultural homicide” through making Black people’s contribution to the U.S invisible, 
which was a drastic change from his earlier rhetoric of appealing to the conscience of white people 
(Dyson, 2001, 37-38, 113). While King’s changed rhetoric was in line with a growth in black 
nationalism and the Black Panther movement in the US, this still meant that the strategies and 
approaches of the Chicago Freedom Movement seemed out-dated to many (Finley et al., 2015, 7). 
During this time, King maintained his commitment to nonviolent resistance, but did come to 
understand better the arguments against a philosophy of conversion and forgiveness of whites 
(Dyson, 2001, 112). He also moved away from previous judgement of Black Americans in the North 
as apathetic and gained more empathy after witnessing the “hopelessness” in the ghettos (ibid).  
The Chicago Freedom Movement came to a formal end in 1967 when the local Chicago group 
was dissolved (Finley et al., 2015, 6). Although this later part of King’s career is far less known and 
admired than the Southern campaigns, and sometimes dismissed as a side-note and a failure, Finley 
et al. (ibid, xii, 3-5) argue that the Chicago Freedom Movement was “a crucial part of King’s life” and 
the long-term impacts of his work and the American struggle for racial justice, as well as an 
“experiment in nonviolence that is relevant to students and practitioners of nonviolence today”.  
Martin Luther King Jr. was assassinated in 1968, an event which was monumental in the US 
and the rest of the world, but especially in the Black community in the US (Dyson, 2001, 1-3). 
Following King’s death, a struggle broke out over King’s legacy as either a “radical incendiary”, or 
the moderate civil rights champion “appealing to the nation’s highest ideals” (Jackson, 2009, 359). 
Ultimately, the American hero narrative became dominant in public discourse, as evidenced for 
example by the marking of King’s birthday as a national holiday in the US (Jackson, 2009, 360).  
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Violence and pragmatism 
While the three nonviolent movements outlined above are meaningfully different from violent 
resistance in their use of methods, this does not mean that the resistance movements existed in a 
nonviolent sphere free of all forms and influences of violence. Some of the ways in which violence 
occurred and played a role in the movements will be discussed in the following section. In addition, 
the section will discuss the question of whether the movements were shaped by pragmatic or 
principled nonviolence, as these two questions are at times closely related.  
 Firstly, it is worth emphasising the role that pragmatic reasoning played within these 
movements and leaders when choosing nonviolent resistance, even while also putting forth strong 
moral arguments against violent struggle. As Fredrickson (1995, 225-226) argues, “[n]onviolent 
actions do not necessarily signify a nonviolent ideology”, and even principled arguments for 
nonviolence may have a “practical function” of increasing “the morale and motivation of nonviolent 
protesters” and inhibit the outbreak of violence. Gandhi is a good example of the at times 
complicated overlap or symbiosis between principles and pragmatism, being portrayed in different 
accounts both as a morally convinced pacifist, and a pragmatic strategist of nonviolence rejected by 
“genuine” pacifists (Benjamin, 1973, 197; Isserman, 1986, 48; Satha-Anand, 2015, 298; Sharp, 1959, 
42). In fact, Gandhi himself presented arguments for both points of view (Gandhi and Parel, 1997, 
114; McLauchlan, 2016, 432; Satha-Anand, 2015, 292-293; Terchek, 2000, 3). In the South African 
anti-apartheid movement, pragmatic considerations around the choice of violent or nonviolent 
methods were widespread and dominant, both among the grassroots membership and leadership 
(Presbey, 2006, 151).  When Albert Luthuli, the President of the ANC at the time, received the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1961, he echoed this sentiment in a newspaper interview where he said that “I would 
not pigeon-hole myself as a pacifist … But on practical consideration it would be suicidal in the circles 
today to abandon our policy of non-violence” (Simpson, 2018, 143). Finally, in the civil rights 
movement, there was an ongoing debate about the role and value of violence, both violent attacks 
but especially violent self-defence (Nimtz, 2016, 4). Although King always used strong moral rhetoric 
arguing for nonviolence, conversion, and forgiveness (Satha-Anand, 2015, 293), the brand of 
nonviolence used by him and the SCLC was extremely tactical in its nature, and this was a major part 
of their success (Nimtz, 2016, 2). Civil rights leaders working closely with King, such as other 
organisers of the Montgomery bus boycott, were not pacifists, nor willing to give up their right to 
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defend themselves (Kosek, 2005, 1343). In fact, as Kosek (ibid) writes, during the boycott, “[g]uns 
were everywhere, and black Montgomerians made no apologies for their defensive preparations” 
and King himself prepared for armed self-defence at the beginning of the Montgomery bus boycott 
(Fredrickson, 1995, 256).   
Secondly, and related to the strategic nature of these nonviolent campaigns, violence played 
a role in the three movements because the extreme violence used against protesters became a 
major part of the movement dynamics, sometimes by backfiring for the opponent and having the 
effect of strengthening the resistance movement. This particular role of violence, and the backfire 
effect, is examined in more detail in Chapter Five. A number of the most iconic or famous instances 
of regime repression backfire happened during the three resistance movements discussed here, and 
these are a major part of the popular narrative around the movements and the history and power 
of nonviolence. The Amritsar massacre and Dharasana protest in India, the Sharpeville and Soweto 
shootings in South Africa, and the Birmingham and Selma campaigns in the US, all of which are 
mentioned in the previous sections, are particuarly important historical examples of the backfire 
effect (Kosek, 2005, 1345; Mandela, 1994, 206; Martin, 2015, 146-148; Presbey, 2006, 153-154). 
The events in Amritsar in 1919 and Dharasana in 1930 differed greatly in the reaction of the 
protesters, with participants in Amritsar attempting to run away from the protest once police 
opened fire, whereas protesters in Dharasana kept walking towards the police line as other 
protesters were beaten (Martin, 2015, 148-149; Presbey, 2006, 153-154). This, potentially, 
encapsulates some of the differences between Gandhi’s concepts of voluntary and involuntary 
suffering, which may explain his condemnation of the protesters in Amritsar for running away from, 
rather than towards, the bullets (Terchek, 2000, 183-184). In both cases, however, police violence 
against protesters was excessive and produced strong condemnations (Martin, 2015, 148-149; 
Presbey, 2006, 153-154). Given that Gandhi himself admitted that a large proportion of the 
protesters in the Indian independence movement were not morally convinced of nonviolence, but 
merely followed strict nonviolence because of “the insistence of their leaders”, as well as because 
of a lack of weapons, the idea that the suffering endured was voluntary, even in Dharasana, is 
debatable (Fredrickson, 1995, 229; Presbey, 2006, 146).  This less than full commitment to 
nonviolence was, however, sufficient for Gandhi, who did not want to wait for what he called “the 
perfect conditions” (Presbey, 2006, 146; Satha-Anand, 2015, 293). Gandhi’s approach to the 
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suffering of protesters, and the incomplete voluntariness of this, demonstrates, as Fredrickson 
(1995, 229) also argues, a “spiritually elitist argument” which reduces followers not to satyagrahi 
themselves, but rather “an army pledged and conditioned to follow the general even though they 
did not fully understand the cause for which they were fighting” – and perhaps also the 
consequences.  
In contrast, the question of the suffering of protesters, the responsibility of organisers, and 
the possibility of alternative resistance methods which might decrease suffering were prominent in 
the South African anti-apartheid movement, and part of the reason for a turn to violent struggle. 
Following the events in Sharpeville and Soweto, and the widespread everyday violence against 
South Africans of colour – especially anti-apartheid activists – leaders of the anti-apartheid 
movement had since the early 1960s been questioning if they could defend imposing that degree of 
suffering and risk of dying on their followers (Seidman, 2000, 163-164). This question was intensified 
by the fact that within the wider anti-apartheid movement (although not with the direct 
involvement or approval of the ANC), reluctant citizens were at times pressured or forced into 
participating, as for example the PAC did before the protest at Sharpeville (Presbey, 2006, 162-163; 
Seidman 2000, 165-166). This question was brought to the forefront following the shooting of 
protesters in Bisho in 1992. After the shooting, both black anti-apartheid activists and conservatives 
blamed the activist organiser for his responsibility as well as blaming the guards who shot at 
protesters (Seidman, 2000, 161). This allocation of responsibility was because it was argued to not 
be unexpected that guards might react with excessive violence, and so, within the extremely violent 
and repressive context of South African apartheid, “the decision to place volunteers in the line of 
fire was widely viewed as irresponsible, perhaps murderous” (Seidman, 2000, 161).  
The American civil rights struggle is especially known not just for the occurrence of violence 
against protesters, and this violence backfiring, but also for a form of nonviolent resistance which 
focused on provoking repression as one of its main features and ways to succeed (Kirk, 2004, 89; 
Nimtz, 2016, 2; Satha-Anand, 2015, 294-295). The strategy included gaining the “moral highground” 
through nonviolent discipline, and this was most effective when met with extreme and well-
documented violence, often with the aim of achieving federal action and intervention (Nimtz, 2016, 
2). In the case of the civil rights movement, it is worth noting the explicit attempt to provoke 
opponents into “blatant, public brutality” (Nimtz, 2016, 2; Satha-Anand, 2015, 294).  The 
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recruitment of high school students in Birmingham exemplifies this tactic, since especially the 
images of children being beaten and placed in jail resulted in even stronger reactions across the US 
than when the same was done to adult protesters (Gross, 2018, 321). In April 1963, when a group 
of young Black protesters were attacked by the police and police dogs, SCLC organisers at the 
headquarters were “elated because the police had been provoked into creating an incident that 
supplied press coverage for the protest”, repeating to each other “We’ve got a movement. We had 
some police brutality. They brought out the dogs. We’ve got a movement” (Satha-Anand, 2015, 
294).  
Another and very direct way in which violence played a role in these movements is through 
the occurrence of armed struggle. Although there are arguments that armed struggle was more 
important to the Indian independence movement than what is commonly recognised (McQuade, 
2016), the focus here is on South Africa and the US. While in the US the relationship between violent 
and nonviolent resistance is perhaps more complicated, in the case of South Africa, the turn to 
violent resistance was openly embraced by anti-apartheid activists (e.g. Tutu in Sutherland and 
Meyer, 2000, xii). However, the approach to violent struggle highlights a strong focus on principles 
of minimising harm and preserving human life, thereby referring back to the theme of principles 
and pragmatism in the movements. Importantly, the preservation of life was both in terms of not 
targeting white South Africans, and in terms of attempting to minimise deaths and harm from 
regime repression in the Black community (Presbey, 2006, 143; Seidman, 2000, 164). To this effect, 
Mandela stated to a British journalist in 1961 that “[t]here are many people who feel that it is useless 
and futile for us to continue talking peace and nonviolence against a government whose reply is 
only savage attacks on an unarmed and defenceless people. And I think the time has come for use 
to consider, in the light of our experiences in the stay-at-home, whether the methods which we 
have applied so far are adequate” (Madrigal, 2013). It is important to note here that Mandela did 
not argue that extreme state repression makes nonviolence fully useless; rather, he consistently 
claims that the combination of violent and nonviolent means, which was the method used by the 
ANC, was what brought a resolution to the anti-apartheid struggle (Presbey, 2006, 143). Finally, ANC 
leaders argued that the “agonizing” decision to embrace violent resistance with the establishment 
of MK was in part an attempt to “control and direct the various violent movements springing up” 
(Presbey, 2006, 151, 156).  
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The American civil rights movement demonstrates a further nuancing of the at times 
symbiotic relationship between violent and nonviolent movements. The violent and nonviolent civil 
rights movements are often portrayed as distinct groups, often even opposing because of their 
different choice of methods, with King and Malcolm X as the peaceful and loving and violent and 
vengeful leader respectively (Whitlock, 1996, 289-290). However, the success of the civil rights 
struggle was arguably exactly because both these movements existed and interacted with each 
other (Nimtz, 2016). The nonviolent civil rights movement gained influence with the federal 
government in part because of the threat of violent uprisings, both from more organised violent 
groups such as the Black Panthers and Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam, and because there was 
not full adherence to nonviolent discipline in all nonviolent protests, and a fear that this would 
escalate further (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 10; Nimtz, 2016, 8-9). An example of this was the end of the 
Birmingham campaign, where a Kennedy administration representative in Birmingham warned the 
president of an increasing danger of violence, leading the Attorney General to speak directly with 
one of the organisers of the campaign on the phone to secure an agreement (Nimtz, 2016, 8). King 
himself used this dynamic well and positioned his civil rights movement as an alternative to the 
violent campaign, emphasising to the US government that it was either his movement or the Nation 
of Islam and violent resistance (ibid, 7). Another central actor who recognised, and used, this 
dynamic, was Malcolm X himself, who although he would often attack King in public as “an Uncle 
Tom”, met King’s wife Coretta Scott King in Selma while King was in prison (Dyson, 2001, 30, 110-
111). Malcolm X had flown in to give a speech to the SNCC, and said to Coretta King that “I want Dr. 
King to know that I didn’t come to Selma to make his job difficult … I really did come thinking that I 
could make it easier. If the white people realize what the alternative is, perhaps they will be more 
willing to hear Dr. King” (quoted in Dyson, 2001, 30, italics removed).  
Lone male hero syndrome 
A recurring narrative around these three famous nonviolent movements and within nonviolence 
traditions is that of the importance of the charismatic leader, or lone male hero of nonviolence 
(Fredrickson, 1995, 230). This theme becomes relevant to subsequent chapters, in part as an idea 
of respectability in resistance movements, as well as discussions around internal dynamics and 
hierarchies of nonviolent movements. Within this narrative, the movements are largely defined, 
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directed, and established by this one leader, or at times with the added nuance of another 
charismatic figure, for example Nehru as the apprentice, Tutu as the co-organiser of racial justice, 
and Malcolm X as the hateful, violent counterpart (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 90-
91). The imagery of the lone male hero or genius runs through a number of fields, such as film and 
media, and technology and science (e.g. Burton, 2017; Rohn, 2017; Smil, 2011). This narrative of the 
importance or necessity, of a perfect or superior charismatic leader effects not only popular 
perceptions of past movements such as these, which works to hide the importance of the work of 
others in the movements, but also perceptions of future strategies and possibilities, since these are 
shaped by past success stories.  
Gandhi, Mandela, and King are all extraordinarily popular figures, not only within social 
movements, but also in wider society. A manifestation of this is the use of their images, as well as 
actual or misattributed quotes, for commercial purposes, nationalist projects, conservative political 
causes, popular mobilisation attempts, resistance movements’ printed materials, etc. (Dyson, 2001, 
6; Finley et al., 2015, 6; Mishra, 2018; Shillam, 2018). This is a strong manifestation of the cult of 
personality surrounding these figures, as is the making and popularity of blockbuster films about 
them (Gandhi in 1982, Mandela: Long Walk to Freedom in 2013, and Selma in 2014). The cult of 
personhood was also traced in the introduction to this chapter, which demonstrated examples of 
protests imitating, or claiming to carry on, the actions of the three leaders.  
Gandhi himself attributed great importance to his role as a leader, and to using himself and 
his own life as central to mobilising a resistance movement in India (Fredrickson, 1995, 230). He was 
highly successful in this attempt at creating a strong personal following, with “his dress, language, 
mode of public speaking, food, bodily gestures, ways of sitting ... humour, and staff” all becoming 
symbols of the way of life and method of resistance that he was recruiting for (Gandhi, 2007/1909, 
125; Gandhi and Parel, 1997, 68-69, 97; Parekh, 1997, 9; Terchek, 2000, 3). In this manner, Gandhi 
effectively turned himself into the perfect lone, heroic leader of a movement of people seeking a 
superior – perhaps almost superhuman – way of life (McLaughlan, 2016, 433). The influence of this 
on subsequent movements is evident in the call for a “new Gandhi” in both South Africa and the US 
during the struggles covered in this chapter, in order to both mobilise support and secure nonviolent 
discipline, calls which Gandhi himself put forward as advice (Fredrickson, 1995, 230, 232).  
King, like Gandhi, believed in the importance of charismatic leaders to build and maintain a 
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movement. King solidified his own status as one such leader when, for example, he failed to credit 
other organisers sufficiently, especially women, as with the Montgomery bus boycott, and also 
when he did not admit the extent to which his writings and speeches were collaborative works  
(Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 34-35; Dyson, 2001, 297-298). The personal reputation 
and influence of King as the charismatic leader of the civil rights movement is so strong that 
proclamations of his genius border on descriptions of a perfect person (Dyson, 2001, 303). This 
personal influence was so significant that an SNCC communications director explained that “We 
would sometimes ask King to go to some place, because we knew the attention he drew would be 
helpful to the local scene, even if it wasn’t helpful to us” (quoted in Kirk, 2004, 125). It was King’s 
talent as an orator which formed the basis of the extraordinary focus on his person as almost an 
embodiment of the civil rights movement, a rhetoric which “comports well with America’s 
romanticized conception of the selfless hero who arrives in the nick of time to save the community 
from whatever evil it faces” (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 1). King’s sermonic style of 
speaking was closely influenced by his background as a church minister, and his leadership in the 
civil rights movement enacted, in a sense, “the traditional role of the black preacher in African-
American history” (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 6). This is part of what Edwards (2012, 
xv) describes as “one of the central fictions of black American politics: that freedom is best achieved 
under the direction of a single charismatic leader”. To contradict this fiction, Fredrickson (1995, 253) 
writes that “recent historians of the American civil rights movement of 1955-1965 have shown that 
it sprang from no single ideological or organizational source and was certainly not the creation of 
one great man”.  
Finally, Nelson Mandela eventually became this charismatic leader in the anti-apartheid 
movement, especially in the eyes of the international community which centered solidarity 
campaigns around the call to “Free Mandela” (Lodge, 2006, x; Wilkinson, 2013). The intense focus 
on Mandela’s person is evident in research and historical literature, which contains analysis of not 
only his life but also in-depth discussions of his personal characteristics as uniquely important to the 
anti-apartheid struggle (e.g. Lieberfeld, 2003; Lodge, 2006; Simpson, 2018). Lodge (2006, ix-x, 84-
85) argues that this status as charismatic leader was at least in part cultured and established by 
Mandela himself, along with close allies, and that his background gave him not only “an unusual 
assurance about his destiny as a leader”, but also tools to achieve this. They (ibid, xi) argue furhter 
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that Mandela consistently treated politics as “primarily about enacting stories ... about exemplary 
conduct and only secondarily about ideological vision”. An important part of the mythology around 
Mandela – and important to the theme of this thesis – is his short-lived role as commander of the 
armed wing of ANC, along with his long imprisonment (Lodge, 2006, ix-x; Seidman, 2000, 165). 
Further highlighting the strongly symbolic role of the MK, this commandership strengthened the 
symbolism around Mandela in his “messianic leadership role”, as Mandela and his comrades in the 
MK used this to establish their political legitimacy and “engender hopes among their compatriots 
that salvation would be achieved through their own heroic self-sacrifice” (Lodge, 2006, ix). Although 
this particular enaction of heroic leadership may seem only relevant exactly to violent resistance, 
Chapter Five will argue that the nonviolent concept of self-sacrifice or voluntary suffering can serve 
a very similar purpose.  
The intense focus on charismatic leaders can have a number of effects for both the resistance 
movement in question, historical accounts of the movement, and nonviolent resistance theory. An 
obvious consequence is the erasure or marginalisation of other people’s work and its importance to 
the success of a movement. King, for example, would at times gloss over the work of other civil 
rights activists in the campaigns he was part of (Dyson, 2001, 297-298). This led to criticism from 
allies of King’s such as the SNCC and some local organisers. The SNCC were frustrated that King 
regularly failed to give credit to activists and movements who had been organising for a long time 
in the places he went to “stir things up” (ibid, 297). King’s model of social change was seen as 
“camera-hogging” and putting him and the SCLC above local activists and populations (Calloway-
Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 45-46; Dyson, 2001, 297). Another form of work which is erased – 
excluding that conducted by activists in the movement – is the work outside of the movement that 
is, in fact, integral to a resistance movement by enabling leaders and activists to continue their 
resistance work. South African activist Emma Mashinini pointed out as much in an interview with 
Sutherland and Meyer (2000, 172) when discussing the absurdity of missing the importance of 
women’s work at home. As Mashinini asked: 
Can you imagine that when Nelson Mandela and Sisulu came out of prison, they did not 
wander in the streets, they went back to their homes – homes that had been maintained by 
women. They went back to their homes and found their children educated (quoted in 
Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 172).  
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Another possible consequence of the charismatic leader myth is a weakening of resistance 
movements through a lack of focus on building leadership and decision-making structures within 
the movement, and the risk that a movement fails if a charismatic leader turns out to be less than 
perfect. Ella Baker, an SCLC organiser who was instrumental in starting the SNCC and became an 
organiser there instead, was a vocal critic of King, the intense personal focus on him, and its effects 
on the movement. In contrast to King’s style, Baker’s focus was on empowering individuals and 
communities to make their own change, arguing that King failed “to nurture leadership in others”, 
thus creating an “unhealthy dependence” typical of traditional leadership models (Dyson, 2001, 
297). Baker argued that because leaders of movements are typically made leaders when they “found 
a spot in the public limelight”, this means that “the media made him, and the media may undo him” 
and this is especially risky if both the leader and others believe that the leader “is the movement” 
(quoted in Dyson, 2001, 297). Based on her scepticism of charismatic leadership models, Baker tried 
to convince King to resist the “cult of personality” around him as early as in Montgomery, but did 
not succeed (Dyson, 2001, 298; Finley et al., 2015, ix-xi).  
Although nonviolence theorists argue at times that a focus on nonviolent civil resistance 
through history does, precisely, go “beyond the Great Man theory of political change” (Bartkowski 
ed, 2013, 340), the argument here is the opposite: that nonviolence theory and historical accounts 
of iconic nonviolence movements do not avoid this problem. Although this issue does not just apply 
to a single account of nonviolent resistance, or to views of the past, but rather the wider field 
including today, it is worth noting that some critiques are made of Gene Sharp as an example of a 
theorist who “replaced the heroism of male physicality with the heorism of the wise counsellor or 
strategist who was usually assumed to be a man” (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 343). A number of 
consequenes of this narrative have been discussed here. Another more broad consequence is the 
risk of a belief that “nonviolence could not succeed elsewhere unless it had an equally virtuous and 
charismatic leader” (Fredrickson, 1995, 230). As Edwards (2012, xxi-xxii) points out, this 
consequence was clear in American politics, in which “[t]hroughout the twentieth and early twenty-
first centuries, public culture bemoaned the black leadership void and presumed the natural and 
inevitable necessity of singular, male charismatic leadership for African American political and social 
advancement”. Therefore, actively and directly calling into question the “myth – or fiction – that 
charismatic leadership is a necessary precondition for social change, political access, and historical 
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progress” (Edwards, 2012, xviii) becomes crucial.    
Specificity versus universalism  
While Gandhi’s practice and teaching of nonviolence are often treated as universally valid and 
applicable, they are in fact specific to the cultural, social, and religious context in which they were 
developed. Baldoli (2019, 4-5) complicates the assumption of universalism further by arguing that 
Gandhi’s concepts were not in fact universalised, but merely Westernised; that is, Gandhi’s 
conception of nonviolence faced “the reduction of its meaning to terms belonging to the Western 
tradition”. This was part of the initial reason why Gandhi started using the term satyagraha.  Even 
this term, however, has since become an international “conceptual shorthand” for nonviolent mass 
action, despite the naming’s explicit emphasis on the particular context of Gandhi’s nonviolence 
(Baldoli, 2019, 5; McLaughlan, 2016, 431-432). Other central concepts in Gandhi’s framework, such 
as dharma, himsa, and ahimsa are taken from Hindu world views, although all with a degree of 
reinterpretation by Gandhi (Terchek, 2000, 186, 191). However, despite this explicit rooting of 
nonviolence in Indian civilisation, Gandhi still remained committed to spreading satyagraha as a 
global and universal idea (Fredrickson, 1995, 227-228), thus encompassing the tension between 
specificity and universalism within his own thinking as well. 
The universality of “Gandhian nonviolence” is at times suggested through the emphasis on 
the link between South Africa and Gandhi (Fredrickson, 1995, 227; Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, 
160). However, as Sutherland and Meyer (2000, 18) point out, although inspiration from Gandhi was 
influential in the anti-apartheid movement, there are also a number of nonviolent characteristics to 
be found throughout African history that influenced the movement, much of which is ignored. An 
example of this is the concept of Ubuntu, explained by Desmond Tutu as a “uniquely African” term 
which “speaks about gentleness, hospitality, putting yourself out on behalf of others, being 
vulnerable”, and “embraces both compassion and toughness” (in Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, xi). 
What is further important, especially in the context of Ubuntu as a base for South African 
nonviolence, is that the term goes beyond discussing “short-term strategies and tactics, which too 
often divide progressive people”, and points to a “larger struggle” than that between violent and 
nonviolent struggle, that of fighting united for “economic justice, for true freedom and equality, and 
for a world of lasting peace” (Tutu in Sutherland and Meyer, 2000, xi). By emphasising the concept 
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of Ubuntu, Tutu is then suggesting that the more important cause, which as he sees it should unite 
progressive struggles, is not between violent and nonviolent methods, but for a world with less 
violence. 
The role of the Youth League of the ANC is important to the history of the anti-apartheid 
struggle, in part because it was the Youth League which originally pushed for more confrontational 
civil disobedience in the early days of the ANC, and later for the establishment of an armed wing 
(Fredrickson, 1995, 241; Presbey, 2006, 150). However, the Youth League was noteworthy for 
another focus of theirs, which was to establish a specific bond between black South Africans through 
“espous[ing] a mystical Africanist philosophy that anticipated the later Pan-Africanist and Black 
Consciousness movements” (Fredrickson, 1995, 241). Further, although the Youth League’s 
suggested programme for mass nonviolent action when they suggested this was highly similar to 
Gandhi’s program and model, it makes no mention of Gandhi or the earlier Indian passive resistance 
campaign in South Africa (ibid, 242-243). This was because – rather ironically – the ANC Youth 
League did take on one central lesson from Gandhi, which was one of “turning nonviolent struggle 
into a question of authenticity and rebuilding ‘noble’ civilisations” meaning that for the ANC, their 
methods could not be seen to be based off the Indian movement (ibid, 243). However, the Youth 
League leaders eventually decided to abandon this attempt to create an “original Africanist 
nationalism” in order to encourage Indians, whites, and other South Africans who wanted to support 
the struggle to join (ibid, 243).  
Similarly, the role of black nationalism in the US highlights the importance of context, 
rootedness, and specificity in these movements. Although King was and is famous for preaching an 
ideal of universal brotherhood, Dyson (2001, 104) argues that in the last years of his life, “King 
embraced powerful dimensions of enlightened black nationalist thought”. Black nationalism, unlike 
King’s civil rights struggle against Southern Jim Crow laws, sprung from ghettos in Northern 
American states, as a strategy for defining a sense of authenticity to “resist the definition of 
blackness by whites or bourgeois blacks” (ibid, 105-106). Malcolm X presented a highly elaborate 
version of this black nationalism, in which “black self-determination” meant “self-creation”, leading 
to “economic control, cultural recreation, social cohesion, spiritual rebirth, psychic regeneration, 
and racial unity” (ibid, 111). The difference between the two approaches can also be seen in the 
conceptions of ‘equality’ which, once again, span ideas of universalism or specificity. In his rhetoric, 
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King was highly successful in presenting the idea of equality as fundamental to American society, 
and through that the struggle for racial equality as an essentially American project, a universalising 
struggle for the betterment of all of society (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 87-103; 
Hooker, 2016, 457).  
As Hooker (2016, 457) argues, this framing places the civil rights struggle as fitting into “a 
specific liberal understanding of both racism and US democracy” that could be called “the 
perfectibility of US democracy thesis”. According to this thesis or narrative, “political relations 
among citizens are constantly moving in a more egalitarian direction, and gradual progress toward 
racial justice is thus inevitable and natural” and the image of Martin Luther King Jr., is a central part 
of this narrative (ibid). In contrast to this, Malcolm X in his black nationalist ideology used the 
concept of equality to represent “a commitment to a relationship of equivalence between two or 
more clearly separate entities, each of which possesses its own independent identity but was 
similarly powerful” (Calloway-Thomas and Lucaites eds, 2005, 92-93). The dominance of King’s 
universalising call for equality leads not only to a simplified popular narrative of King as “the primary 
leader of the civil rights movement and the savior of racial justice” against Malcolm X as the “radical 
advocate of black supremacy and racial violence” (ibid, 90-91), but also adds to the “romantic 
narrative of the civil rights movement” which works to “downplay the more radical aspects” and the 
diversity of perspectives within the movement (Hooker, 2016, 457).  
Through universalising narratives, figures such as Gandhi, King, and Mandela can then 
become not only charismatic heroes of the movements they were part of, but also of the idea of 
nonviolent resistance as such, as well as within the collective memories of the countries in which 
they were active. Such figures are then not merely remembered as effective rebels or outsiders who 
embody breaking the rules when the rules are unjust; they have also become emblematic of the 
very countries, and the very systems, that they resisted, and a sign of the ‘inevitable’ progress 
towards equality within these self-proclaimed progressive and enlightened societies (Bartkowski ed, 
2013, 1). 
Conclusion 
This chapter has provided an outline of the main events, thoughts, and practices of the three major 
nonviolent histories of the independence struggle in India, the anti-apartheid struggle in South 
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Africa, and the civil rights struggle in the US. The chapter has emphasised both the main influences 
that these movements have had on nonviolence theory and literature, but also in the subsequent 
section the nuances and complications to this, such as the role of pragmatism, violence, and 
charismatic leadership myths. What this illustrates is that although these movements were in 
meaningful ways nonviolent, this does not mean the absence of violence; this understanding of 
nonviolence runs throughout the thesis and forms the main line of inquiry. It is, then, as others who 
have nuanced these narratives before have also argued, not an attempt to argue against the use of 
these histories for lessons and inspiration for nonviolent campaigns and politics, but rather, an 
attempt to learn not just from the successes and virtues, but also from the failures, prejudice, 
coercion and problematic attitudes that can also be observed (see for example Mishra, 2018; 
Seidman, 2000, 166). As Seidman (2000, 166) argues, rather than denying the existence of a 
category of social movements that could be called ‘nonviolent’, or denying the normative claims of 
nonviolence theory because of this, a critical and nuanced approach to nonviolence history can 
“underscore the problems inherent in grading political protest against an absolutist scorecard on 
which violence and nonviolence are seen as pure and distinct categories”. The histories of these, 
and other, nonviolent movements are then not only important because of what happened, and 
what the literature can draw from that when creating theories of nonviolent resistance; they are 
also important in the sense of how they are remembered and retold in the literature, the narratives 
or popular perceptions of them (as Frankel (2001, 17) also argues with regards to the Sharpeville 
massacre).  
What these histories do show is, firstly, that the idea of what it means to be nonviolent can 
change. Whereas for Gandhi, for example, “nonviolence” meant no engagement with direct 
violence and an extreme call for sacrifice from resisters, in South Africa, the concept of being 
nonviolent also meant that if violence was going to break out, a nonviolent leader felt compelled to 
control and direct this as much as possible, and that a nonviolent movement had a responsibility to 
protect their own participants as well as opponents. Secondly, the histories have shown that 
violence will, in some way, play a role in the dynamics of a nonviolent movement. In South Africa, it 
did so most directly through a direct combination of methods; in the US, violence worked in the 
nonviolent dynamic both as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) threat of violence breaking out if 
nonviolent movements were not successful, and as the go-to methods for especially King and the 
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SCLC to gain national attention and push for federal intervention; whereas in India, violence played 
a role, as in the US, through building attention and sympathy when nonviolent protesters were 
exposed to extreme violence. These themes will be explored further in the following chapters.  
On their own, the themes of leadership and universalism are relevant to the question of 
violence in nonviolent movements in a number of ways. The lone male hero narrative can be related 
to this through two main avenues. Firstly, this is a narrative quite clearly taken from a hierarchical, 
militaristic view of organisations and political change, prevalent in armed struggle, in which the hero 
narrative is imperative. This legacy is certainly not new for nonviolence theory, which quite readily 
admits to taking lessons from military warfare, and to being a method of war through different 
means, as shown in Chapter Two. Secondly, the tendency to view organisations through this lens 
undermines democratic organisation, and diversity in the movement, but especially in leadership 
roles, as Ella Baker for example critiqued (Dyson, 2001, 297). Through this, prejudice, inquality, 
silencing, and repression can be reproduced within nonviolent movements. The importance of this 
to nonviolence theory is discussed and demonstrated in subsequent chapters. The issue of 
specificity versus universalism is important to understanding better the applicability of nonviolence 
lessons across contexts, where factors such as the repressiveness of the opponent, inequality in the 
wider society – and through that within the movement – and the role of othering through the 
creation of a community in the nonviolence movement, are all crucial to gain a better understanding 
of. What this section demonstrated is, in essence, that context does matter, and that it can be 
problematic and/or ineffective, and risk perpetuating violence unnecessarily, if tactics, lessons, and 
thoughts from one nonviolent movement are transferred uncritically to another.  
In an almost circular fashion, this final tension of specificity and universalism brings the 
discussion back to the importance of nuancing these histories. What the lesson of specificity shows 
from these three movements is, that “collective identity” is crucial to resistance movements, since 
it can bring people in to the movement and maintain their engagement with the resistance, 
especially “when a movement’s ultimate goal ... seems distant and while autocracy and repression 
persist” (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 32; Samuel, 2013, 397). The attempt to create a global, nonviolent 
imagined community, which cuts across local traditions of both violent and nonviolent resistance, 
differences in government repression, different degrees of economic inequality as well as different 
degress of prejudice, can arguably be seen in these popular narratives of polished, universally 
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appealing heroes of a global and unlimited nonviolence and respect for all. The components of 
tactics and action and “texts, narratives, and discourse” are some of the main parts of collective 
identity formation (Bartkowski ed, 2013, 39).  An example of this was provided by the Break Free 
and Campaign Nonviolence protests described at the beginning of this chapter, in which the actions 
of the present protesters incorporated important texts, anthems, and symbols from nonviolent 
movements of the past, resulting in a process of collective identity formation within a tradition of 
nonviolent resistance perceived as coherent and universal. Smithey (in Bartkowski ed, 2013, 39) 
writes of these actions intended to create or demonstrate collective identity that “[e]xperienced 
organizers make sure that the symbolism of a collective action is not lost on the media”, emphasising 
the importance of the performative aspect of collective identity, for example, the “performing” of 
nonviolence in order to join the “nonviolent movement”.  
Following on from these themes and discussions, the next chapter will discuss the concept 
of violence in depth in order to establish the argument that violence is a highly complex, multi-
dimensional, and dynamic concept. The chapter will not attempt to arrive at one definition of 
violence – just as the literature review did not attempt to arrive at one definition of nonviolence – 
but will provide an overview of some of the different definitions, principles for defining violence, as 
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Chapter Four: The Concept of Violence 
Although the concept and definition of violence is to some extent acknowledged as relevant to the 
study and practice of nonviolent resistance, the difficulties of drawing a line between violence and 
nonviolence are not fully explored – and this leads to a number of issues. While some recent work 
argues that the relationship between violence and nonviolence has been sufficiently explored in the 
literature, and any further focus on this is unnecessary (Baldoli, 2019, 8-9), the argument here is the 
exact opposite; both because this relationship has not been thoroughly explored in the literature, 
as demonstrated in the previous chapters, and because a definitive and final definition of violence 
is not possible, as will be demonstrated in this chapter. Therefore, a need to continuously discuss 
and think about this relationship arises. Having said that, Baldoli (ibid, 8) is certainly right to argue 
that not every interrogation of the concept of nonviolence has to start with discussing the concept 
of violence – precisely because a definition of violence will not be settled on, and consequently, 
waiting for this before being able to discuss nonviolence would be obsolete. What the analysis of 
violence and nonviolence here does share with Baldoli (ibid, 9) is the scepticism about analysing the 
two concepts as “opposites”. Rather than arguing that violence must be defined in order to define 
nonviolence as the opposite of this – or everything not violent – this thesis argues that the concept 
of violence needs to be investigated because it is part of nonviolent resistance in important ways, is 
the context for nonviolent resistance, and at the same time is still what nonviolent resistance seeks 
to avoid.  
Violence is, as will be demonstrated in this chapter, a vague and complex term. Stanko (ed, 
2003, 2), for example, writes that “[d]espite an assumed, almost self-evident core, ‘violence’ as a 
term is ambiguous and its usage is in many ways moulded by different people as well as by different 
social scientists to describe a whole range of events, feelings and harm” (see also for example Harris, 
1974, 215; Lawrence and Karim eds, 2007, 106). Despite this fact, much research within different 
fields, including statistical data analysis on violence tends to rely on an assumption that “everyone 
interprets the incident, the act, or the question in the same way” as either violent or not violent 
(Triplett et al., 2016, 332). This assumption can also, as demonstrated in the literature review, be 
traced through the field of nonviolent resistance studies. What is often thought of as the agreed 
upon definition of violence is what Harris (1974, 215) calls the obvious cases of violence such as 
“rape, murder, fire and sword paradigm which involves the sudden, forceful, and perhaps 
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unexpected, infliction of painful physical injury upon an unwilling victim”.    
In general politics as well, violence is an essential, and highly contested concept, and an 
effective way to raise the importance of a political problem: if it is violent, it is often taken more 
seriously than if it is simply “wrong”. Harris (1974, 213, 219) talks of the “rhetorical force” that the 
term violence has, one which leads in political discussions of violence to an “unwillingness of the 
various parties to renounce the right to use one of the most powerful terms of political rhetoric”. 
This is linked to a certain “popularised notion” of violence as including “two prominent players – 
one an evil perpetrator, the other an innocent victim” (Stanko ed, 2003, 4). What this notion does 
in politics is relegate violence to be something which “bad” people or citizens do, and not a normal 
presence in society. This is an extremely purist conception of violence, as it functions to create a 
perceived “pure” society of good people, who just need to figure out what to do with the few “bad”, 
violent people in it. Such a notion is so powerful that Stanko (ibid) recounts how, even when 
researchers were working on a project to challenge this notion, they were constantly having to deal 
with media interest in the research, which attempted to spin the research findings into ones that fit 
the popular narrative of an evil perpetrator and an innocent victim.  
The political importance of not only understanding individual and societal perceptions of 
violence, but also understanding the role that assumptions about violence within research play in 
politics is then crucial. Several historical examples demonstrate the influence that researchers can 
have on public opinion and policy by defining a problem as “violence”; this was a factor in raising 
opinions against for example child abuse, elder abuse, domestic violence, and so on (Triplett et al., 
2016, 347). Conversely, if research condones violence, or does not describe acts of force as violence, 
then “the fundamental assumption of learning theory is that definitions approving violence will lead 
to violence” (ibid, 334). Therefore: 
When researchers study violence, it is important that they remember that their own 
operationalization will have implications for the extent of the phenomenon uncovered, the 
causes of the phenomenon, and the consequences of the behavior. In addition, these 
operationalizations will affect how violence is constructed by consumers of the research 
(Triplett et al., 2016, 347). 
Personal bias is especially important for a field of research such as civil resistance studies, in 
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which there is a strong connection between researchers/theorists and consumers of the research. 
As shown in the literature review, research on nonviolence involves a more or less explicit 
understanding or definition of violence as well. This means that the effects of how researchers 
conceptualise violence will firstly define to what extent violence is seen to play a role in nonviolent 
movements (a broader definition will most likely mean that more violence is seen to occur), and 
secondly it will influence strongly how nonviolent activists and practitioners themselves 
conceptualise violence. As researchers “are people too”, the bias and variation in individual 
understandings of violence are, as well as “hegemonic processes that influence” how people view 
the world, also relevant to the process of using a working definition (assumed or stated) of violence 
in research (Aune, 2011, 429; Triplett et al., 2016, 333-334, 347; a discussion example of this can be 
found in Stanko ed, 2003, 3).  
The approach of this chapter, and thesis, is the same as in for example Stanko’s (ed, 2003, 
3) study of violence in the United Kingdom, which is the approach that “what violence means will 
always be fluid, not fixed; it is mutable”. The approach to dealing with this conception of violence is 
to discuss instead “theories of violence [which] must be as varied as the practices within which they 
occur” (Lawrence and Karim eds, 2007, 7). Following from this approach, this chapter is 
interdisciplinary, drawing on a number of fields which all add to the study of violence, such as 
criminology, sociology, philosophy, political theory, and, of course, nonviolent resistance literature. 
While some of these are broader in their application, some add to specific aspects of violence, such 
as criminology, which is mainly focused on interpersonal violence. Sociology adds significantly to 
the study of violence in relation to social structures, as well as to the social construction of different 
conceptions of violence which are then made to be seen as normal or universal. Political theories, 
such as feminism, have worked to highlight previously overlooked forms of violence – and with that 
have had a more openly normative approach – such as intimate partner violence and sexual assault.  
 In addition, this chapter goes beyond the common visualisation of different definitions of 
violence as mapped on a spectrum ranging from narrow to broad definitions (for example 
Vinthagen, 2015, 65; Galtung, 1969, 168), and argues instead that viewing definitions as reducible 
to one single spectrum is overly simplistic and does not capture the different ways in which a 
definition of violence might be considered “narrow” or “broad”. Instead, it presents a number of 
definitional lines, categories, and spectrums, which overlap and interact with each other. This lack 
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of clear separations is not a mistake or inaccuracy as much as it is a reflection of the complexity of 
how violence works in the world. The conclusion of this chapter will summarise the key points about 
the conceptualisation and definition of violence, as well as determine possible implications for 
nonviolence theory.  
Material and non-material definitions of violence 
A fundamentally important dividing line between different definitions of violence is that between 
material and non-material definitions of violence. For this chapter and thesis, these two categories 
of violence will both appear in discussions of other and definitional boundaries. However, the 
dividing line is of key importance, mainly because in many theories of violence, only material or 
physical harm qualifies as violence (e.g. Devetak and Hughes eds, 2007, 10), and the expansion of 
violence to include non-physical harm is highly contested, including in academic discussions and 
projects on the topic (e.g. Nimni, 2017; Stanko, 2003, 7).  
Non-material definitions of violence are definitions which see harm other than physical or 
bodily harm as a possible foundation for classifying an act as violent. Material definitions, in 
contrast, limit conceptions of violence to consequences of physical or bodily harm. This definition 
of violence is, despite the constant widening of the literature and thinking on non-material 
definitions, still the most commonly used, especially in discussions which do not explicitly discuss 
how to define violence. Much of the nonviolent resistance literature covered in the literature review 
falls under this (e.g. Chenoweth and Lewis, 2013, 419). The division between material and non-
material definitions of violence appears in different places throughout this thesis: for instance, many 
of the other categorisations and definitional lines discussed in the present chapter will encompass 
both categories, or will explicitly only be discussing one of these; additionally, the division is 
especially important, and explicitly discussed, in Chapter Six which discusses violence within 
nonviolent movements, and in which the question of whether non-material forms of harm qualify 
as violence is a point of contention within movements.     
Justification as a definitional boundary 
By using justification as a definitional boundary around violence, “violence” is defined or seen as 
unjustified causing of harm, whereas “force”or an equivalent term is used for harm caused with an 
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acceptable justification (Triplett et al., 2016, 332). As has been discussed previously in this thesis, 
there is a tendency to equate “violence” with “evil”, “bad” and so on (ibid), and so, the association 
between violence and a lack of justification is a common one. While this section will mainly discuss 
political or philosophical theories which make this distinction, it is worth noting that it is a commonly 
observed distinction employed by individuals when asked to rate an event as either violent or not 
violent, suggesting that the mechanisms behind this classification “extend beyond factors related to 
the nature of the act itself to include those factors that give the act meaning”, one of which is 
whether the action is seen as “necessary, good, and/or legitimate”, or “bad” (ibid, 333-336, 345).   
The definitional line that relates to justification is important in two ways: in part because 
there are influential social, philosophical, and political theories of violence which employ this line; 
and in part because it seems to be a common bias in perception, and therefore, it should be assumed 
that this bias will influence the dominant views within social movements, communities, etc. These 
two parts are also related, however, since the creators of theories of violence are also, of course, 
individuals, and open to the same forms of bias (e.g., Lawrence and Karim eds, 2007, 10; Stanko, 
2003, 3).  
As mentioned, an often used term for a perceived good or justified act which includes the 
use of physical force or the causing of harm (and could therefore be labelled violent) is “force”. 
Gandhi (2007/1909, 120), for example, talks of this distinction when discussing an example of 
stopping a child from running towards a fire, saying that to “forcibly prevent” the child from doing 
so is “force of a different order” to violence. Through this example, Gandhi argues that the intention 
and consequence of using force determines whether or not the use of force is violent or not. In the 
example of the child and the fire, Gandhi (ibid) argues that “in thus preventing the child, you are 
minding entirely its own interest; you are exercising authority for its sole benefit”; however, the 
argument does not hold in arguments for using force/violence against the British in India, since 
when “using brute force against the English you consult entirely your own, that is the national, 
interest” (ibid). Although Gandhi does then use justification as a definitional boundary between 
violence and force, he is markedly different from most thinkers who do this, since his idea of 
justification is very narrow, and applies only when the personal or communal interests of the violent 
actor are completely removed from the scenario.  
Other theories of violence, such as “Realist, behaviourist, and rational choice” theories, 
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explicitly deny the use of justification as a definitional boundary around violence (Baron et al., 2019, 
201). These theories talk of concepts such as “deterrence and compellence to describe violence as 
a tool that is rationally wielded to achieve a desired end” (ibid). While the concept of “rational” 
actions is one with a number of connotations and theories attached to it, a minimum interpretation 
of this would presumably mean knowing the consequences of an action, both in terms of the 
chances of achieving the desired aim, and any possible side effects or collateral damage, as well as 
having an ability to balance the two.  
Malcolm X is another example of the refusal to use justification as a definitional line between 
violence and force or not violence. Although he does advocate and justify violence in his speeches 
and writings, he never calls the actions anything other than violent. Arguing for what he calls the 
“uncompromising stance”, Malcolm X states that:  
you should never be nonviolent unless you run into some nonviolence. I’m nonviolent with 
those who are nonviolent with me. But when you drop that violence on me, then you’ve 
made me go insane, and I’m not responsible for what I do … Any time you know you’re within 
the law, within your legal rights, within your moral rights, in accord with justice, then die for 
what you believe in. But don’t die alone. Let your dying be reciprocal. This is what is meant 
by equality (Malcolm X, 2007/1964, 149) 
Violence in this argument is then not necessarily justified in terms of an end, but rather in 
terms of its cause and the principle of equality; that is, violence may cause further violence, and the 
victim of the original violence is not to be blamed for their reaction. 
Interpersonal, systemic, and structural violence 
The discussion of the concept of violence in this chapter goes, as mentioned before, beyond the 
common depiction of violence definitions as fitting on a linear spectrum ranging from narrow to 
wide definitions. Instead, the argument is that the field of definitions of violence goes beyond this 
single line, and is comprised of a number of spectrums, definitional dividing lines, and categories of 
meanings of violence. The following section does, however, present a spectrum of sorts, by 
introducing firstly the concept of interpersonal violence as a relatively narrow conception of 
violence; secondly the concept of systemic violence, which broadens the scope of the context and 
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background structures that are relevant to make sense of individual acts of violence; and thirdly the 
concept of structural violence, which is a broad conception of violence in which social, political, 
legal, and economic structures can be described as violent. Apart from sitting on the spectrum just 
defined, these three forms of violence span another spectrum which is the spectrum between 
material and non-material conceptions of violence; that is, both interpersonal, systemic, and 
structural violence can be either material or non-material. 
Interpersonal violence 
Interpersonal violence is violence committed by an identifiable individual actor (or group), usually 
towards an identifiable victim or victims. This definition of violence is a major category within 
several areas of study, such as criminology and sociology (Triplett et al., 2016, 334; Walby, 2013, 
96). Interpersonal violence is also the form of violence most commonly thought of and used to mean 
violence if nothing else is specified, both in general usage and research, perhaps because it is the 
most obvious occurrence of violence (Baron et al., 2019, 2000; Galtung, 1969, 173). Within the 
category of interpersonal violence, the definition can be material or non-material, and a number of 
other definitional lines can be drawn within this broad category (sometimes called simply personal 
violence (e.g., Galtung, 1969, 173)). Stanko (2003, 3) for example writes that their edited volume 
contains research which treats “[b]ullying, verbal abuse, physical harm, threats, intimidation and 
killing” all as instances of violence.  
  As this chapter demonstrates, considerable work has gone into theorising violence as a 
broader concept than the often implicitly defined idea of narrow, directly imposed physical harm; 
in contrast, Hannah Arendt spends time and analysis on elaborately and thoroughly drawing 
definitional lines around a narrow conception of violence, and distinguishing the phenomenon from 
concepts such as power, force, and authority (Arendt, 1970, 44-45). Importantly, she distinguishes 
power from violence, writing that while the "extreme form of power is All against One, the extreme 
form of violence is One against All. And this latter is never possible without instruments" (ibid, 42). 
In many ways, Arendt seems to present power and violence as contrasting phenomena, with power 
being held by collectives, while violence and strength is individual. An important point to make 
about violence is precisely the instrumentality inherent to the concept, since "the implements of 
violence, like all other tools, are designed and used for the purpose of multiplying natural strength" 
(ibid, 46). This, then, underlines the idea of violence as physical, as somatic incapacitation, whereas 
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many of the broader forms of violence are arguably, to Arendt, more a matter of the misuse of 
power. It also raises the possibility of popular rebellions against, say, a tyrannical state or leader, 
being about both power and violence, rather than just violence.  
An important aspect of interpersonal violence, especially when conceived of as a random or 
not systemic form of violence, is its usage to delineate a perceived line between a “civilised society” 
and its “uncivilised outcasts”. That is, violent acts are used to create a sense of fear and threat, 
against which society – or the state – can protect through their monopoly on the use of force (Butler, 
2020, 6). This is a sharp contrast to conceptions of violence which see the very structures of society 
and the state as inherently violent, meaning that violence is part of society, rather than a 
phenomenon which marks the boundary between society and “not society”. Stanko (ed, 2003, 4) 
writes, for example that “[t]here is a contradictory assumption that violence as a social 
phenomenon is a break from the presumed civilising progression of modernity”, meaning that an 
increase in violence - especially the forms of violence that spring from poverty - is seen as 
contradicting or undermining a narrative about the safety and progress of modern society. However, 
instead of addressing the inequality and poverty in this picture, Stanko (ibid) argues that “we prefer 
to pass laws [against these instances of violence] than to look carefully at how violence is so much 
welded to (often unequal) social relations”. Walby (2013, 104-105) argues how this narrative of 
violence as deviant personal acts on or around the margins of society can also be reproduced in 
academic discussions of violence. This is particularly an effect of bringing different conceptions of 
violence, such as interpersonal, systemic, and structural violence, too far apart in analysis. An 
example of this is when interpersonal violence is seen only through the lens of crime and therefore 
reserved for the field of criminology, at which part interpersonal crime and violence comes to be 
seen as “on the margins of society, deviance” rather than as a “part of structured social inequality” 
(ibid).   
Private violence 
The category of so-called private violence is perhaps one of the most contested ones within the 
study of violence. While the definitional line in question here - which is between categories typically 
called “public” and “private” violence - is not one which conceptualises “violence” on one side and 
“not violence” on the other, it does typically denote a sense of relevant/important violence versus 
irrelevant/less important violence (McAllister ed, 1982, 9-10). It is this hierarchy of relevance which 
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has been contested for decades, especially by the feminist movement, which famously declared that 
“the personal is political” (Hanisch, 1969; McAllister ed, 1982, 11). While this refrain started with 
the “second wave white” feminists who “addressed cisgender men’s violence against women as a 
system of oppression and not as a personal issue”, it has continued to be used by intersectional 
feminist approaches as well (Chen et al., 2016, xxvi-xxvii). In academia, this has produced a “growing 
body of scholarship focus[ing] attention on women’s experiences of violence in the home and in the 
public space, and the state’s responses to this” (Kaladelfos and Featherstone, 204, 233).  
It is worth noting here that although discussions of what is political when it comes to 
instances of violence is discussed here, that does not equate to the category of “political violence” 
discussed later in the chapter, which is a narrower category defined by the aim of the violence, 
which has to be an identifiable political goal. Behind the statement that the personal is political is a 
challenge of the fact that so-called private violence is often relegated to a category of violence which 
does not matter to politics, political theory, or is at best less important that “public” or “political” 
violence, based on an idea of a public and a private sphere (McAllister ed, 1982, 9-10; Topper, 2001, 
42). It is therefore important to note that even when discussions of these categories continue to 
use these terms, such as this thesis does, these should not be seen as ontological categories - that 
is what actually can be seen by the public, or what actually is political. Rather, they are socially 
constructed categories of what should be seen and what should matter politically. 
Triplett et al. (2016, 338) illustrate this in their paper on individual perceptions of violence, 
writing that “[r]eserach on interpersonal violence indicates that people react less tolerantly to acts 
of force between strangers than family members”, demonstrating that ideas of public and private 
often have more to do with the relationship between actors than any actual placement in the street 
or a private home. This decreased political and legal attention to private violence can be observed 
also in public debates and legislation around rape, which tends to still focus heavily on the “stranger 
in the dark street” narrative, despite research and statistics showing clearly that most rapes are 
committed by people who know the victim (Linder and Lacy, 2020, 433-434). It is this creation of a 
category of so-called private violence, classified as not mattering in political discussions and political 
theory, which is discussed both here and in Chapter Six of the thesis.   
Systemic violence 
The concept of systemic violence addresses a number of concerns about the problematic nature of 
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calling some violence(s) private, by highlighting the systematic oppression and inequality connecting 
seemingly separate acts of private violence into a wider system of repression. Systemic violence is 
interpersonal violence which systematically happens only or more often to certain groups of people, 
often committed by a certain group of people, because of structural or systemic background factors. 
The individual instances of violence may, however, appear as interpersonal and unconnected, in 
that they are committed by one person towards one or more other persons. Systemic violence 
covers terms such as gendered violence, homophobic violence, racist violence, and so on. While this 
clearly emphasises the close link between theories of systemic violence and anti-violence activism 
and social justice work, academic fields such as sociology have also seen a rising interest in the study 
of “interpersonal violence in relation to inequalities of gender, ethnicity, religion and sexuality, as 
new forms of violence are documented and theorized” (Walby, 2013, 96, 100).  
These background factors are typically systemic oppression or prejudice, which become a 
condition for such seemingly separate violent events by making them more likely, easier to commit, 
possible to commit with no or fewer consequences, more “normal” or acceptable to surrounding 
society, and even less visible (Crenshaw, 1991, 1241-1242). At the same time, the individual 
instances of violence can also be part of upholding the oppressive structures they are part of. 
Systemic violence theory is then one of a group of theories which “look at violence and its definition 
from a conflict perspective [and] encourage us to think about violence as an expression of power 
that often occurs within hierarchical social arrangements” (Triplett et al., 2016, 336).  
Within the category of systemic violence are the widespread and (at times) widely discussed 
concepts of sexual and gender-based violence (Kaladelfos and Featherstone, 2014, 233). Although 
these are of course not the only forms of systemic violence, they serve as a strong example of the 
principles behind this concept and will be used here to illustrate the wider concept. This example 
also demonstrates another important point, which is the role of so-called critical or activist 
perspectives on theory and academia, since historically, sexual and gender-based violence have 
mainly been addressed by feminist perspectives which have “long been at the cutting edge of 
nuanced investigations of violence” (ibid). Through this pressure from feminist theories, new 
understandings of the concept of violence as such have thus been articulated and discussed. 
The work of Kimberlé Crenshaw is an example of this form of nuanced definition and 
examination of violence, stemming from a discussion of violence against women of colour. As part 
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of this discussion, Crenshaw (1991, 1251-1252) coined the term “intersectionality” which has since 
become an influential concept in studies of violence and oppression (e.g., Collins, 2017; Parker and 
Hefner, 2015). Crenshaw (1991, 1242) highlights how a nuanced and broader understanding of 
violence is a continuation of previous work in feminism and other identity politics. She argues 
further that the seemingly separate events of interpersonal violence are for some an “almost 
routine violence that shapes their lives” (ibid, 1241), and this is when individual instances of violence 
become systemic. This argument brings structure into the discussion and treats these instances of 
violence as “social and systemic” rather than “isolated and individual” (ibid, 1241-1242). 
Importantly, this process leads to decreased visibility of such violent events, since:  
At its first eruption, violence is always experienced as unique. If given time and repetition, 
however, it becomes routine, part of the air, and one learns how to breathe it without being 
asphyxiated. One no longer seeks to eliminate it, nor even to understand it (Lawrence and 
Karim eds, 2007, 5).  
In her analysis, Crenshaw does not directly broaden the scope of what violence is often taken 
to mean. Rather, violence is social and systemic in that physical violence is often an immediate 
manifestation of a much wider system of subordination. This relates to other feminist analysis of 
violence which emphasises the “systemic nature of gendered power in structuring legal, political 
and social responses to violence”, so that, for example, women are often financially dependent on 
staying in a violent relationship, or that seeking legal redress for gendered violence or rape is 
extremely difficult and unlikely to succeed (Kaladelfos and Featherstone, 2014, 233). The theory of 
systemic violence means, then, that although instances of sexual and gendered violence are, in an 
immediate sense, interpersonal and individual events, these instances of violence have a clear 
systematic and political nature. In other words, direct physical violence and systematic oppression 
are in a number of cases integrally linked and cannot be understood or addressed separately.  
Structural violence 
In the definition of structural violence, an identifiable individual or group is not needed as a 
perpetrator of violence; instead, social, political, economic, or legal structures can be violent, by 
causing physical or non-physical harm to certain people (van der Wusten, 1996, 406). The definition 
of violence in this category is then one mainly focused on the effect, that is harm, rather than an 
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intent, action, or identifiable perpetrator being what defines violence (Vinthagen, 2015, 65). 
Galtung (1969, 170-171) writes that what follows from both interpersonal and structural violence is 
that “individuals may be killed or mutilated, hit or hurt”. Structural violence shares with systemic 
violence a focus on specific groups or identities being the victims of violence, rather than violence 
hitting equally or randomly across a society. Well known examples of structural violence arguments 
are articulations of capitalism as a violent economic structure (e.g., Bruenig, 2017; Laurie and Shaw, 
2018), and borders as violent (e.g., Isakjee et al., 2020; Jones, 2016; Pallister-Wilkins, 2017, 19). 
Galtung (1969, 178) also uses the term indirect violence for structural violence and describes 
this as the main line of distinction between structural and interpersonal violence. As mentioned 
above, the concept of structural violence falls on one side of an important dividing line between 
different definitions of violence, the question of whether or not an identifiable actor is needed to 
talk of violence (ibid, 170). Galtung (ibid, 175) states that the mechanism behind structural violence 
is “inequality, above all in the distribution of power”, and Vinthagen (2015, 65) describes it as mainly 
“a kind of ‘injustice’ or ‘oppression’”. Harris sums up the core of the argument of structural violence, 
and why it is important, writing that:  
Where muggings and violent demonstrations are the fear and the theorists speak for the 
fearful, vigorous direct actions will seem the most important features of violence. Where the 
streets are quiet, but people who could be saved are left to die of neglect or cold or hunger, 
or are crippled or killed by their living or working conditions, a different group of people may 
suffer, and other theorists may see their suffering as attributable to human agency, and so 
class it a part of man’s violence to man (Harris, 1974, 219).  
This quote illustrates clearly the aim of structural violence theories and definitions, which is 
to go beyond what is immediately seen as “violent” – that is, direct, physical harm of one person by 
another – and conversely, what would then be seen as a “not violent”, or “peaceful” situation, and 
challenge this assumption. By widening the scope of who or what can be violent, and how directly 
responsibility is placed, structural definitions of violence bring everyday and often unseen harm into 
the centre of discussions of violence.  
Ted Honderich’s (1976, 13-21) discussion of the very different intuitive reactions people will 
have towards violence (understood as direct, physical, and obvious violence) and inequality (which 
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following the arguments here could be labelled structural violence) provides an argument for why 
direct violence is met with much more outrage and aversion than inequality is, despite the 
significant harm caused by inequality. He argues that one reason for this is because of: 
the correct perception of the inequalities as constituting a state of order, and violence as 
constituting a circumstance of disorder. Inequality is a product of law, of diverse settled 
institutions, of custom and indeed of assent … Violence is otherwise. A man shot by a political 
assassin is one of two figures in a circumstance of a wholly different character, a 
circumstance of anarchy (Honderich, 1976, 19).  
As mentioned, a well-established example of structural violence is when the capitalist 
economic structure is described as violence, as famously done by Marx and in Marxist theories in 
general (Harris, 1974, 196). In his works, Marx provided “repeated examples of the injury, shame, 
degradation, and death suffered every day by the working class and directly caused by the capitalist 
economy” (ibid). What Marx focused on was the harm caused to humans by working in unsafe or 
“injurious conditions” which could be prevented by an employer or society, but are not because of 
a focus on monetary profits (ibid, 197). As Harris (ibid) writes, “Marx believes that where human 
intervention could prevent this harm, then failure to prevent the harm must be seen as a cause”. In 
a similar line of reasoning, Galtung argues that:  
if people are starving when this is objectively avoidable, then violence is committed, 
regardless of whether there is a clear subject-action-object relation, as during a siege 
yesterday or no such clear relation, as in the way world economic relations are organized 
today (Galtung, 1969, 172).  
An example of a non-material category of violence is Pierre Bourdieu’s influential concept of 
“symbolic violence” (Bourdieu, 2007/1977, 195). The concept of symbolic violence applies to a 
number of areas in society and was based on Bourdieu’s experiences in French-colonised Algeria, 
sociological analysis of Western societies, the concept of gift giving, as well as linguistic analysis (von 
Holdt, 2013, 113; Topper, 2001, 36-37). Symbolic violence refers to gestures, actions, norms etc., 
which function to retain a mode of domination between individuals, without the “dominated” 
themselves being aware of this (Aune, 2011, 432; Topper, 2001, 36). Other definitions focus on 
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effects and define symbolic violence as:  
the experience of feeling out of place, anxious, awkward, shamed, stupid and so on because 
those who experience symbolic violence are both objectively unable to construct 
appropriate actions (because the resources necessary to do so are unavailable to them) and 
subjectively committed to, in the sense of recognizing, the very rules of distinction by which 
they are excluded and dominated (Samuel, 2013, 402).  
Through these “invisible” mechanisms of domination, symbolic violence makes “the 
reproduction of social order something of an inevitability”, in part because dominated individuals 
often perceive the socially constructed norms of behaviour, identity, speech, etc., as natural and 
therefore participate in reinforcing the norms that oppress them (von Holdt, 2013, 115-116; 
Bourdieu, 2007/1977, 195-198; Topper, 2001, 37). Importantly, symbolic violence is not necessarily 
practiced or used consciously by a dominant group or individual, but can be used subconsciously as 
well (Topper, 2001, 47).  
The example of symbolic violence in the shape of language and linguistic norms provides a 
clearer idea of what is meant by symbolic violence (Topper, 2001, 43). Domination happens here 
because there are clear social expectations of “correct” ways of speaking, as well as prejudice 
attached to having a certain accent and so on; in this way, speaking correctly confers legitimacy to 
a speaker, and a result of this is that:  
in formal settings where ‘official’ modes of speech are socially authorized as the norm, one 
often finds silent and impalpable, yet also insidious forms of symbolic violence in which 
dominated speakers (those less skilled in the use of the authorized mode of language) 
desperately seek to correct, either consciously or unconsciously, the stigmatized aspects of 
their pronunciation, vocabulary, and syntax (Topper, 2001, 37).  
The example of speech is also important in political theory, since (free and equal) speech is, 
and has been for a long time, integrally linked to ideas of politics and the political (Topper, 2001, 43-
44). In an analysis focusing on symbolic violence, such as Topper’s (2001, 45-46), the idea of free 
speech goes beyond direct exclusion of certain people from speaking - a more direct and observable 
form of violence or domination - and focuses on how “although there may be no formal barriers to 
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speech within a particular field, there are practical barriers to authoritative speech, I.e., speech that 
is recognized as legitimate and worthy of attention”. Most often, this will lead dominated speakers 
to simply withdraw from the space in question (ibid).  
Symbolic violence is then argued to be violence because it results in the harm of keeping 
individuals in relations of being dominated. Samuel (2013, 402) adds a further dimension to the 
concept of symbolic violence, by arguing that apart from the “objective hardship” experienced by 
the dominated in a given social order, symbolic violence is also “the subjective experience of self-
blame, hesitation, self-censorship and so on” experienced because of a misfit with the dominant 
social order. It is important to note that Bourdieu emphasises that instances of symbolic violence 
are not identical or as “brutal” as forms of physical violence and that symbolic violence differs from 
physical violence because it works “not directly on bodies but through them” (Topper, 2001, 47). 
However, it shares “an accent on relations of domination and subordination, and on modes of 
domination or the breaching of human dignity” with other forms of violence (ibid). By defining the 
concept of symbolic violence, Bourdieu is credited with facilitating theoretical and academic 
explorations of: “those inconspicuous forms of violence, domination, denigration, and exclusion in 
everyday affairs that go unnoticed precisely because they are so ordinary and ‘unremarkable’” 
(Topper, 2001, 42).   
In a discussion of interpersonal and structural violence, Galtung (1969, 173) provides a 
convincing argument for why interpersonal violence is often focused on more, despite the fact that 
it does not necessarily result in more harm than systemic and structural forms of violence. Galtung 
(ibid) writes that “[p]ersonal violence shows”, and is clearly experienced as such by the victims of 
violence. In contrast, “the object of structural violence may be persuaded not to perceive this at all” 
(ibid). He writes that:  
Personal violence represents changes and dynamism - not only ripples on waves, but waves 
on otherwise tranquil waters. Structural violence is silent, it does not show - it is essentially 
static, it is the tranquil waters. In a static society, personal violence will be registered, 
whereas structural violence may be seen as about as natural as the air around us (Galtung, 
1969, 173). 
Harris (1974, 216) adds to this with an argument for the importance of looking also at 
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structural and systemic violence, writing that when evaluating whether a society is violent or uses 
violent to a significant extent, “we would certainly not ignore the fact that the society eliminated an 
opposition group or an unpopular minority by herding them into ghettos where they were left to 
die of starvation or disease”. Finally, Stanko states that:  
In some ways, the willingness to make ‘ordinary’ violence visible heightens awareness about 
the damage of violence, and this is a good thing. It demonstrates that we are now in a 
position to challenge the impact of violence for groups of people where before, such violence 
was ‘tolerated’ as a condition of living in the world (Stanko ed, 2003, 12).  
Political violence 
This section will discuss the broad and commonly used concept of political violence. Although 
political violence is, in a sense, related to the definitional boundary of justification discussed earlier 
- it is distinguished as a separate category of violence mainly through its aim or justification of 
achieving certain political goals - it is different in the sense that it mostly does not function as a 
definitional line between violence and “not violence” (often named force instead). In his influential 
work on political violence, especially focusing on political violence on the Left, Ted Honderich 
defines political violence as  
a considerable or destroying use of force against persons or things, a use of force prohibited 
by law, directed to a change in the policies, personnel or system of government, and hence 
also directed to changes in the existence of individuals in the society and perhaps other 
societies (Honderich, 1976, 9, emphasis removed).  
With this definition, Honderich distinguishes political violence from state violence (or at least 
from state violence that complies with the legal limitations placed on state power), through the 
qualification that political violence must be illegal violence. Other definitions of political violence 
focus explicitly on the collective nature of this form of violence, defining political violence as “those 
repertoires of collective action that involve great physical force and cause damage to an adversary 
to achieve political aims” (della Porta, 2013, 6).  
Political violence covers a wide range of acts and events. For example, Lorenzo et al. (eds, 
2014, 3) list events such as “violent protest, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, and civil wars”, 
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della Porta (2013, 6) mentions “attacks on property, rioting, violent confrontations between ethnic 
or political groups, clashes with police, physical attacks directed against specific targets, random 
bombings, armed seizure of places or people (including armed trespassing), holdups, and hijacking”, 
and Honderich (1976, 98) writes that the definition “covers such things as race riots in America, the 
destruction by fire and bomb of pubs and shops in Ulster, and, in both places and also in England, 
the injuring, maiming and killing of citizens, policemen or soldiers. It also encompasses revolutionary 
violence of the past”. Further, Honderich (ibid) specifies that the use of force “does not require that 
the agents of violence have in view highly specific aims of change”, which is why riots are included 
in his list, “despite the absence of well-articulated intentions of the given kind and also despite their 
non-rational momentum”.  
Although the concept of political violence is well-studied in both political theory and 
terrorism studies, it has only more recently become significantly incorporated into the field of social 
movement studies (Lorenzo et al. eds, 2014, 15; della Porta, 2013, 7). This is “perhaps because 
researchers [in social movement studies] had been inclined to study groups and organizations they 
felt sympathetic to, which had not included violent political organizations” (Lorenzo et al. eds, 2014, 
1). However, the concept of political violence is, according to Lorenzo et al. (ibid, 8), important to 
this area of study, mainly because “political violence often develops in the context of larger protest 
movements”. Political violence is especially important to the field of nonviolent resistance studies 
since the examples of violence said to not be used here are mainly examples of political violence 
(e.g., Chenoweth and Stephan 2011, 12-13).  
Through extensive writing on violence and revolution, Hannah Arendt has contributed 
significantly to the literature on political violence. In On Violence, Arendt (1969, 35) writes of the 
“general reluctance to deal with violence as a phenomenon in its own right”, and in On Revolution, 
she traces the relationship between war and revolution, the 20th century’s “two central political 
issues” (Arendt, 1963, 1). What these two political phenomena have in common is the role of 
violence, and Arendt writes that “revolutions and wars are not even conceivable outside the domain 
of violence”, a fact which sets “them apart from all other political phenomena” (ibid, 9). Arendt 
conceptualises a revolution as a political event which leads to a fundamental break and a new 
beginning and argues that “no beginning [can] be made without using violence, without violating” 
(ibid, 10). Although this sense of beginning could perhaps be conceived as a negative or undesirable 
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event, to Arendt (ibid, 27) it is crucial, because it is necessary in order to achieve freedom, i.e., “the 
experience of man’s faculty to begin something new”.  
Although Arendt then describes violence as necessary for revolution, and revolution as an 
essential political event because it leads to freedom through a new beginning, in general, she does 
not ascribe violence a central role in politics as such. Instead, Arendt (1963, 9) describes violence as 
a “marginal phenomenon in the political realm” or often as simply outside of the political realm 
altogether. In fact, violence is in a sense destructive of the political realm, a realm based on speech 
and persuasion, because “[w]here violence rules absolutely … everything and everybody must fall 
silent” (ibid). While this does raise a question of whether Arendt would argue that the concept of 
“political violence” is nonsensical altogether, it is argued here that since revolutions and wars are 
commonly – and by Arendt – classified as political phenomena, and Arendt discusses the role of 
violence in these, her theory of violence can usefully be applied to the theme of political violence. 
Arendt (ibid) does address this inherent contradiction herself, but nevertheless argues that 
revolutions and wars are political phenomena because they are not “completely determined by 
violence”. This is a sharp contrast to other influential political thinkers in the Western tradition, such 
as Weber, who argued that “[t]he decisive means for politics is violence” (quoted in Devetak and 
Hughes eds, 2007, 10).  
State violence 
While political violence has been shown to be a wide category of politically motivated violence, the 
smaller category of state violence is rarely described as a form of political violence (or even as 
violence at all), despite the clear political aims and consequences of much state violence. This 
seeming contradiction illustrates the definitional boundary around justification very well, and is 
arguably a prime example of the use of justification to call an act “force” rather than “violence”. For 
example, della Porta (2013, 6) argues that “political violence is generally understood as behavior 
that violates the prevailing definition of legitimate political action”, which excludes many forms of 
state violence from being political violence. State violence is also an important concept in the 
context of this thesis, because state violence - or a state overstepping what is perceived to be the 
boundary of legitimate state violence - is often the cause and context for an uprising or resistance 
campaign, and it is therefore another way in which violence plays a role in nonviolent resistance.  
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In contrast to this common separation of state violence and political violence as distinct 
categories, Frazer and Hutchings (2019) challenge the distinction in a number of ways. Firstly, they 
argue that the two forms of violence are at least inherently and closely connected, since the majority 
of events that would be considered political violence, such as riots or sabotage, are accompanied 
by the involvement of “police and security personnel whose job is to protect the existing social and 
political order, including policing demonstrations and counter-demonstrations” (Frazer and 
Hutchings, 2019, 7-8). However, the authors go further and argue that the state violence-political 
violence line is “[c]learly … a difficult distinction to sustain” because of the “vagueness of these 
distinctions, between institutions, actors and kinds of violence” (Frazer and Hutchings, 2019, 9, 12). 
This leads them to argue that:  
a more plausible approach might be to include in the category of political violence all 
violence connected to political purposes broadly conceived, including winning, securing, 
stabilizing, destabilizing, deploying and challenging power (Frazer and Hutchings, 2019, 12).    
Whether seen as just another instance of political violence, or a unique category of state 
violence or force, the relationship between states and violence is well documented and thoroughly 
discussed. This was famously pointed out already in 1919 when Weber defined the state as “a 
human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force 
within a given territory” and argued that “the relation between the state and violence is an 
especially intimate one” (quoted in Barbalet, 2020, 3). Further, authors such as Devetak (Devetak 
and Hughes eds, 2007, 12) argue that “all states, from ‘failed’ states to ‘strong’ ones, are conditioned 
by violence, even if the type, degree and intensity of this violence varies”. State violence essentially 
functions as a “central part of the punishment for rule-breakers” with the assumption that this 
punishment will deter people from breaking the rules (Vinthagen, 2015, 173). The state’s monopoly 
on violence, through “key groups such as the police and the military”, creates a possibility for this 
deterrent to be in place (Vinthagen, 2015, 173).  
Violence is further described as central to the process of state building, both by establishing 
borders through international warfare and establishing absolute power by subduing the population 
within those borders (Devetak and Hughes eds, 2007, 11). Within Weber’s influential theory of the 
state, “states had to monopolize control over the instruments of violence” in order to “consolidate 
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and intensify their rule” (ibid). This process “required the concentration of administration power 
and more intensive and extensive forms of social surveillance through policing” (ibid). Even in more 
established states, violence remains “not just a permanent potential but a structural component of 
the state” (ibid, 12). 
Further, in another example of interpersonal violence being used to draw boundaries 
between “society” and the dangers outside it, European states were able to further focus “political 
authority around the state’s monopoly over physical violence” by fighting and minimising so-called 
“private international violence” such as “pirates, privateers, mercenaries, and merchant 
companies” (Devetak and Hughes eds, 2007, 11). Through this solidification of a monopoly on 
violence, states were able to produce “a pacified social space that makes the outbreak of physical 
force less likely. That is why the monopoly over force has been central to the state’s legitimacy” 
(ibid, 12), because it is seen as guaranteeing the safety of its citizens.  
A number of thinkers have, however, been challenging this assumed right of the state to use 
physical force to coerce. Famous examples of this include Marxist theories, anarchist theory, and 
also Gandhi’s thinking on the state (Gandhi, 2007/1909, 123; Lawrence and Karim, 2007, 12-13). In 
his writings, Gandhi is not merely against British rule over India, but more generally against the 
conception that a state should be governed by majority rule with no acceptance of civil disobedience 
of laws that a citizen might find immoral or unjust (Gandhi, 2007/1909, 123). Rather, Gandhi (ibid, 
123-124) writes a “passive resister will say he will not obey a law that is against his conscience”. 
Such continued scepticism and resistance is a crucial part of the concept of swaraj, or self-rule (ibid).  
Harris (1974) summarises the Marxist conception of violence as one which seeks to 
emphasise violence and physical harm that is often overlooked. They write that while it is often easy 
to see events such as revolutions as having led to an unusual number of deaths, if the deaths 
resulting from the regime in place were calculated based on factors such as “starvation and 
injustice”, it would not be drastically different from the death rate from revolutionary violence 
(Harris, 1974, 196). Thus, Marxist theories of violence point to the political agendas or “partisan 
hypocrisy” that can be behind seeing some physical harm as the result of violence and others as 
simply inevitable or the state of the world and argue that “responsibility rests as much with those 
who allow such states of affairs to continue as with those who brought them about” (Harris, 1974, 
196-197).  
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Within liberal theories of the state, the argument that violence is intrinsic to the building and 
maintaining of a state structure is challenged in an arguably highly purist theory of the state’s 
relationship to violence. In liberalism, there is an assumption that violence is arbitrary and “an 
aberration that can be expunged from political life if only the right institutions are established to 
govern” (Devetak and Hughes eds, 2007, 10). However, as Devetak (ibid) argues, “[n]otwithstanding 
their aversion to violence, even liberals must acknowledge that physical force may sometimes be 
necessary to protect the institutions of liberal democracy and punish lawmakers”.  
In the area of critical theories, Bourdieu’s conception of symbolic power shares a focus on 
the state as violent, since “the state is at the centre of the construction of symbolic order” and holds 
“the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence” (von Holdt, 2013, 115). Because current social 
orders are based on domination and being dominated, it constitutes symbolic violence when the 
state plays a crucial role in reproducing this social order over time (ibid). In his analysis of state 
violence, Bourdieu comments on the overlap of material and non-material definitions of violence, 
by pointing out the “symbolic dimension” to the physical violence of police repressing protest, by 
which they “are not only attempting to control ‘rioters’”, but also “asserting the symbolic authority 
of the state to deploy violence” to maintain “order” (ibid, 119). This symbolic aspect of physical 
violence is not only seen with state violence, however, but also when protesters for example smash 
or burn buildings, or attack police officers or soldiers (ibid). A final contribution mentioned here to 
the critical literature on state violence is that of Malcolm X, who commented on the role of the 
police in upholding oppressive, unjust, and at times illegal state structures. In his famous speech The 
Ballot or the Bullet, Malcolm X argued that:  
Whenever you demonstrate against segregation, whether it is segregated education, 
segregated housing, or anything else, the law is on your side, and anyone who stands in the 
way is not the law any longer. They are breaking the law, they are not representatives of the 
law (Malcolm X, 2007/1964, 149). 
Here, Malcolm X pointed out, as part of his defence of a violent civil rights struggle, that 
there is violence on both sides, that the police and police dogs attacking protesters is not a form of 
necessary force to uphold peace and order, but rather an inherently violent action which defends 
an unjust and violent social system. An interesting aspect here is that although Malcolm X uses his 
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arguments to advocate violent resistance, while Gandhi used his to advocate nonviolence, the two 
thinkers have a surprising amount in common in their arguments about placing justice and morality 
above existing laws, as well as sacrificing oneself for the cause of justice. The arguments around 
state violence and making state violence visible and a site of contestation can then be seen in both 
violent and nonviolent advocacy.  
Property damage 
The discussion of how to classify property damage in relation to the violence-nonviolence distinction 
is central to nonviolent resistance. While the question is discussed in a number of activist and 
practitioner deliberations on the line between violence and nonviolence, it is more sparsely 
addressed in academic nonviolence literature (Case, 2018, 10, 12; Sommier et al., 2019, 218). The 
implied consensus in this academic literature is that property damage is either violence, or, at least, 
clearly not compatible with nonviolent resistance methods; that is, not nonviolent.  
Examples of discussions about property damage and the violence/nonviolence divide among 
activists or practitioners includes for example the online magazine Quaker Theology, which states 
that that “[t]here is a long standing debate among peace and justice advocates over the use of 
property damage as a tactic” (Johnson, 2004). Because of the contested nature of property damage 
tactics, many nonviolent protests or actions involve an explicit agreement for the action in question, 
as to whether property damage will be accepted or not (Johnson, 2004). The New Internationalist 
also provides a discussion of the protest tactic of property damage, writing that:  
Photos of masked ‘black bloc’ protesters smashing windows seem to accompany most 
international summits these days. But the debate over whether property destruction is a 
valid tactic for bringing about social and political change stretches as far back as protest itself 
(New Internationalist, 2011).   
In an article in Current Affairs, Nimni (2017) writes that the particular broadening of the 
meaning of violence to include damage to property is one that comes from the political right, but 
also that it is seen increasingly in news reports on political protests. As Nimni (ibid) writes, this 
definition “flows logically from certain strands of libertarian philosophy, which view a person’s 
property as an extension of the self, and therefore acts of aggression against property as being 
Chapter Four: The Concept of Violence  
- 108 - 
 
indistinguishable from acts of aggression against persons”. The argument about property damage 
as violence which Nimni is discussing here seems to be the one that claims that property damage is 
in and of itself and in all cases a violent act, because it is intrinsically tied to the person who owns 
the property. Other arguments about property damage as violence, as ones presented in this 
section, could feasibly be found within all political convictions, as they centre around property 
damage as a threat of violence (and therefore as violence), as indirect harm to a person (and 
therefore as violence), etc. Nimni (2017) dismisses this idea of property damage as intrinsically 
violent as only valid if “we accept quasi-religious fiction of property as part of a person’s self” and 
concludes that property damage is different to violence in “an obvious and significant way”. In 
addition, they attribute the media coverage of protests as “turning violent” when property damage 
occurs as “often merely just rhetoric deployed to paint ‘rioters’ as morally bankrupt” (ibid).   
A famous and prominent example of a nonviolent movement using property damage as a 
central tactic is the Plowshares movement, a pacifist movement on “the so-called Catholic Left” 
(Nepstad, 2008, xiv). The movement became well-known in the US during the Vietnam War for 
breaking into offices holding conscription files to destroy the files by pouring blood on them and 
burning draft records (ibid). After the Vietnam War, the Plowshares movement turned their 
attention to nuclear warfare, and “engaged in property destruction to resist the escalating nuclear 
arms race, using household hammers to damage nuclear weapons” (ibid). Since then, the movement 
has been conducting what they call “acts of disarmament” in which “activists enter weapons 
production sites or military installations to damage weapons” (ibid, 3). In Quaker Theology, Johnson 
(2004) emphasises that the main argument in this tradition for embracing certain forms of property 
damage as nonviolent tactics is that “some property has no right to exist and therefore damage 
done to this type of property is not violent” (see also Nepstad, 2008, 63-64 and Sommier et al., 2019, 
229 for arguments from Plowshares activists on this). It is then worth noting from these Plowshares 
arguments, and from nonviolence theory on property damage which will be discussed below, that 
an important assumption here is that “property” as a concept holds a special protection. That is, the 
assumption is that it is violent to damage an object because it is the property of someone, rather 
than because the damaging of objects in itself is automatically violent.   
Despite this interest amongst practitioners of nonviolence, the issue of categorising property 
damage is as mentioned discussed only rarely discussed within research literature on violent and 
Chapter Four: The Concept of Violence  
- 109 - 
 
nonviolent resistance. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan provide a discussion of property 
damage and the violence-nonviolence definitional boundary only in a footnote to their discussion 
writing here that: 
While it goes beyond the scope of this study to elaborate on this debate, certain forms of 
destruction – such as Gandhi’s burning of identity cards in South Africa and Vietnam war 
protesters’ burning of draft cards – are typically classified as nonviolent direct actions. In 
each of these examples, the acts of property damage were planned and conducted in the 
context of highly organised nonviolent campaigns, were limited in focus and specific intent, 
and were explained by the activists, who were willing to face the legal consequences of their 
actions. These actions differ from acts of vandalism targeting shops and government 
buildings during demonstrations, often conducted by individuals who flee from the scene 
and are unwilling to face the legal consequences of their actions. Throwing rocks through 
shop windows during anti-globalization demonstrations are examples of actions that, while 
technically not violent, would not be classified by most as methods of nonviolent direct 
action (in Chenoweth and Lawrence eds, 2010, 250-251, footnote 7). 
The examples provided here can certainly be described as nonviolent and violent 
respectively within a consistent explanatory framework; they fit neatly into the principle described 
by Johnson (2004), for example, that there is a significant different between property damage 
during large protests and riots, and property damage against “a carefully planned symbolic target”. 
However, other examples, such as planned and disciplined destruction of buildings (such as in South 
Africa) as potentially nonviolent, or the burning of flags or books as potentially violent, challenge 
the extent to which this definitional line can be clearly drawn. This is then, arguably, an example of 
the issues which can arise from basing any theory solely on observations of practical examples: if 
the examples chosen are fairly clear and evidently belong in one category or the other, it creates an 
image of a clear definition, where in fact the lines may be much less clear if other questions or 
examples were examined instead.  
In The Politics of Nonviolent Action, Gene Sharp provides one of the few lengthier and more 
thorough discussions of property damage and sabotage at length. In this discussion, acts of damage 
or destruction against property are explicitly excluded from the definition of violence, unless they 
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result in “injury or death to persons, or threaten to do so” (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 608). The 
discussion also demonstrates ways in which sabotage has been used as part of nonviolent action 
(ibid). Sharp also recognises that, as argued above, some actions will “fall somewhere between 
sabotage and nonviolent action”, that is, it will not be clearly and easily classifiable as violent or not 
violent acts, but he excludes these borderline cases from the subsequent discussion (Sharp and 
Finkelstein, 1973, 608). Although Sharp concludes that sabotage is not in itself violence, he writes:  
But sabotage has never, to my knowledge, been deliberately applied by a disciplined 
movement which has consciously chosen to fight by nonviolent action. Gandhi constantly 
emphasized that sabotage was contrary to this technique. In terms of the principles, strategy 
and mechanisms of operation, sabotage is more closely related to violent than to nonviolent 
action. This is true even though the aim of the sabotage may be only the destruction of 
material objects without taking lives – such as an empty bridge as distinct from a bridge 
being crossed by enemy troops (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 609). 
In other words, Sharp argues that although property damage is not violent, as a tactic for 
political struggle, it has more in common with armed struggle than nonviolent resistance; and thus, 
it is not part of his repertoire of nonviolent tactics. Although Sharp mentions principles in the above 
quote as an aspect in which property damage is significantly different from nonviolent action, true 
to his usual focus on tactics and strategy, the main argument used to exclude property damage from 
nonviolence repertoires is nine different reasons why sabotage will weaken a nonviolent 
movement. These are all rooted in the fact that the two approaches have “differing dynamics and 
mechanisms” (Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 609). Sharp (ibid, 610-611) then mentions examples of 
actions where sabotage undermined nonviolent action, and concludes that “[f]or these reasons, the 
idea that sabotage is compatible with nonviolent action must be rejected, as either a false 
accusation of uninformed critics, or as a highly dangerous action proposal likely to disrupt the 
processes which could bring strength and victory.”  
Martin et al. (2009) provide an example of research which examines the differences between 
violence towards objects and persons in depth, while treating property damage as violence. This 
article argues – contrary to the argument here – that the definition of violence as being both damage 
on people and objects is widely accepted, but that the distinction between the two categories is still 
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significant and under-explored in research (Martin et al., 2009, 822-823). This is true also for 
empirical research on the topic of collective violence (ibid, 823). This assumption of property 
damage as included in the definition of violence is then not, as Nimni (2017) suggests, only evident 
in mainstream media’s reporting on protests, but also in some research literature, much of which 
places the distinction between persons and objects as targets on a spectrum of “light to heavy 
violence” (Martin et al., 2009, 823). Harris (1974, 214) for example defines property damage as 
violence – and intuitively so – but as “minor, even trivial” violence. If this is applied to a distinction 
of violent and nonviolent campaigns, then an opposite conclusion to Sharp’s might be made: which 
is that property damage is violent, but could be part of a nonviolent campaigns, whereas Sharp 
concludes that property damage is not violent, but cannot be part of a nonviolent campaign. This 
argument could even be seen as consistent with Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011, 12) categorisation 
of “principally nonviolent” campaigns as being counted as examples of nonviolent resistance.  
However, Martin et al. (2009, 823) do not address arguments for why property damage is violent 
and treat this lack of attention as “unproblematic” as long as “the causal mechanisms responsible 
for violence do not vary depending on who or what is attacked”. The authors ultimately conclude, 
however, that the distinction does matter, since they provide evidence suggesting that the causal 
mechanisms are different (ibid, 832).  
Conclusion 
What this chapter has aimed to demonstrate is that although there is a rich and varied literature on 
the concept of violence, this does not provide or promise a single and unified definition of violence. 
What the literature does demonstrate and argue is that violence is a highly complex, varied, and 
contested idea within politics as well as other fields of study. As Butler (2020, 14, emphasis 
removed) argues, “violence is always interpreted”; however, this “does not mean that violence is 
nothing but an interpretation, where interpretation is conceived as a subjective and arbitrary mode 
of designation”. This argument, that the lack of a single clear definition of violence is not the same 
as stating that violence can mean anything and everything, is also apparent from the present 
chapter, which demonstrates that consistent arguments for what counts as violence can be applied. 
However, which arguments are chosen is important to understand, and matters immensely to the 
theories and research which use them.    
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Considering this, it is perhaps unsurprising that much nonviolence literature has been 
reluctant to start on what seems not only a complex, but a never-ending task of understanding and 
defining violence as a starting point for understanding and defining nonviolence. However, the aim 
of this thesis is to argue that an understanding of and interest in violence is necessary for 
nonviolence theory; but also, as argued in the introduction to this chapter, that this is not in the 
sense of having to finally define violence in order to know what the “opposite” or “not” of 
nonviolence is. Rather, it is a task of continually thinking about and engaging with violence, because 
violence and nonviolence are continually engaged with each other in different ways and contexts. 
The following chapters of the thesis will provide some possible demonstrations of how to 
operationalise a more thorough understanding of the concept of violence, showing how this 
understanding can be applied to practical and relevant issues for nonviolent resistance, in order to 
add constructive and necessary perspectives to nonviolence theory and practice. Although the 
remainder of the thesis is then essentially an exploration of the implications of applying a thorough 
engagement with thinking on the concept of violence to nonviolence theory, a few of those possible 
implications will be discussed briefly here as well in order to start that conversation.  
One example of this is the perspective of Hannah Arendt, who is rarely included in pacifist 
or nonviolence literature. However, through her theory on violence and politics, Arendt makes a 
potentially important contribution to nonviolence arguments, writing that:  
a theory of revolution … can only deal with the justification of violence because this 
justification constitutes its political limitation; if, instead, it arrives at a glorification or 
justification of violence as such, it is no longer political, but antipolitical (Arendt, 1963, 10).  
Although Arendt does argue that violence is a defining and creative part of both wars and 
revolutions (Arendt, 1963, 21-22), she also argues here that acknowledging the role of violence in 
revolutions does not mean – and cannot mean within the limits of “the political” – glorifying violence 
as such.  
Also, Harris (1974) provides an example of implications for nonviolence theory in their 
discussion of Marxist theories of violence. While Harris does – as discussed earlier in this chapter – 
acknowledge the importance of Marxist critiques of seeing violence as only direct physical harm by 
one actor to another, they write here that:  
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the Marxist view would obscure or collapse the traditional distinction between violence and 
nonviolence. We can, and do, tell the difference between clubbing a man to death and 
peacefully enjoying a good meal while he starves to death outside, or between burning down 
a man’s house and evicting him. The distinction between violent and nonviolent ways of 
doing things is clear and useful for evaluating actions, and it allows us to try to understand 
and explain just what it is about violence that makes it such a fearful thing, so fearful a thing, 
indeed, that many men have been led to renounce violence absolutely (or at least as much 
as is convenient). The maintenance of the violent-nonviolent distinction, so far from begging 
any questions, as Marxists sometimes argue, leaves open all questions as to whether violent 
means are, for example, better or worse than nonviolent means. The distinction merely 
allows us to reserve the name of violence for those fearful acts upon which the traditional 
abhorrence of violence is founded (Harris, 1974, 213). 
While parts of Harris’ argument will be shown to be debatable throughout this thesis, it 
provides a strong example of the problem of assuming that the need to understand violence better 
is because there is a simple violence-nonviolence dichotomy, one which means that everything 
which is not violence is nonviolence (rather than not violent), and that everything which includes 
some measure of violence is no longer nonviolent work or methods. In this way, the implications for 
nonviolence theory of providing a more thorough understanding of the concept of violence is not a 
simple, linear one, but as with the concepts themselves, a complex and perhaps at times 
contradictory one.  
Another important point to note from this chapter is the approach of trying to understand 
and conceptualise violence better, not through seeking one final definition of the concept, but by 
seeing violence “as understood through the lives of a diversity of people” as having “diverse 
contexts and forms” (Stanko, 2003, 2). As Stanko writes further:  
Through an approach that does not assume a standard definition, violence – as a 
phenomenon – can no longer be conceptualised as fixed, understood and inevitable. I would 
even go so far as to suggest that it is only through fluidity of definition that we can think 
creatively about disrupting violence as a social phenomenon (Stanko, 2003, 3). 
This is why, in the context of nonviolence (which does seek to minimise or disrupt violence), 
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theorists and activists cannot be “finished" with thinking about violence, as Baldoli (2019, 8-9) for 
example suggests they can. Rather, to practice and develop nonviolence becomes in this framework 
a task of continually discussing, conceptualising, and looking at violence – not as an absolute 
opposite to the work of nonviolence, but rather as a present reality which compromises, but does 
not negate, the idea of “nonviolent” work and activism. This, again, also comes back to a theory of 
nonviolence which avoids purism, and realises that reckoning with the continued role of violence in 
nonviolent activism is not a matter of pointing out hypocrisy and rejecting the entire idea, but rather 
a matter of realising and working with the full complexity of the situation (Shotwell, 2016, 6-7).  
However, another part of understanding this complexity better is one which strays further 
away from much nonviolence literature. Where especially the strategic literature on nonviolence 
often aims to be apolitical, that is, to be a tool or method to be used potentially by groups of any 
political persuasion (Baldoli, 2019, 7; Weber, 2003, 260), this chapter on violence has aimed to 
demonstrate that that is unrealistic and potentially problematic. This argument starts already with 
the examination of different theories of violence, which are often motivated by different political 
outlooks, and always representative of a certain discourse and narrative about the social and 
political world. As Harris (1974, 219) for example argues, different definitions and theories of 
violence do not necessarily spring from “confusion of any kind”, but rather from different 
conceptions of underlying (political) questions such as responsibility, the role of negative actions, 
etc. For example, in Butler’s (2020, 4-6) discussion of how to avoid state co-optation of the term 
violence to be applied to any opposition to state power, they emphasise structural and systemic 
state violence and distinguishes this as significantly different to unarmed protest violence by 
specifically adopting the framing of working against less visible forms of state violence, rather than 
simply against “all” violence. This is important, because “to define violence is, in a sense, to 
determine the scope of [the] problem”, and this definition will vary depending on political view 
point, personal bias, context, and so on (Harris, 1974, 219). 
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Chapter Five: Violence Against Nonviolent Protesters 
In 2015, Republican presidential contender Mike Huckabee argued in an interview with CNN that 
Martin Luther King, Jr. would have been “appalled” by the Black Lives Matter movement (BLM), a 
movement which had been receiving increasing attention during presidential campaigns in the US 
(Bradner, 2015). The Black Lives Matter movement started in 2013, originally from the Twitter tag 
#BlackLivesMatter, but reignited and grew on a completely different scale in 2014 after the killing 
of Michael Brown by police officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri (Banks, 2018, 709). Since 
then, the grassroots movement has become a network of over 40 chapters across the US and in 
other countries (Clayton, 2018, 449; Black Lives Matter, 2020a). The interview with Huckabee was 
far from the only time that the Black Lives Matter movement has been held up against the popular 
narrative of the 1960s civil rights movement as a peace-loving and all-encompassing justice 
movement with King as the charismatic promoter of universally American ideals of progress and 
liberty as discussed in Chapter Three. In these narratives, BLM is often found to be lacking in 
comparison (Banks, 2018, 709; Clayton, 2018, 449). However, BLM activists are not necessarily 
deterred by this, with hip-hop artist Tef Poe, for example, proclaiming at a Black Lives Matter event 
in 2014 that “This ain’t your grandparent’s civil rights movement” (quoted in Marah et al., 2018, 1). 
If this lack of concern with being denied a status as the civil rights movement 2.0 is to be taken 
seriously, then that indicates that these BLM activists do not see what the 1960s civil rights 
movement did or achieved as the only way to protest and resist racial inequality and racist violence. 
While there are a number of ways in which BLM has purposefully changed or developed their form 
of activism compared to the civil rights movement, some of which are discussed further in Chapter 
Six, the focus in this present chapter is their respective responses to repressive violence. Both 
movements have been met with public and extreme violence when protesting racial violence and 
inequality, and dramatic pictures and footage of this have been an important part of public 
knowledge and narratives about the movements (Cullors, 2019; Engler and Engler, 2014; Kurtz and 
Smithey, 2018b; Reis and Martin, 2008, 7; Vinthagen, 2015, 113). The example of these two 
movements for racial justice illustrates a number of aspects of the wider situation of repressive 
violence against nonviolent movements, which is the centre of this chapter.  
Violent repression of civil resistance campaigns is common, and this is an important part of 
understanding nonviolent activism. In their statistical analysis, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 51) 
Chapter Five: Violence Against Nonviolent Protesters  
- 116 - 
 
found that repression of resistance campaigns occurred in 88 percent of the campaigns in their 
dataset. Within nonviolence literature, this situation has mostly been discussed with reference to 
the concept of voluntary suffering or self-sacrifice as a way to convert the opponent, and later with 
reference to backfire dynamics or repression backfire as a model in which violence against a 
campaign backfires on the opponent and strengthens the movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
the backfire dynamic is one of the central mechanisms of nonviolent resistance (Kurtz and Smithey, 
2018, 1; Martin, 2015, 150; Nepstad, 2015, 124). Traditionally, the idea of voluntary suffering is 
viewed as belonging to the tradition of principled nonviolence, while backfire models are seen as 
belonging in the strategic approach to nonviolence. However, this chapter argues that these 
concepts and discussions are a particularly strong example of the continued connections and 
inseparability of principled and strategic approaches to nonviolence, and that attempts to ignore 
questions of principles and normative assumptions in backfire models lead to problematic 
assumptions and recommendations, as well as a limitation of options provided by nonviolence 
literature on how to respond to violent repression.  
Extinction Rebellion, introduced in Chapter Two, are an example of this overlap or 
intersection of principles and strategy, and this example will be used here as an illustration. The 
group have been criticised, especially in the early days of their activities, for failing to understand or 
acknowledge the full implications of their strategy of mass civil disobedience, and particularly their 
attempts to provoke mass arrests. Among the critiques were concerns that Extinction Rebellion did 
not understand the vastly different experiences that people of colour would have in the UK policing, 
legal, and prison system compared to white people. For example, a prison guide published by XR for 
jailed activists advised their members to use their time in prison to “practice yoga” and “learn from 
their experience”, and that “[i]f you get solitary [confinement], there’s plenty of time for meditation. 
Lastly you can take as many naps as you want!” (Rannard, 2019). In response to this, Eda Seyhan, a 
lawyer and anti-prison activist, stated to the BBC that “[p]rison is not - and I cannot stress this 
enough - a yoga retreat … Prisons are dangerous and oppressive institutions where disproportionate 
numbers of black and brown men are locked away from the rest of society” (ibid). What these 
critiques demonstrate is that inequalities amongst nonviolent activists in their private lives also have 
important effects on their participation in nonviolent resistance. In this particular instance, the focus 
of this chapter which is violence against protesters, is one such equality, because some citizens – 
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and therefore activists – will be met with disproportionate police violence, whether or not they 
choose to participate in “voluntary suffering” or not.  
This chapter makes three overall arguments: firstly, that the approach of some theories of 
nonviolence to the occurrence of violence against nonviolent protesters, mainly through models of 
repression backfire, illustrate the continued importance of pacifism or principled nonviolence, 
despite attempts to articulate a purely strategic theory of nonviolence; secondly, and relatedly, that 
the dynamic of backfire and the strategic options presented raises important normative questions 
and issues, which should not, this chapter argues, be ignored fully with an argument of focusing on 
possible short-term victories; and thirdly, that examining these issues also leads to an argument 
that there are other possible and constructive approaches for nonviolent movements to deal with 
violent repression, and that the focus on backfire alone leads to a narrowing of strategic options for 
nonviolent campaigns.    
To demonstrate these arguments, this chapter starts by looking briefly at normative issues 
or themes around the situation of violence against protesters and previous discussions of this. It 
then looks in more depth at the issue of risk and unequal levels of risk for different protesters, by 
revisiting the story of Extinction Rebellion and looking at critiques that the group did not realise or 
account for these inequalities. After this, the chapter will demonstrate the continued influence of 
spiritual and moralistic arguments around voluntary suffering in modern backfire theories. This 
discussion will show that although this is no longer conceptualised as about conversion of the 
opponent or perpetrator, conversion remains at the centre of backfire theories. This means that 
although the basic argument around repression backfire and violence against protesters is a fairly 
simple one, a number of the assumptions and concepts behind this seemingly simple mechanism – 
repression leads to sympathy, leads to support – warrant further examination. Also, the hierarchy 
of different forms of suffering, as well as the hierarchies that can arise between activists and within 
movements based on this will be discussed. After this, the chapter will complicate and problematise 
the process of sympathy generation, which will be shown to be a more biased, unequal, and 
problematic process than assumed in backfire theories. During these discussions, both Extinction 
Rebellion and the Black Lives Matter movement will be used as examples. Finally, the chapter will 
consider arguments, based mainly on the example of Black Lives Matter, that the requirement to 
suffer violence and repression in an exemplary fashion to earn progress on social justice issues is 
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not only problematic, but also counterproductive to substantial moves towards equality for 
marginalised groups.  
When violence is part of movement success  
Although violence against protesters is frequently discussed within nonviolence literature, there is 
little to no discussion about whether this fact - that violence used against nonviolent protesters is 
the basis of a major mechanism of nonviolent resistance - complicates, blurs, or changes the label 
of “nonviolent resistance” at all. As Butler (in Schneider, 2011) asks, “[i]f one puts one’s body on the 
line, in the way of a truck or a tank, is one not entering into a violent encounter?” That is not to 
argue that nonviolent resistance is thereby the same as violent resistance, but rather that the 
placing of nonviolence resistance “outside of the orbit of violence altogether” (ibid) seems mistaken. 
Once this is recognised (which requires a rejection of purist ideas of this situation being simply a 
question of self-sacrifice with no violent implications) a number of questions with regards to the 
relationship between violence and nonviolence within this scenario arise.  
The question of whether it is, or can be, part of a theory of repression backfire within 
nonviolent resistance to encourage or provoke violent repression in order to achieve backfire is an 
immediate question and concern. Although this chapter will discuss the fact that organisers in 
Extinction Rebellion did not see this as entailing a risk of violence, this question is relevant when 
discussing the movement, which stated outright that their strategy involved “courting arrest” 
(Farrell et al., 2019, 96). A video produced for British newspaper The Guardian demonstrates this, 
showing Extinction Rebellion co-founder Roger Hallam telling a police officer that “arrests aren’t 
happening quickly enough”, and later telling an assembly of people that “[y]ou need about 400 
people to go to prison. About two or three thousand people to get arrested” (quoted in Smoke, 
2019). This refers back to one of the iconic nonviolent movements covered in Chapter Three, since 
the US civil rights movement is known for its ability to use and sometimes provoke displays of 
“blatant, public brutality” from their opponents in the police or military (Kirk, 2004, 89; Nimtz, 2016, 
2). Despite this prominence of tactics which deliberately provoked violence, or more extreme 
violence, the issue and possible controversy around this is mostly only hinted at or briefly mentioned 
in the literature on backfire. For example, Kurtz and Smithey write in their book on the paradox of 
repression:  
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While Gandhi may not call for the provocation of opponents, he declares that nonviolence 
often involves taking on suffering rather than inflicting it. Whether that necessarily involves 
strategically provoking repression remains a matter for debate. Some feel that much of the 
power of nonviolent action lies in the purity of a nonviolent discipline that it easily contrasted 
with the brutality of open repression. In Chapter Seven, we argue that a fundamental goal 
of nonviolent resistance is to proactively heighten the contrast between the nonviolent 
discipline of activists and elite repression (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 306).  
While this quote attempts to not state this directly, the authors do argue that provoking 
repression, or provoking to increase the intensity of the repression, is compatible with nonviolent 
resistance and sometimes a necessary part of this. Elsewhere, the authors do state directly that “the 
paradox of repression relies in large part not on avoiding repression but on enduring and sometimes 
provoking it” (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 13). Vinthagen (2015, 112-113) also argues, with the 
example of segregation and the civil rights movement in the US, that when using repression to 
dramatise injustice, “[t]he more violence that is used [by the opponent], the more brutal the 
segregation (and its defendants) appear”.  
In contrast, Gross (2018, 317) brings this question of provoking repression to the center of 
the discussion by including it in the definition of the backfire effect. They (ibid) write that backfire 
“is used here to describe how protesters successfully employ nonviolent tactics to provoke a brutal 
and disproportionate response from their adversary” to increase sympathy and support for the 
movement. Gross (ibid, 317-318) argues that this raises a number of ethical questions, including 
questions of organiser responsibility, a right to resist for protesters exposed to such violence, and 
whether “provoking violence that may result in the deaths of activists [is] antithetical to nonviolent 
resistance even if effective at achieving larger goals”. This leads to the naming of the backfire 
dynamic “the dark side of nonviolent resistance”; however, this is not, Gross argues, because the 
occurrence of violence against protesters or because the backfire effect ultimately contradicts the 
nonviolent nature of the protest, but because the normative and ethical questions that arise from 
this dynamic are not discussed and illuminated (ibid, 324). In other words, and in keeping with 
overall arguments in this thesis, the fact that violence is fundamental to a major nonviolent 
resistance dynamic does not mean that its nonviolent character is negated. It does, however, make 
it important to acknowledge and reckon with the integral role that violence plays in this part of 
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nonviolent resistance, and issues and complications arising from this fact. To address this, Gross 
(ibid, 321, 324-325) attempts to draw out some preliminary and/or vague ethical guidelines around 
backfire in terms of preserving the moral high ground for nonviolent resistance movements, 
arguing, for example, that a condition for arguing that the suffering is indeed voluntary is the ability 
to meaningfully consent. This raises the issue that that “seems to exclude minors from political 
activism that may turn violent. In the annals of nonviolent resistance, however, children have often 
proved exceptionally effective” (ibid, 321). A further consideration is the access to information for 
activists, in terms of understanding the risks they are taking (ibid).  
In addition to this discomfort with a potential for encouraging activists and movements to 
provoke repression, this chapter is also concerned with the limited focus of nonviolence literature 
when it comes to the question of how movements might respond to or deal with repressive 
violence. With regards to this particular role of violence, nonviolence literature focuses almost 
exclusively on the potential for backfire, which will be shown in this chapter to be based on a number 
of problematic dynamics and assumptions in itself. This means that other more defiant responses, 
or responses attempting to avoid using and strengthening these problematic dynamics, are 
excluded from the nonviolent repertoire presented by key literature. Because of that, these 
responses risk being excluded from the imagined possibilities and tactics of activists who defer to it. 
That is, the implication of this heavy focus on backfire dynamics is that dealing with repression by 
attempting to achieve backfire is the only “constructive” or “strategic” way to approach this. In 
contrast, this chapter will discuss arguments and strategies that challenge the necessity of suffering 
in order to earn social justice as alternatives to seeking out repression backfire. This is not to argue 
that avoiding repression as a resistance movement is feasible, and therefore not to argue against 
attempts to theorise what movements and activists can do in response to this, but merely an 
attempt to open up the field of options for responses, and to demonstrate the limitations and 
problems with the backfire dynamic.  
Inequalities of risk 
While a number of the discussions and themes in this chapter are centred around the normative 
assumptions and implications of (even strategic) nonviolence theory on violent repression, one 
aspect in particular speaks also to a core part of the strategic arguments for nonviolent resistance: 
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the discussion of risk for protesters. This discussion of risk is in one sense well acknowledged in 
nonviolence literature. For example, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 37) argue that it is an 
important advantage of nonviolent resistance over violent that it is open to “people with varying 
levels of commitment and risk tolerance”. In other words, the risk arising from participation is 
acknowledged as important, because it makes participation more likely in nonviolent campaigns 
than violent ones. However, a number of the arguments for why nonviolence is less risky are centred 
around what Chenoweth and Stephan (ibid, 38) call “methods of dispersion”, which are nonviolent 
tactics aimed at avoiding arrest, detection, and violent repression, rather than about the tactics 
mainly discussed in the present chapter, which come with a high level of risk of arrest, and, 
especially for some activists, violence. The glorification of the public and performative suffering that 
is discussed here is therefore also important in a purely strategic sense, in that it risks pushing to 
the margins of movements and popular imagination the very diversity of tactics and roles which are 
argued to be a major strength of nonviolent resistance.  
Extinction Rebellion was met – especially in the early months of the movement – with 
criticism that their approach to nonviolent protesting was problematically colour blind and 
privileged. These criticisms particularly focused on how heavily centred Extinction Rebellion’s tactics 
were around provoking arrest through their actions (e.g., Cowan, 2019; Smoke, 2019). It is 
important to emphasise that these critiques, as well as the present discussion, are not aiming to 
criticise the tactics of civil disobedience and direct action as such, tactics which inevitably involve a 
degree of risk for activists, but rather the heavy focus of this one aspect of resistance, and the 
dismissal of other tactics. For example, Roger Hallam who is one of the founders of XR, writes in the 
Extinction Rebellion manual that “[w]e have to be clear. Conventional campaigning does not work. 
Sending emails, giving money to NGOs, going on A-to-B marches” (Farrell et al., 2019, 100). Hallam 
(ibid, 104) writes further that although nonviolent civil resistance does not “work every time”, it 
“enables you to roll the dice. Emailing and marching don’t roll that dice”. The group’s manual, This 
is not a drill: An Extinction Rebellion handbook (ibid, 96) also argues that “[o]ne of the most powerful 
ways to bring about change is when people are willing to be imprisoned for non-violent civil 
disobedience”, and that this means “courting arrest”.   
Apart from the focus on arrestable actions as the exclusive model for achieving social 
change, critics also pointed to Extinction Rebellion’s approach to arrests, policing, and prisons in the 
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United Kingdom as displaying a problematic lack of acknowledgement of the violence of these 
institutions. This is important not only because it highlights an intersection of forms of violence 
which is important in itself, but also because this form of violence against some protesters – 
depending on systematic and structural factors – affects the dynamics of protesters risking 
repression in the form of arrest and/or violence. As Cowan (2019) notes in one of the earliest 
published critiques of Extinction Rebellion, climate justice organisers had been raising concerns that 
XR’s “tactics of engaging with law enforcement fail to acknowledge the long history of police 
brutality against communities of colour”. In their movement handbook – published after Cowan’s 
critiques – Extinction Rebellion acknowledged some differences in safety levels in terms of risking 
arrest. The group wrote that “[t]he tactics we use in the United Kingdom or the United States are 
not always effective or safe in other countries, especially those under repressive regimes or 
dictatorships” (Farrell et al., 2019, 12). What this acknowledgement does not discuss, however, is 
the difference in safety levels within the UK and US, which are affected by race, gender, disabilities, 
etc. and which are what the majority of the critiques of XR focus on.   
Cowan (2019) also interviewed a climate justice organiser with the Black Lives Matter UK 
movement, who stated that while getting arrested “is definitely part of a repertoire of resistance”, 
Extinction Rebellion’s approach to this was “quite dangerous”. Some of the concerns centred 
around whether Extinction Rebellion had sufficient, or any, trial support in place, and that with as 
many arrests as XR were aiming for, “they aren’t going to have all 500 people who have been 
arrested trialed on the same day. That means you are going to have really isolated people going 
through quite traumatic experiences” (in Cowan, 2019). This concern was echoed by Smoke who 
voiced similar concerns in an article for The Guardian in April 2019. This was based on Smoke’s own 
experience going through the UK court system as one of the “Stansted 15” activists, a group of 
activists who stopped an immigration deportation flight through direct action by chaining 
themselves to the plane (Smoke, 2019). Smoke (ibid) writes that “direct action and becoming 
entombed in the endless bureaucracy of our glacial criminal justice system because of it, should only 
make up a tiny portion of our work as activists”, because prolonged legal battles take resources 
from a movement which could otherwise have gone towards helping marginalised people and 
groups who do not have the option to choose to be arrested for civil disobedience. This experience 
is especially relevant given the fact that the Stansted 15’s trial, which took place in 2018, 
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demonstrated a strategy of cracking down on direct action by maximising penalties through 
terrorism charges (BBC News, 2019; BBC News, 2018). Smoke therefore argues that: 
[Extinction Rebellion’s] notion that 2,000 arrests will evoke the kind of systemic change 
needed to fight climate change is naive at best. At a time when the government has cracked 
down on protest, to not see that this could go the other way, and be used simply as a way 
of increasing already draconian anti-protest legislation and prosecutions, is shortsighted and 
irresponsible (Smoke, 2019).  
Cowan (2019) argues further that apart from the immediately practical concerns, the 
rhetoric of aiming to get arrested to disrupt the system, “is characteristic of XR’s campaign 
literature, [and] fails to recognise that the very institutions they are so keen to interact with such as 
police and prisons, have been systematically killing people of colour and lacerating our communities 
since day one.” This whitewashing of climate change activism risks “alienat[ing] certain people who 
may have more to lose by being arrested than others” such as “immigrants, whose visa status could 
be affected by a criminal record, or black people, who 2018 figures suggested, are more likely to 
have force used against them by the Metropolitan Police” (Rannard, 2019). 
A pacifist legacy: how principles are still at the heart of the backfire dynamic 
The concept of voluntary suffering or self-sacrifice stems from Gandhi’s theory and practice and 
nonviolent resistance is highly influenced by his idea of this phenomenon (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 
6; Terchek, 2000, 184). Although Gandhi is in his writings almost obsessively focused on self-
perfection through ascetic practices and abstentions in the private life of a satyagrahi, the 
overriding focus with voluntary suffering is to secure the attention and hopefully sympathy of the 
oppressor and other audiences in society through very public and visible displays of voluntary 
suffering (McLaughlan, 2016, 433; Terchek, 2000. 183). 
More recently, some authors argue that the strategic, “modern tradition of civil resistance” 
differs from pacifism’s focus on “moral demands”, including the move from calls for voluntary 
suffering towards backfire dynamics and “repression management” (Engler and Engler, 2014; Kurtz 
and Smithey, 2018a, 14-15). An important difference is the “strong spiritual component in Gandhi’s” 
thoughts on personal sacrifice, whereas the strategic approach has, the argument goes, adopted a 
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more “practical” view on the effects of suffering violent repression by simply looking at the results 
in empirical studies of resistance movements (Engler and Engler, 2014). I argue, however, that the 
split between principled and strategic pacifism is not as clear as claimed, and that the situation of 
violence against protesters is in fact one of the aspects of nonviolent resistance in which the 
blurriness of these lines is particularly important and influential. One aspect of this is that even in 
more “practical” or “strategic” discussions of the effects of violence against protesters, the results 
of the resisters’ suffering are much the same as in the spiritual, religious, or ethical narratives of 
voluntary suffering.  
 For example, even though recent nonviolence literature emphasises the move away from 
focusing on conversion as the mechanism to achieve a campaign’s goal and towards coercion 
through leveraging pressure and withdrawing consent (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 42-46; 
Isserman, 1986, 47; Martin, 2015, 154; Stiehm, 1968, 24), when it comes to the function that 
voluntary suffering and repression may serve for a nonviolent campaign, conversion continues to 
be of central importance. This discussion goes back to Richard Gregg, a student of Gandhi who 
developed the concept of “moral jiu-jitsu” from Gandhi’s thoughts on voluntary suffering as a way 
to convert the opponent and liberate both resister and oppressor (Chakrabarty, 2006, 67; Kosek, 
2005, 1319, 1329; Martin, 2015, 148; Terchek, 2000, 183; Vinthagen, 2015, 212). With Gregg’s 
theories came also the beginning of the attempt to move discussions of violence against protesters 
from “ethical or religious principle[s]” about virtuous self-sacrifice and towards a strategic method 
and study of social action (Kosek, 2005, 1320). However, Gregg’s theory of moral jiu-jitsu is still 
heavily focused on converting the opponent or perpetrator of the violence rather than other 
audiences (Gregg, 1936, 25-26; Vinthagen, 2015, 213). While subsequent writers have developed 
the concept, often giving it a different name, the theory of moral jiu-jitsu remains influential to the 
study of backfire, and is widely seen as the starting point for this theory (Martin, 2015, 149). For this 
reason, some of the basic assumptions which make up the argument for moral jiu-jitsu are analysed 
and discussed in this chapter along with discussions of backfire dynamics. 
In more recent theories, in contrast, it is different audiences or groups of bystanders – either 
neutral or supportive of the movement but not yet actively involved – who need converting (Engler 
and Engler, 2014). Gene Sharp developed the concept of “political jiu-jitsu”, adding to moral jiu-jitsu 
by widening the scope from moral dynamics and individual psychology to one including “political 
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and social dimensions” (Gregg, 1936, 25-26; Martin, 2015, 150; Sharp and Finkelstein, 1973, 657-
658; Vinthagen, 2015, 213). At this point, the theories of the situation of violence against nonviolent 
protesters moved from a focus on converting the perpetrator of violence to focusing on the reaction 
and sympathy of bystanders and witnesses (Martin, 2015, 150). While this is certainly a different 
mechanism, it is hardly one which removes all normatively influenced assumptions about causal 
mechanisms, since the process depends on converting bystanders from neutral, passive, or 
supportive of the opponent, to feeling sympathy and solidarity with the resistance movement and 
supporting them in some way.  
Brian Martin introduced the “backfire model” as his conceptualisation of the dynamics 
around violence against protesters. The backfire model builds on the concepts and theories outlined 
above while adding several new dimensions (Martin, 2015, 160). For one, Martin (ibid, 160-161) 
expands on previous theories by incorporating several possible processes and outcomes into the 
model, instead of assuming that the same action will lead to the same reaction. This makes 
repression backfire a dynamic and evolving process in which both sides have a number of tactics 
and counter-tactics available, and “struggles may evolve as each side becomes familiar with the 
opponent’s tactics” (ibid, 161). For nonviolent campaigns, this makes it important to know and 
practice “repression management”, which, if successful, will turn violent repression into an 
advantage for the movement through “preparation, mobilization, strategy, and tactical choice” 
(Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 14-15, emphasis removed). It is in part within this field of possible ways 
to “manage” repression that by focusing solely on a narrow conception of backfire, nonviolence 
literature has limited the range of choices described as available to protesters when responding or 
reacting to repression.  
Importantly, there are two key requirements for outrage over repression to occur: firstly, 
that a significant number of people find the violence against a resistance movement wrong or unfair; 
and second, that information about the event reaches “receptive audiences”, that is, groups of 
people likely to find the event wrong (Martin, 2015, 155). The role and reactions of different 
audiences is important in literature on repression backfire and for concrete tactical choices for a 
nonviolent movement (e.g., Farrell et al., 2019, 104). This chapter will not, however, be focusing 
explicitly on different audiences, since the aim of the chapter is to examine more general 
assumptions behind audience reactions, such as becoming convinced of the dedication of the 
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protesters or feeling sympathy for them. This focus spans the boundaries of different audiences, 
although it is worth noting that since the case studies are all movements within liberal democracies, 
as discussed in Chapter One, this has some impact on specific arguments about sympathy for not 
only a resistance campaign, but also the state opponent.   
In backfire theories, this conversion of audiences to a standpoint of solidarity, and support, 
is achieved through a number of different mechanisms. These mechanisms are not simple 
prescriptions to follow strategically, but rather biased, political, and at times prejudiced or violent 
dynamics. The argument here is that this influences nonviolent resistance and should influence how 
nonviolence theory views and grapples with situations of violence against protesters.  
Proving your dedication and commitment 
The first of these mechanisms is that public and voluntary suffering is supposed to display to 
audiences how committed and dedicated the nonviolent resisters are (Gregg, 1936, 25, 30-31). For 
example, Engler and Engler write for Waging Nonviolence on this:  
Movements are primed to flare up when participants demonstrate the seriousness of their 
commitment. One main way of doing this is through showing a willingness to endure 
hardship and inconvenience, to face arrest, or even risk physical harm in dramatizing an 
injustice (Engler and Engler, 2014).  
Vinthagen (2015, 212) also emphasises this relationship between public suffering and 
dedication when he defends Gandhi’s glorification of suffering, which could be “misinterpreted” as 
“praise for suffering itself”. However, Vinthagen (ibid) argues that what the concept really entails is 
that “suffering is powerful if it stems from a conviction about the truth”. In other words, suffering 
becomes powerful by stemming from conviction, and therefore, the ability to withstand suffering 
displays the conviction and dedication of the nonviolent resister who must be prepared to lose 
everything except their honour to “set the power of truth free”.  
Extinction Rebellion emphasised heavily how their strategy of civil disobedience worked not 
only through creating disruption and using that to pressure for change, but also by demonstrating 
the dedication, and therefore the worthiness of the protesters (Farrell et al., 2019, 101). In fact, as 
Joyce (2020, 394) writes, members of Extinction Rebellion argue that the disruption of their strategy 
only works if combined with a willingness to suffer and display vulnerability. Joyce (ibid) argues that 
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the idea of “intentional vulnerability” is at the centre of XR’s mass civil disobedience tactics, with 
the achieved disruption being secondary. They write further that “[t]he disruption, then, simply sets 
the stage for the symbolism of fearless sacrifice. It is the sacrifice that brings about the social change, 
not the disruption in itself” (ibid). Hallam writes of this display of dedication that “[e]veryone loves 
an underdog narrative. It’s the great archetypal story in all cultures: against all odds, the brave go 
into battle against evil. Breaking the rules gets you attention and shows the public and the elite that 
you are serious and unafraid” (Farrell et al., 2019, 101).  
Inviting sympathy 
Another function of public suffering or repression is to achieve conversion of previously neutral or 
inactive “bystanders”, not through impressing them with the commitment of the movement, but by 
inviting empathy and sympathy, which will activate their conscience (Engler and Engler, 2014). This 
is similar to Gandhi’s arguments that the nonviolent resister can, through voluntary suffering, 
communicate their arguments and cause in a more urgent way than “abstract reasoning” can do 
(Terchek, 2000, 184). This assumption demonstrates the influence of bias, cultural ideas of 
proximity, and violent or oppressive structures which shape ideas of who an observer can identify 
with. 
Making heroes and martyrs 
Finally, backfire theories argue that risking repression can become a “moment of personal 
transformation” for a protester, because being faced with risk enables them to clarify their own 
sense of their commitment (Engler and Engler, 2014). This focus on narrating repression and 
violence as a moment of personal transformation has an important strategic purpose of preparing 
activists for these risks and attempting to “reframe repression meaningfully before and after it 
happens” (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 305). Despite this practical function, the process of preparing 
activists for repression and training them to react to this in the way thought most likely to result in 
repression backfire, is another area in which the inseparability of more recent theories and the 
ethical, moral, spiritual, and religious roots of this phenomenon become clear.  
 To this effect, Kurtz and Smithey (2018a, 305) argue that one way to frame repression as 
meaningful is by “tapping into the resonance of cultural themes of sacrifice” during training and 
preparation sessions. In the same volume, George Lakey (ibid, 272) writes in more depth about 
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different ways for movement cultures to be created and shaped to help activists and movements 
overcome – or even thrive from – repression. Lakey (ibid, 272, 278) writes that “[s]trategists and 
trainers need to think carefully about whether a movement’s culture includes stories about pain 
and suffering that offer a positive and transformative meaning” which can be done for example 
through “religion-based frameworks”, “the portrayal of martyrdom”, “placing sacrifice within a 
narrative of spiritual development”, and “linking risk with self-esteem”. The final point about self-
esteem is discussed further in the section about the movement hierarchies springing from the 
elevated status of certain forms of public repression and suffering over other kinds of involvement, 
sacrifice, and dedication to a movement. 
Extinction Rebellion are an example of this use of spiritual, religious, and ethical themes in 
their rhetoric and materials for activists. Roger Hallam writes that although Extinction Rebellion are 
based on an adherence to strategic nonviolence literature and developing effective tactics, the 
people that are the most successful with civil disobedience actions are not the ones focused on the 
outcome, but the ones inspired by “traditional virtue ethics” such as “duty, honour, tradition and 
glory” (Farrell et al., 2019, 104). The movement also maintains strong links to Christian traditions in 
their focus on “intentional vulnerability” and “symbolism of fearless sacrifice” (Joyce, 2020, 392-
393). These links to not only Christianity, but a wider spiritual tradition, are also clear when the 
group’s founding document, the Declaration of Rebellion, states that “[i]t becomes not only our right 
but our sacred duty to rebel” (Farrell et al., 2019, 2). Later in their Extinction Rebellion handbook, 
the group also writes that civil disobedience and “courting arrest”:  
is the self-sacrificial idea of arrest at the core of Extinction Rebellion’s strategy, and it gives 
you strength from within. Ancient values are overtly resurrected in this Easter rebellion in 
London: the values of chivalry and honour, faith in life and being in service to Our Lady, Notre 
Dame, Mother Earth, the mother on whom everything else depends (Farrell et al., 2019, 96).  
While strategic nonviolence researchers have developed a language and framework which 
uses less normatively loaded language, the argument here is that these theories contain an inherent 
glorification of the very public and performative suffering that the concept of self-sacrifice refers to. 
This glorification speaks strongly to purist, moralistic, and religious roots of the field of nonviolence. 
The argument here is therefore that although strategic violence theory may aim to be descriptive 
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rather than normative (simply pointing to what is observed to work well to achieve defined goals), 
this process remains normative both in its causal explanations and its results.   
The glorification of (certain forms of) suffering  
Not every form of voluntary suffering is treated as equal or valuable in nonviolence literature. This 
hierarchy goes back as far as Gandhi’s views on suffering and personal sacrifice, which reject 
isolationist self-suffering and highlights instead the importance of visibility and public attention 
(Kosek, 2005, 1325; Terchek, 2000, 183). Gandhi was also very dismissive of what he called 
“involuntary suffering”, which he saw as a form of suffering which can help uphold an oppressive 
ruler’s power instead of challenge it (Kosek, 2005, 1325; Terchek, 2000, 183). This disregard for 
forms of everyday and less visible suffering has consequences not only for what forms of resistance 
work are valued, but also for how dedicated a movement member is seen to be, since the actual 
ability to participate in public, visible, and dramatic instances of personal sacrifice is impacted by 
the amount of invisible violence and repression an individual has to overcome on a daily basis. While 
the importance of visibility is obvious when trying to achieve public attention and sympathy, an 
exaggerated emphasis on this risks marginalising or hiding other important functions of nonviolent 
resistance, which are not all dependent on converting a bystanding public. Ben Smoke writes that:  
There’s undoubtedly something sexy about direct action. As activists we spend our life trying 
to agitate for change in a system built to resist it. Wins are rare, and the day-to-day grind of 
trying to transform the world into a better place – one that works for everyone – bears down 
on all of us. To take part in something material, that feels real, as if you’re actually doing 
something, is overwhelmingly attractive (Smoke, 2019).  
Highly visible and public, high-risk actions are then for a number of reasons going to also 
maintain a high status within nonviolence theory and practice. However, as Smoke (2019) also 
points out, this does not mean that they are necessarily the most effective form of activism or 
resistance, especially not if glorified at the expense of other work and tactics. Civil disobedience 
actions are, if met with repression, going to induce a massive cost to not only the activists arrested, 
but the entire movement through support work, bureaucracy, and so on (ibid). Because of this, 
direct action and high-risk protests “should only make up a tiny portion of our work as activists” 
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(ibid) not be the be-all and end-all of proving the dedication of the movement and individual 
activists.   
In addition, the glorification of this particular form of personal suffering as an ultimate 
display of dedication and conviction risks creating or reinforcing a hierarchy within nonviolent 
movements, in which those protesters who undertake the most publicly visible and risky actions are 
at the top and seen as the most dedicated and valuable members of the movement. This, however, 
ignores differences in ability to take risks, for any number of reasons, differences in how risky the 
same action is – as discussed in the Extinction Rebellion example earlier – and the fact that visibility 
is not the only measure for how risky an action is, as well as the fact that taking risks is not 
necessarily the only way to have and show dedication to a cause. As Smoke (2019) acknowledges 
after having been arrested themselves for a direct action, there is an “inherent privilege in being 
able to be arrested”. And as the debates around Extinction Rebellion demonstrate, these different 
levels of privilege and risk are not always acknowledged in nonviolent movements when deciding 
on tactics and rhetoric.  
The ability of highly visible and publicised suffering to raise the profile and importance of 
individual activists relates back to the theme of the lone male heroes of nonviolence, as discussed 
in Chapter Three of this thesis and is a common theme in histories of nonviolent resistance in 
general (Engler and Engler, 2014). For example, Frankel (2001, 4-5) argues that part of the reason 
that Nelson Mandela is so widely recognised and admired is because of the “mystique of suffering” 
and that “there would be little to nothing of Mandela without Robben Island” and the narrative of 
heroically enduring hardship in pursuit of justice. Another example of the glorified narrative of 
(certain forms of) suffering is Martin Luther King, Jr., whose ideas of “the political, transformative 
power of suffering did not come from just his Christianity but also from Gandhi”, a view which 
emphasised endurance through suffering as a path to justice, as well as the importance of 
maintaining love for the opponent no matter their levels of violence and repression (Vinthagen, 
2015, 211). In addition, the theme is relevant to the discussion in the following chapter on violence 
within nonviolent movements, in which some of the everyday forms of violence and suffering which 
are disregarded by voluntary suffering theories are brought up as crucially important by negatively 
impacting the running and functioning of nonviolent resistance movements.  
Lakey, in a book chapter about how to train and prepare activists for repression, 
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recommends tapping into this theme to encourage activists in taking risks (Kurtz and Smithey, 
2018a, 281-282). This is done along with the calls for trainers and facilitators to use religious and 
ethical narratives to frame risk and repression as “martyrdom”, a way to achieve “spiritual 
development”, or to raise one’s self-esteem, as discussed earlier in the chapter (ibid, 272, 278). 
Lakey writes on the topic of encouraging more movement members to participate in higher risk 
events than they have so far:  
Movements often find themselves calling on participants to risk more. As a result, we 
sometimes see participants performing acts that they would not have considered a year or 
two earlier … Movements support this dynamic when they celebrate those who risk boldly. 
They shift the meaning of being hurt by repression from victimhood to the experience of, for 
example, a ‘heroic nonviolent soldier’. They encourage those who are ready to risk more – 
who may be few in the beginning – and in that way cultivate the contrast between exemplary 
suffering and minimal suffering. This stimulates the low-risker’s comparison of others’ 
sacrifice with her or his own, a calculus within a frame of self-esteem (Kurtz and Smithey, 
2018a, 281-282, my emphasis).  
This promotion of the image of activists who participate in publicly high-risk activities as 
“heroes” and the framing of self-esteem as being tied to (certain forms of) risk-taking may, 
according to Lakey, have the effect of making movement members ask what “more” they can do, 
with more meaning taking further risks (Kurtz and Smithey, 2018a, 281-282). What this argument 
does not mention or take into account is that a nonviolent movement is likely to consist not only of 
people who are “willing” or “brave enough” to take different levels of risk, but rather, members for 
whom the same actions entail different levels of risk, and members with different abilities to take 
risks altogether.  
The power of sympathy – romantic narratives of shared humanity 
Apart from different abilities or opportunities to take risks and participate in public, dramatic acts 
of voluntary suffering, there are also significant differences in what such suffering will achieve, or 
how much suffering will be required to achieve goals. This is explored in the present section through 
the concrete dynamic of creating sympathy within audiences, and a complication of what the 
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process of encouraging sympathy and solidarity entails. As mentioned earlier in the chapter, 
creating sympathy in audiences is one of the central dynamics through which the suffering of 
nonviolent protesters may lead to repression backfire. What is at stake here is what Gregg calls the 
“power of sympathy”, which happens especially “if the suffering continues long” and if leaders of a 
movement also suffer (Gregg, 1936, 84; Kosek, 2005, 1329). Gregg suggests that sympathy arises 
when causing or witnessing suffering because humans are evolved to react to the pain of other 
humans, and because there is a potential to identify with the victim (Kosek, 2005, 1319, 1329-1330; 
Martin, 2015, 148). Similarly, Gandhi’s idea of voluntary suffering is based on the assumption that 
other people do not “relish witnessing suffering in others and will eventually do what they can to 
bring it to an end” (Terchek, 2000, 184) and Vinthagen (2015, 213) argues that the conversion of 
“the heart” in Gandhi’s conception of voluntary suffering is “an attempt to resolve the emotional 
blocks or social distance between conflicting parties” by creating “empathy, sympathy, perspective 
or trust”.  
Martin (2015, 158) refers to this, in a more strategic framing, as the process of “managing 
outrage” by both protesters and opponent. What is needed to be able to create outrage – by 
managing the situation well – is for accounts of the repressive violence to reach “receptive 
audiences” and for a significant part of these audiences to find the violence wrong or unfair (ibid, 
155). Similarly, Chenoweth and Stephan (2011, 50) write that backfire can happen “if the 
[nonviolent] campaigns have widespread sympathy among the civilian population”. Although these 
dynamics are recognised as a less predictable mechanism than appeals to common human reactions 
in Gregg’s and Gandhi’s thinking because “not all people react to events in the same way”, it is still 
argued that “it is clearly observable that some events cause an adverse reaction in a wide cross-
section of the population” (Reis and Martin, 2008, 6). In other words, backfire theory has more 
recently moved away from making universal assumptions about a “human” reaction to observing or 
perpetrating violence. However, the theory still treats the processes of sympathy and solidarity that 
underpin the different processes of backfire as sufficiently predictable to be relied on for planning 
and teaching nonviolent resistance (Martin, 2012; Martin, 2015, 161; Reis and Martin, 2008, 7, 19). 
Given that this is done without including bias, inequality, and different perceptions about what 
constitutes unjust or excessive repressive violence, the assumption becomes in practice that these 
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processes can be considered universal or neutral, despite nonviolence theory moving away from 
direct phrasings of common human reactions and experiences.  
 This development further underlines the argument that although more recent literature on 
nonviolent resistance attempts to move the topic into a strategic realm in which moral principles or 
arguments appear irrelevant and therefore not open to critique, this is not the case. Backfire 
literature has moved from fairly simplistic and moralistic accounts of a universal human response 
to witnessing suffering, to later theories of more diverse reactions such as moral outrage, solidarity, 
and perceptions of justice – reactions which are still relatively scarcely researched (Reis and Martin, 
2008, 6; Saab et al., 2015, 539). However, values and norms are still at stake here. Processes of 
eliciting solidarity and sympathy, whether on a personal or social scale, are inherently a question of 
norms, principles, and world views, and therefore, theories and mechanisms which are based on 
these processes should not avoid them. The present discussion will also argue that the concept of 
sympathy is in itself limited by bias and structures of prejudice and marginalisation, and that these 
are important to understand in order to come to terms with both the workings and limitations of 
theorising the effects of violence against resistance campaigns.  
In Precarious Life, Butler (2004, 20) complicates assumptions about common human 
reactions to suffering in their discussion of political grief and morning. Rather than starting from the 
assumption of a constant and universal entity of the “human”, with universal or common “human 
reactions”, they question how certain people are seen to count – or not count – as “human”, and 
with that, have lives that count (ibid). In other words, Butler uses the concept of the human and 
human experience to interrogate a socially and culturally determined idea of who is included in the 
supposedly universal and equalising “human experience”, rather than assume the existence of a 
shared and unifying experience between all humans, as is seen especially in early discussions of 
repression backfire. As a part of this interrogation, they (ibid, 32) discuss the reactions to losses of 
life in Afghanistan or the US, and asks “What are the cultural contours of the human at work here? 
How do our cultural frames for thinking the human set limits on the kinds of losses we can avow as 
loss?”. Butler (ibid, 30) introduces the idea that lives are made to be more or less “grievable” based 
on cultural, social, and political narratives. This is an important complication of the argument of 
sympathy and identification, which is at the core of the process of converting bystanders or other 
audiences to support a resistance movement. 
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Writing in the context of the aftermath of the 9/11 attack, Butler (2004, 32) argues that some 
lives (privileged lives in the Global North) “will be highly protected, and the abrogation of their 
claims to sanctity will be sufficient to mobilize the forces of war”, as seen with the invasions 
following 9/11. “Other lives [however] will not find such fast and furious support and will not even 
qualify as ‘grievable’” (ibid). As an example, while many of the victims from the World Trade Center 
were “humanized” through obituaries and naming, Palestinian victims of Israeli military violence, or 
Afghan victims of the U.S. invasion are not, if discussed at all, given “names and faces, personal 
histories” and so on, but become numbers in statistics (ibid). A response to this is seen in the Black 
Lives Matter movement’s campaigns – such as #SayHerName – to name victims of police violence 
and humanise them in the public sphere through stories of their lives (Black Lives Matter, 2016; 
Maxouris, 2020).  
Beyond the discussion of the vastly different response to the loss of human lives in the U.S. 
and Afghanistan in the context of 9/11, there is a wider “racial differential that undergirds the 
culturally viable notions of the human” (Butler, 2004, 33). This is what Hooker (2016, 459) refers to 
as “racialized solidarity”, an effect which means that “[r]ace has historically impeded upon the 
recognition that fellow citizens who are racial others deserve the same care, concern, respect, or 
even that the harms they suffer merit the same attention”. This dynamic of solidarity “has been the 
norm in existing liberal democracies” (ibid). This is important to the functioning of repression 
backfire, because, as Kurtz and Smithey (2018b) argue, “[i]n order for insurgents to invoke the 
sympathy and outrage of bystander publics, these publics must relate to and identify with the target 
of repression”. This is not a neutral or universal requirement, however, as Butler demonstrates, 
when they write of their reaction to the murder of American journalist Daniel Pearl in Pakistan:  
Daniel Pearl, ‘Danny’ Pearl, is so familiar to me: he could be my brother or my cousin; he is 
so easily humanized; he fits the frame, his name has my father’s name in it. His last name 
contains my Yiddish name. But those lives in Afghanistan, or other United States targets, 
who were also snuffed out brutally and without recourse to any protection, will they ever be 
as human as Daniel Pearl? … We should surely continue to grieve for Daniel Pearl, even 
though he is so much more easily humanized for most United States citizens than the 
nameless Afghans obliterated by United States and European violence (Butler, 2004, 37).  
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It is not, therefore, an attempt to condemn different reactions based on the perceived 
proximity or relatability of a victim that is at stake here; but with an understanding of these 
mechanisms comes also an argument that they are not necessarily pre-social ideas of similarity and 
identification, but rather social and cultural norms, “circumscribed and produced in these acts of 
permissible and celebrated public grieving”, and, importantly, that these norms “operate in tandem 
with a prohibition on the public grieving of others’ lives” (Butler, 2004, 37). What this does is 
establish a narrative in which this familiar human that the observer or public can identity with 
becomes the standard for making a life matter (ibid, 38).  
This questioning of what makes someone “human” in the sense of having their life count, 
and whether this requirement can be dismantled rather than adapted to strategically, is a radically 
different approach than what is seen in parts of nonviolence and voluntary suffering theories. For 
example, in Vinthagen’s (2015, 216) discussion of suffering, the merit of voluntary suffering is 
exactly that it may move protesters from categories such as “‘non-people’, ‘God’s enemies’, 
‘treacherous’, ‘rats’, ‘cockroaches’, ‘dirty’, ‘barbarians’, ‘idiots’ or ‘animals’” into a category of 
human beings worthy of attention and care. Because of this potential, Vinthagen (ibid, 215) argues 
that “Gandhi’s thesis about the political role of suffering in the liberation struggle was developed in 
specific social contexts – segregated South Africa and colonial India – characterised by racism and 
ethnic superiority and inferiority”. In other words, for groups who in their present social and cultural 
settings are placed in a category of “not people” or “lesser people”, he claims that Gandhi’s thoughts 
on and practice of voluntary suffering is particularly useful and powerful, because this exemplary 
public suffering – which shows “the humanity, civility and egalitarianism of the subalterns” 
(Vinthagen, 2015, 215) – may humanise them in the eyes of their oppressors and neutral or complicit 
bystanders. In contrast, others argue that this extremely racialised and unequal context is one in 
which self-sacrifice and suffering is inappropriate (Hooker, 2016, 462). Hooker (ibid) also critiques a 
strategy of accepting the requirement that an oppressed group have to “prove” their humanity 
through suffering in order to earn social justice.    
 In a journal article on possible psychological explanations and models for creating outrage 
and repression backfire, Reis and Martin (2008, 13-14) discuss the impact that different “framings” 
of a victim and perpetrator can have on audience perceptions of the justice of a situation by 
attributing blame to either the victim or the perpetrator of violence. The authors argue that a 
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bystander with a “strong belief in a just world” will be less likely to feel sympathy for the victim, or 
attribute blame to the perpetrator, because of this belief that the world (or their society) is 
inherently just (ibid, 13). This is, they argue, “enhanced when the victim is actively devalued by the 
attacking group (especially in terms of defamation of character)” (ibid). The discussion does not 
include, however, an acknowledgement of the impact that political bias, structural prejudice, and 
so on, will have on audiences’ views on the value or worth of a victim of repressive violence. 
Although nonviolent resisters can, Reis and Martin (ibid, 14) argue, attempt to influence this 
dynamic and heighten the chance of “generating sympathy from observers” through “framing the 
character of the victim”, the obstacles to doing so and the chances of succeeding are vastly different 
depending on the grievance group in question and this is not elaborated on by the authors.     
 An example of such obstacles is the discourse around victims of police violence in the US, 
violence which for the Black Lives Matter movement is both a cause of their protests and what these 
protests are met with. As Hooker (2016, 460-461) writes, Black Americans are placed in systems of 
bias and prejudice which mean they are already less likely to be thought of with sympathy, 
regardless of any active attempts to frame the victim as deserving or not deserving of sympathy. 
They write:  
This dynamic is evident in the dissection of the pasts of unarmed black victims of police 
violence, even children (as in the cases of Aiyana Stanley-Jones and Tamir Rice), for evidence 
of criminality in order to claim that they were not innocent and were thus mainly or partly 
responsible for their own deaths. The problem is that if white solidarity requires black 
innocence, then the goalposts for racial justice continually shift because every specific 
instance of injustice becomes a discussion of whether or not a black victim was ‘deserving’ 
(Hooker, 2016, 460-461).  
The argument in Reis and Martin’s article (2008, 13-14) that theories and understandings of 
managing outrage can simply make use of these dynamics rather than question them has, then, 
obvious and serious consequences. This can be seen also in the discussion of a study by Friedman 
and Austin on the impact of positive or negative information about a victim on audience reactions. 
Reis and Martin summarise how the study found:  
more sympathy and less derogation for an imaginary hit-and-run victim framed as a 
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distinguished researcher (positive condition) compared to a sensationalistic, self-interested 
researcher (negative condition) or a researcher with routine accomplishments (neutral 
condition). They also varied the level of suffering supposedly experienced by the imaginary 
victim, with the finding that, in the positive condition, as suffering increased, so did 
sympathy for and attraction to the victim. In the negative condition, however, derogatory 
responses increased steadily as suffering increased (Reis and Martin, 2008, 13).  
This then leaves a model of “managing outrage” based on these mechanisms with an 
implication that if an audience – whether actively encouraged to or not – has negative ideas of the 
victim’s character, they may in fact react with less care the more violence the victim is exposed to. 
In contexts such as a highly racialised society and high rates of racialised police violence, the 
consequences of this cannot justifiably be ignored, even with an argument of achieving short-term 
goals. In the case of the Black Lives Matter movement, the impossibility of using these dynamics 
rather than fundamentally question the requirement that a victim of repressive and excessive 
violence be “worthy” of sympathy, is even clearer, since this would work directly against the aims 
and goals of the movement.  
 In a later piece on backfire, Martin (2015, 156) does address some of the wider systems and 
mechanisms which impact the chance of sympathy for victims of repressive violence. He writes that 
“[w]hen the targets of attack are of low status or stigmatized by allegations, such as being called 
terrorists or criminals, then what is done to them may not seem so serious. But if the targets are 
highly valued, then outrage will be greater” (ibid). Although Martin does not mention this, the 
discussion of who may be counted as valued and having prestige is closely linked to the concept of 
respectability politics. Martin writes:   
Protesters typically have higher status when they behave in a dignified fashion, dress 
respectably, and have prestige because of their occupations or accomplishments. Police 
know it looks much worse to beat and shoot business executives, Buddhist priests, or 
Catholic nuns than protesters who look scruffy and dress strangely (Martin, 2015, 156).  
The 2014 article Affect and Respectability Politics by Michelle Smith problematises a number 
of aspects related to uncritical uses of respectability politics for political goals. The basic logic of 
respectability politics are questions or views such as: 
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Have the police thrown you against a wall to search your pockets? Don’t stand on the street 
looking like you’re up to no good! Propriety breeds respect. Did your unarmed 
son/daughter/husband/wife/best friend/cousin die after the police applied the chokehold 
too vigorously? Cooler heads will prevail!  (Smith, 2014).  
This fails, however, to address the systemic and structural oppressions and violence at the 
root of the violence that took place, which have very little to do with the actual behaviour, dress, 
speech, or demeanour of the victim. Smith (2014) discusses a number of conversations in the wake 
of the killing of Michael Brown in Ferguson and the subsequent protests, all of which demonstrate 
in some way the impact that a requirement for respectability politics can have on protest and 
political displays of outrage. While all of these were not discussions over outcomes, since all 
participants “want the unjustified use of lethal force to stop”, Smith describes how to proponents 
of respectability politics: 
the critical theorizing and deliberate action of the young men and women (and boys and 
girls) who make up the Lost Voices, with their neck tattoos, XXXL white t-shirts, sagging 
pants, dread locks, outdoor voices, hip hop ethos and civil disobedience-rejecting rage, is 
either unintelligible as politics or unworthy of attention (Smith, 2014).   
In these arguments, the popular narrative and the actual strategies of the 1960s civil rights 
movement, which did make use of respectability politics to raise their profile, is often used, with 
references to the image of “tastefully dressed blacks confronting police dogs and water canon with 
calm demeanors standing in sharp and unambiguous contrast to white faces contorted by 
unreasoning rage” (Smith, 2014). The invocation of the civil rights movements demonstrates that 
while there are, as mentioned above, systemic and structural factors which mean that respectability 
politics – as Martin calls for to increase outrage – are inherently more available to some actors than 
to others, this does not mean that marginalised or vilified groups have no possibilities of pursuing 
respectability. However, this “romantic narrative of the civil rights movement” as the epitome of 
respectability and democratic virtue through accepting democratic loss, may end up foreclosing 
“other (possibly more radical) forms of black politics” as “both illegitimate and ineffective”, or 
resistance movements in general which reject respectability and acceptance of suffering as the 
necessary and legitimate price to be paid for social justice (Hooker, 2016, 457-458). As both Smith 
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(2014) and Hooker (2016) point out, this is not merely a tension between Black Americans (in the 
present case) and the rest of the US, but also a question of different groupings, interests, and 
strategies within the Black community. Smith for example asks with regard to the respectability 
proponents she discusses: 
More provocatively still, doesn’t their refusal to acknowledge the testimony of (urban) black 
youth about the injustice of police action, whether spoken or performed, indicate that 
neither considers urban youth worthy of consideration? (Smith, 2014). 
This leads to a rejection of “black rage, especially that of the black underclass” (Smith, 2014). 
Similarly, Hooker (2016, 465) argues that the “rejection of the politics of respectability and 
insistence that ‘all black lives matter’ by the Black Lives Matter protesters, for example, point toward 
a more radical critique of the carceral state that rejects the distinction between law-abiding middle-
class black citizens and always-already criminalized black ‘thugs’ in urban ghettos”.  
A pass to a world of equality: challenging sacrifice as democratic excellence 
The narrative that choosing to suffer for a cause is a price that should have to be paid by already 
marginalised communities to achieve further equality should not go unchallenged. Hooker (2016, 
451) explains that a core part of certain theories of democracy is democratic loss, that is, the fact 
that some citizens have to give up needs or wishes in service of the public or community. This creates 
the ideal of “democratic sacrifice” as a virtue, that is “citizens who cope with the experience of loss 
in an exemplary fashion” (ibid, 451-452). Citizens who practice democratic sacrifice are seen as “key 
to democratic stability”, and the 1960s civil rights movement is used at times as an exemplary 
example of such virtuous democratic sacrifice (ibid, 452). However, as Hooker (ibid) argues, theories 
of democratic sacrifice carry a risk of forgetting – as the praise of the civil rights movement 
exemplifies – to “challenge the disproportionate distribution of loss”, in which case the praise of 
exemplary performances of democratic sacrifice may instead reinforce and perpetuate this 
entrenched inequality. In their article, Hooker (ibid, 454-455) then attempts to critique not only the 
promotion of one possible resistance tactic – the performance of exemplary citizenship through 
democratic loss – but also the very ideas and system which demand such “extraordinary sacrifices 
from the citizens least positioned to make such ‘gifts’”.  
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This combination of respectability politics and democratic sacrifice is what leads Hooker 
(2016, 458, 460) to critique, in the context of Black protest in the United States, the “mistaken 
theoretical account of white moral psychology that assumes that exemplary forms of political 
activism by racialized minorities induce positive ethical transformations in members of the 
dominant racial group”, without taking the effects of racialised solidarity into account. In other 
words, it is a mistake to assume that “peaceful”, “forgiving”, or “nonviolent” responses to violence 
against Black Americans will be sure to create a rise in sympathy among white Americans simply by 
appealing to their conscience or sympathy. Instead, it can create “resentment and defensiveness” 
(ibid, 459-460). It can also be questioned, however, whether this idea of performing an idealised 
reaction to suffering, violence, and inequality, should be accepted as an entry-pass towards equality, 
even if it does at times achieve some advances.  
Again, the popular narrative of the civil rights movement as the ideal protest movement has 
been instrumental, especially in the US. The narrative of the civil rights movement as the model for 
exemplary citizenship, earning increases in equality through voluntary suffering while also 
improving society as a whole, narrows the perception of what an acceptable protest or resistance 
movement is, and creates the expectation that they should be “socially acceptable” in the first place 
(e.g. Banks, 2018, 713; Hooker, 2016, 451-452). This narrative has, amongst other things, been used 
to delegitimise contemporary protest movements, notably the Black Lives Matter movement 
(Banks, 2018, 710; Hooker, 2016, 450, 456). This delegitimisation happens because of a refusal from 
the Black Lives Matter movement to accept suffering without question or complaint as the price 
that should be paid for equality (Hooker, 2016, 450, 456). This is not, of course, the same as arguing 
that Black Lives Matter organisers do not understand and accept that police violence against 
protesters may be necessary in order for the movement to protest and progress; that is, that it is a 
necessary step or price. However, there is a significant difference between that and accepting that 
equality is not already earned and owed, and therefore, that it has to be earned through exemplary 
citizenship and democratic sacrifice. As Hooker (ibid, 456) argues, a request for democratic sacrifice 
to be performed to earn progress would mean that when “white public opinion has not become 
uniformly mobilized in support of the Black Lives Matter protests against police violence”, this would 
be the fault of the protesters for failing “to make visible to a white audience the reality of an unjust 
criminal justice system via the willing sacrifice of their innocent, non-resisting bodies to racial 
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violence”. Further, Hooker (ibid, 461) questions whether the requirement of excessive democratic 
sacrifice should in fact be read, not as sacrifice, but as “black submission” being “the price of white 
acquiescence to steps toward racial equality, which suggests a much different account of the impact 
of these gestures on white moral orientation”. An alternative line of resistance could feasibly be the 
refusal to accept more suffering from racial violence – whether “voluntary” or “involuntary” – and 
a struggle to have the Black victims of police violence recognised as worthy of sympathy and 
solidarity without further requirements, and whether that is in part what Black Lives Matter do and 
are judged for.  
Atkins (2019) argues, in fact, that the Black Lives Matter movement is in some ways more 
meaningfully compared to the Black Power movement than the 1960s civil rights movement. 
Perhaps this comparison is not made as much because of the perceived strength of the violence-
nonviolence dichotomy when it comes to tactics, and this means that similarities in aims and 
fundamental views on how to achieve change are missed. Atkins (ibid, 7) states that the call for Black 
power was a significant difference to the civil rights movement of Martin Luther King, Jr. because:   
It was power – in some cases political control – that was at issue, not freedom. To call for 
Black Power was to abandon appeals to conscience and, so, to implicitly recognize the 
failures of these appeals, to demand a place in political life whether that seemed good (or 
timely) to whites, and to abandon the shared pursuit of the freedom promised to all (since 
it is power that people can have over you, not freedom) (Atkins, 2019, 7). 
Another feature of holding or gaining power is, of course, that progress or freedoms do not 
have to be “earned” because they do not have to be granted. This, then, constitutes an approach to 
solving the problem of the requirement of democratic sacrifice in order to earn further freedoms or 
protections, and a different option – strategy if you will – for not only Black protest in the US, but 
for struggles for equality and justice for marginalised groups in general. The issue with a short-
sighted “strategic” approach to what works best for nonviolent resistance movements is that short-
term gains are less likely if a more fundamental change of the distribution of power in society is the 
aim. Hooker (2016, 452, 457), for example, argues that the equating of “peaceful acquiescence to 
the perpetual losses characteristic of a racial polity” with a necessary and stabilising “democratic 
loss” may in fact work against further progress towards racial equality, and perpetuate the current 
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“disproportionate distribution of loss”. In other words, the glorified status that voluntary suffering 
holds in nonviolence theory, and especially within the narrative of the civil rights movement, may 
in fact be preventing or limiting further gains for the racial justice movement in the United States 
by accepting the terms that Black Americans only deserve further rights and steps towards equality 
if they behave in exemplary fashion, reacting to violence with dignified and calm nonviolence and 
non-resistance, forgiving their opponents, and working for the betterment of the entire society 
rather than better conditions for themselves.  
A further question is whether suffering is necessarily the most powerful statement a resister 
can make about their belief in what they are fighting for, as theories of voluntary suffering claim 
(e.g. Vinthagen, 2015, 212). Or whether a refusal to suffer, or to accept suffering, can at times be 
an equally powerful statement of truth and power, a defiant act as described for example by Hooker 
(2016, 465), who writes that by refusing to meet the expectation that Black citizens need to be 
“political heroes” in order to achieve further equality, “responsibility for racial justice does not lie 
primarily with those who have already suffered the lion’s share of the losses inflicted by racism”.  
When nonviolence theory focuses exclusively, or mainly, on the situation of violence against 
protesters in terms of what short-term victories or gains may be achieved by approaching the 
repression the right way, and not the wider implications of not only the violence in itself, but the 
narratives that lie behind these short-term gains, there is a risk of missing out on other strategies 
for dealing with violent repression. While there is no doubt that violent repression of resistance 
movements will not stop completely, that does not mean that the only constructive or valid way for 
nonviolent movements to react to this is by putting a positive spin on the violence, and aiming at 
immediate backfire. Rage over the violence, condemnations over the lack of condemnation and 
sympathy, and calls for taking or creating their own power rather than having to perform a certain 
role of the exemplary repressed citizen, may all be valid strategies as well, leading to successful 
outcomes for nonviolent resistance movements.  
Conclusion  
This chapter has been reflective, in large part, of the overall argument of this thesis that nonviolence 
theory is highly influenced by a view of civil resistance as a form of purity politics, because it is not 
violent, or is free of violence. In contrast to this, the present chapter started by arguing that the 
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situation of repressive violence against nonviolent protesters breaks any nonviolent sphere and 
brings violence into the dynamic, particularly considering the importance that violence against 
protesters holds in the literature through voluntary suffering and backfire models. The scepticism 
of purist views and narratives is also reflected in the nuancing and complications of key, and often 
romanticised, parts of backfire theories, such as the heroic and dedicated self-sacrificer, and the 
power of sympathy.  
 The chapter also discussed an important strategic aspect, which is the question of risk. 
Relatively lower risk levels are one factor used to promote nonviolent resistance over armed 
insurgencies, because they enable wider and greater participation. This makes it even more 
important to acknowledge in both nonviolent theory and practice that different activists sometimes 
face widely unequal levels of risk for performing the same action. This is exemplified by Extinction 
Rebellion’s tactics and their early rhetoric and handling of these, which were criticised for not 
understanding and acknowledging the disproportionate violence that communities of colour in the 
UK are exposed to by the UK police. Despite discussing this mainly strategic concern, the remainder 
of the chapter was occupied with demonstrating the argument that in backfire theories, strategic 
nonviolence does not exist outside of concerns with normative assumptions, moral consequences, 
and questions of justice. This was demonstrated through three of the ways in which violent 
repression is argued to be able to result in backfire: by proving the dedication and commitment of 
nonviolent activists; by inviting sympathy from observers and bystanders; and through reference to 
spiritual, religious, and cultural ideals of heroes and martyrdom. 
 The glorification of the very specific kind of suffering included in backfire theory as voluntary 
suffering or self-sacrifice carries with it a risk of devaluing other forms of work and other activists, 
in particular ones who have unequal ability to take the risks associated with high-profile public civil 
disobedience actions. Through this comes also a risk of creating or reinforcing hierarchies within 
movements. Further, as this chapter also discussed, the glorification of this performative show of 
dedication risks overvaluing high-risk actions which may not actually be the best use of the time, 
resources, and energy of both movements and individual activists.  
 The chapter complicated the assumptions about the sympathy which has to arise in order 
for a movement to increase support following an incidence of violent repression. As shown, 
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sympathy is not a neutral or universally human process in the sense that all humans will react to 
witnessing excessive violence by feeling sympathy for the victim, no matter who the victim, 
perpetrator, or spectator is. Rather, sympathy is negotiated by feelings of proximity and 
identification, politically or structurally determined ideas of “us” and “them”, a culturally specific 
idea of what a grievable human constitutes, and racialised prejudice and bias amongst others.  
 Finally, the chapter presented arguments for taking other responses to repressive violence 
seriously as forms of legitimate nonviolent protesting. These include a refusal to “voluntarily” suffer 
police violence as a moral price to pay in order to earn social justice. This was done based primarily 
on Hooker’s (2016) discussion of the Black Lives Matter protests in the US, and the often 
unfavourably intended comparisons between BLM and the 1960s civil rights movement which is 
used as an example of exemplary citizenship through their response to police repression and their 
performance of voluntary suffering. As Hooker (ibid, 462) argues, this has a number of problematic 
consequences, with the main one perhaps being the refusal to consider alternative ways to protest 
for racial equality. She writes that “[i]n the tragic political trap created by the transmutation of black 
sacrifice into democratic exemplarity, there is very little room for blacks to express outrage at 
injustice, or to enact a politics of defiance of their expected status as peaceful democratic losers” 
(ibid). This chapter and thesis is, of course, particularly concerned with the role of nonviolence 
theory and narratives in this regard, and argues that by focusing almost exclusively on backfire, or 
the potential for backfire, when theorising the situation of violence against nonviolent protesters, 
nonviolence theory risks helping with this narrowing down of options and choices.  
These kinds of arguments and examinations are not an attempt to equate nonviolent 
resistance with violent resistance simply because violence plays a role in some way. It is, rather, as 
are the next two chapters, an attempt to nuance what nonviolence is, through a closer look at some 
of the ways in which violence still influences this form of protest and social movement organising. 
Similarly, critiquing the dynamic of backfire as being an at times biased and problematic mechanism 
relying on prejudice and structures of marginalisation does not mean that the dynamic should not 
be studied or used. Instead, the argument here is that through examining the ways that different 
forms of violence impact the backfire dynamic, theories and research may be able to mitigate or 
minimise these, or avoid reinforcing harmful (perhaps violent) narratives of victims deserving the 
violence used against them, or narratives requiring “respectability” from groups of people who will 
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never be allowed full respectability anyway. In addition, we may be able to develop and articulate 
further options for responding to repressive violence, and thereby expand the repertoire of 
nonviolent tactics.  
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Chapter Six: Violence Within Movements 
In 2011, the Occupy movement started with Occupy Wall Street in New York City and quickly spread 
to cities across the US and around the world (Calhoun, 2013, 26-27). The movement, which started 
from a dissatisfaction with the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, protested economic inequality, 
financial greed, and the strong influence of the financial sector on national politics (Calhoun, 2013, 
26-27; Gitlin, 2013, 23). Although Occupy, in the shape of the occupations of public spaces, was 
relatively short-lived, it received widespread attention and was hugely influential (Calhoun, 2013, 
26; Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 157). Occupy is famous not only for its protest of economic inequality 
through clear-cut refrains such as “We are the 99%”, but also for its protest tactics, especially the 
central occupations of public spaces (Calhoun, 2013, 29; Gitlin, 2013, 9). Although the massive 
Occupy marches were an important part of the widespread attention, legitimacy, and traction that 
the movement was able to create, it was the occupations that became emblematic of Occupy’s 
identity, ethos, and vision for alternative ways of organising societies (Gitlin, 2013, 21-23).  
During these occupations, however, reports started surfacing both in Occupy 
communication channels and in mainstream media which problematised the level of security and 
unrest in Occupy camps, including reports of sexual assaults and harassment perpetrated by 
activists in the camps (e.g. Newcomb, 2011; Knickerbocker, 2011; Hardikar, 2011; Hartmann, 2011). 
The impact of these incidents and reports was significant. For one, reports of violence and unrest, 
along with other “health and safety concerns” were used by city officials as part of their justification 
for forcibly breaking up and removing Occupy camps (Knickerbocker, 2011). However, an arguably 
more significant impact - since the protest camps would have been removed anyway, and so, the 
occurrence of violence was not a deciding factor in this - was the ignition of discussions within major 
nonviolence and social movement spaces about unequal levels of safety for activists, due to 
structural and systemic violence and the existence and re-creation of repression and social 
hierarchies from wider society within social movement spaces (Doyle, 2011).  
 This is the starting point of the present chapter, which examines and discusses different 
occurrences of violence within nonviolent movements. The starting point of sexual and gendered 
violence in movement spaces refers back to the highly contested category of so-called “private” 
violence, which was discussed in Chapter Four. The relevance of this category of private or personal 
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issues is pointed out by an Occupy protester who writing that “[c]omplaints of sexual harassment 
at the site are belittled as ‘personal problems’” (Gaeng, 2011). The discussion here aims to 
demonstrate how these instances of private violence do, or should, matter to a political and social 
movement’s nonviolent ethos.  
The chapter goes beyond a limited investigation of incidents of physical, direct violence, 
however, and also discusses occurrences of non-material forms of violence within nonviolent 
movements. This broadening of the concept of violence is, as shown in Chapter Four, not universally 
accepted, but often controversial and contested. This contestation can happen within activist and 
social movement spaces as well. An example of this is the Danish activist, author, and speaker Mads 
Ananda Lodahl (2017), who wrote a public Facebook post with a link to an online journal article 
(Nimni, 2017) problematising the widening of the meaning of violence. The post read: 
It has annoyed me a little that many people describe all sorts of things as ‘acts of violence’. 
Everything from increases in rent, over poor working conditions and gentrification, to 
structural issues and ugly or inconsiderate language has been given the label of ‘violence’. It 
is not that those things are not harmful and need to be taken seriously and fought against, 
but I have sometimes thought that it is people who have never themselves been beaten up, 
who use the word ‘violence’ in that way. For me at least, violence does not mean all sorts of 
different things. It means something very specific. Read the article and tell me what you 
think… (Lodahl, 2017)2 
This comment demonstrates the tensions that arise from the fact that violence is not a 
clearly defined and universally agreed upon concept, tensions which become especially pronounced 
given the rhetorical weight of naming something as violence. That is, the claim of certain events or 
 
2 My translation. Original text in Danish reads: “Det har irritieret mig lidt, at mange folk beskriver alt muligt som 
‘acts of violence’. Alt fra huslejestigninger over dårlige arbejdsforhold og gentrificering til strukturelle ting og sager og 
grimt eller ubetænksomt sprog har fået mærkatet ‘vold’. Det er ikke, fordi de ting ikke er skadelige og skal tages alvorligt 
og bekæmpes, men jeg har ind i mellem tænkt, at det er folk, der aldrig selv har fået tæsk, der bruger ordet ‘vold’ på 
den måde. For mig betyder vold i hvert fald ikke bare alt muligt. Det betyder noget helt specifikt. Læs artiklen og lad 
mig høre, hvad du synes…” 
 
Chapter Six: Violence Within Movements 
- 148 - 
 
actions as instances of violence may heighten the perceived importance and urgency of an issue, 
because violence is so broadly agreed upon as problematic and harmful, but the same claim may 
also take meaning and weight out of the concept of violence, if it becomes too diluted. As Nimni 
(2017) for example argues - on the side of critiquing the broadening of violence to mean non-
physical forms of harm - this can lead to “every bad thing [becoming] every other bad thing. 
Neoliberalism is white supremacy is erasure is gentrification”. While this chapter does not attempt 
to solve this conundrum - partly as a clear solution probably does not exist - the discussion here is 
especially interested in the processes around these tensions and definitional discussions.  
Lodahl’s (2017) particular comment highlights an implicit hierarchy within movements in 
which “frontline” activists who have suffered the most direct violence and repression from 
opponents are at the top as the most legitimate activists, as discussed in Chapter Five, and who 
may, through this, be allowed to act as gatekeepers of the definition of violence, or the relevance 
of specific instances of violence; that gatekeeping function is certainly what seems to be implied in 
Lodahl’s (ibid) argument that only “people who have never themselves been beaten up” would think 
of non-physical harms as violence. This process of creating hierarchies and exclusions of certain 
forms of violence over others is a continuing focus within feminist scholarship and is used here as 
well. Feminist scholarship works for a “recognition of sexual and gender-based violence [which] 
continues to be hampered by social, political, and institutional views of what constitutes ‘true’ 
violence”, as well as the relationship between acts of violence and responses to violence (Kaladelfos 
and Featherstone, 2014, 234).  
This tension over differing definitions of violence is arguably especially pertinent to 
nonviolent movements and theory, in which - as demonstrated throughout this thesis - an implied 
conception of violence is at the basis of what defines nonviolence as a specific mode of action. The 
question then becomes whether racist and sexist behaviours, or silencing of systematically 
marginalised groups, are violent, or at least so integrally linked to violence that they cannot be 
separated, and therefore an inherent issue to labelling a movement as nonviolent. The focus on 
non-material definitions of violence is unusual within social movements literature, which “rarely 
explicitly focuses on forms of violence which go beyond physical acts” (Sommier et al., 2019, 233). 
This chapter is an attempt to open up this conversation, partly by identifying how certain 
assumptions about what constitutes violence become pre-determined and not even considered as 
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potentially contestable. Instead, the chapter aims to bring these questions and debates to the core 
of nonviolence theory through a challenge of the narrow conception of violence, and the strong 
hierarchies of which forms of violence are relevant to nonviolence theory and practice.   
The chapter will start with a brief overview of the question of private forms of violence, and 
violence within movements, as it has been dealt with in nonviolent activism and theory so far. 
Although this has only been minimally discussed, the break between feminist and pacifist groups in 
the 1970s and 1980s illustrate that the challenge to take private forms of violence seriously in 
nonviolent movements has been made before. The chapter will then discuss in more depth 
instances of private violence in the form of sexual and gendered violence that happened within 
Occupy camps, and the impact of this for nonviolent movements and theory. Following this, the 
discussion will focus on one particular potential condition for violence within movements – material 
and non-material – which is the illusion or assumption of equality between members and the ways 
in which this may reinforce, recreate, or lead to, forms of violence. This discussion is based both on 
the Occupy movement and its internal culture, but also revisits the examples of Extinction Rebellion 
and the Black Lives Matter movement during the discussion of internal culture and the assumption 
of equality. The chapter aims to argue and demonstrate throughout the discussion how these 
occurrences of violence, and definitional discussions around violence, impact nonviolent resistance 
not only in terms of principles – being against violence – but also strategy by compromising or 
limiting core nonviolent resistance dynamics.  
The personal is political: contestations of a narrow nonviolence 
As discussed in Chapter Four, the category of so-called private violence is a highly contested one, 
initially by feminist theory and activism through an argument that “the personal is political” (Chen 
et al., 2016, xxvi-xxvii; Pillow et al., 2019, vii; Hardikar, 2011). What is especially contested is the 
sense that private violence means violence which is irrelevant to politics, political theory, or political 
activities, but also the sense that private violence is overall less important than other forms of 
violence (McAllister et al., 1982, 9-10). It is worth emphasising the argument made in Chapter Four 
that the labelling of private and public/political as categories of violence are not “ontological 
categories - that is what actually can be seen by the public, or what actually is political. Rather, they 
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are socially constructed categories of what should be seen and what should matter politically”, and 
it is these normative prescriptions and assumptions that are critiqued and worked against.  
Although there is not much work which focuses on the intersection of feminism and 
nonviolence, the anthology Reweaving the Web of Life: Feminism and Nonviolence (McAllister et al., 
1982) offers an example of this. It also provides an account of a feminist break with nonviolence 
theory and activism, precisely because of a refusal within the pacifist movement to incorporate anti-
violence efforts in terms of personal or private forms of violence into the movement’s aims and 
work (ibid, 6-7). In their contribution to the anthology, Bickmore (ibid, 162-164) provides a summary 
of the feminist arguments in favour of integrating the two perspectives, as well as the reaction of 
the peace movement: 
Patriarchy is violent both in its public manifestations - militarism, economic imperialism, 
capital punishment, and hierarchy-bureaucracy, and in its private manifestations - domestic 
violence, rape, job discrimination, and pornography. For some reason the mainstream peace 
movement has all but totally ignored ‘private,’ close to home violence in favor of combating 
more ‘public’ and remote wrongs (McAllister et al., 1982, 163). 
In the same anthology, Meyerding (McAllister et al., 1982, 9-10) notes that the task of 
“[i]ntegrating nonviolence into feminism requires us to really believe that the personal is political 
and there is no dividing line between them, no hierarchy of which is more important”. These calls 
for taking action against forms of systemic violence within nonviolence and pacifist movements 
were, however, mostly dismissed or ignored (ibid, 6-7).  
While these discussions and many of the concepts developed during them originate from 
second-wave feminism in the 1960s to 1980s, a significant later contribution is the concept of 
intersectionality, first coined by Kimberlè Crenshaw (Chen et al., 2016, xxvii; Collins, 2017; Parker 
and Hefner, 2015). Crenshaw (1991, 1244) used “the concept of intersectionality to denote the 
various ways in which race and gender interact to shape the multiple dimensions of Black women’s 
… experiences” and which cannot simply be viewed as separate forms of oppression or identity. The 
term is intended to go beyond these two particular identities in its analysis, to demonstrate how 
“the multiple and complex identities we each hold in relation to privilege and oppression” affect the 
occurrence and meaning of private violence (Chen et al., 2016, xxvi-xxvii).  
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Chen et al. (2016, xxvi-xxvii) argue that another aspect which the second-wave feminist 
movement did not pay attention to when fighting private violence was “the disturbing paradox of 
prevalent intimate violence within activist communities, and the degree of collusion, refusal, and/or 
incapacity to address this urgent issue demonstrated even by anti-violence movement ‘experts’”, 
an urgent issue which had become “‘dirty little secrets’ within our progressive movements and 
communities” (an example of this omission is found in McAllister et al. (1982, 11)). This shortcoming 
led the authors of The Revolution Starts at Home: Confronting Intimate Violence Within Activist 
Communities to begin working in 2003 on what would eventually become the published book, a rare 
resource on “partner abuse and sexual assault in activist communities” (Chen et al., 2016, xxvi). 
However, these questions of everyday politics and private violence, especially as occurring 
also within nonviolent movements, are scarcely discussed within nonviolence literature. This may 
in part be due to a purist assumption that these issues do not occur within the nonviolent resistance 
sphere, or at least not in a way and to a degree that makes it important to the understanding of 
nonviolent resistance. An example of this can be seen in claims for example that “the gendered 
nature of violence wielded by men” is something found in violent histories of war, not in the “quiet, 
nonviolent” history of civil resistance (Bartkowski ed., 2013, 2). In contrast, this chapter argues that 
violences such as gendered and racist violence are found both within nonviolent resistance 
movements and outside it and are thus not a phenomenon belonging solely to violent resistance, 
or societies outside of nonviolent resistance spaces.  
Brian Martin (2015, 162) argues that the negligence of such questions is because this “mostly 
occurs out of the public eye”, whereas “[c]ivil resistance theory and practice have mainly focused 
on activities in the public sphere … and have given little attention to struggles inside organizations”. 
In this sense, the example of the Occupy camps is especially interesting because the discussion did 
become very public and had an impact on public perception of the movement, thus forcing the issue 
into conversations of social movement spaces. In the following sections, this chapter will also argue 
that although the occurrences of violence discussed here do, in a sense, take place out of the public 
view, they are inextricably linked with the public and highly visible nonviolent protests carried out 
by the movement. The separation between public and private is then, once again, challenged.  
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A more recent example of how nonviolence theory views these questions of violence as at 
best marginal, and at worst even counterproductive to nonviolent resistance is seen in Nepstad’s 
(2015) discussion of regime strategies to weaken civil resistance movements. In the discussion, 
issues such as race, class, religion, etc. are treated as imagined, or at least irrelevant divisions, which 
organisers should avoid regimes taking advantage of to divide the movement (Nepstad, 2015, 136-
137). With phrasings such as the risk of diverting “attention from the real political issues”, “claims 
of movement prejudice”, and “accusations of being led by elites” (ibid, 137, my emphasis), the 
implication is that these issues do not occur within nonviolent movements, or are at the very least 
not very important except as potential weak points for an opponent to take advantage of. This form 
of hierarchy of violences or issues is a reoccurring theme for this thesis and especially this chapter.   
  In his book on the workings of nonviolence, Vinthagen (2015, 49, 145) discusses the influence 
of feminist nonviolence from the 1970s of working against the specific forms of private violence that 
are silencing and marginalisation through internal power structures in meetings. Vinthagen (ibid, 
145) writes of the feminist inspired focus on “the problematic roles and oppression that arise in 
meetings”, and the response of suggesting concrete behaviours and structures to counter this in 
nonviolence handbooks. Although feminist critiques have then influenced nonviolence theory in this 
particular way, the chapter will discuss whether these influences and techniques have been at times 
co-opted to justify an assumption of complete equality within nonviolent movements, an illusion 
which may work to mask and reinforce inequality and marginalisation.  
While there is, as shown, a history of the discussion of private violence within social 
movements (including nonviolent ones), the push for focus on this has been resisted and contested 
and has led to breaks between theories and movements rather than integration. This is arguably 
visible in recent nonviolence literature, which deals with the question only rarely, and often more 
with an implication that such discussions are distractions or potential weaknesses rather than part 
of the core of what nonviolent resistance is and does.  
Not everyone’s streets: violence in protest spaces 
While the Occupy movement was widely regarded as an inspiring and important social justice 
movement, the occurrence of sexual assaults, harassment, and gendered violence within Occupy 
camps had a profound impact on public perception and, more importantly for this discussion, on 
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conversations of safety and privilege in social movement and activism spaces (North, 2011a; Penny, 
2015, 87). Associate Professor in Race and Gender Studies, and co-founder of online publication The 
Feminist Wire, Lomax (2011) wrote, as the Occupy camps were at their height, that the “Occupy 
movement has a growing challenge that needs immediate attention: in-house rape”, referring to at 
least four reported rapes in occupations, and arguing that there were probably “several others, most 
of which have likely gone unreported - for various reasons”. An anonymous Occupy protester 
reported to the feminist news site Jezebel that while they were very supportive of the movement 
and its goals, “the physical space is not very safe - especially for women” (quoted in North, 2011b). 
This reality resulted in disappointment and disillusionment amongst activists, as a space which was 
supposed to be uniquely open to everyone to participate and speak in, with “unifying” potential, 
became unsafe for some of the same groups that were already used to being unsafe in public spaces 
(Doyle, 2011; Penny, 2015, 86). Journalist and author Laurie Penny (2015, 86-87) describes how 
“even … in these brief magical spaces opening up across the world to let in freeloaders and free-
thinkers and revolutionaries and lost kids to hold the space for as long as they could stand, even 
there, there was rape” and sexual assaults in tents and at sit-ins.  
This disappointment is especially understandable given the importance of these 
encampments to the identity, symbolism, legitimacy, and organisation of the Occupy movement 
and its branches. The centrality of occupations and protest camps in nonviolent theory and practice 
also demonstrates why the instances of violence and their aftermath are (or should be) important 
to discussions of nonviolent resistance. Although protest camps - or occupations - were of course 
not new phenomena at the time, they became an important global phenomenon in 2011, with 
protest camps in Tahrir Square in Egypt, Syntagma Square in Athens, Zuccotti Park in New York City, 
Puerto del Sol in Madrid and the London Stock Exchange (Calhoun, 2013, 27-28; Feigenbaum et al., 
2013, 1). Gitlin describes that especially to activists themselves, what Occupy “‘stood for’ was the 
virtue of encampment itself, assembly as a way of life, a form of being”, an idea which springs from 
influential American and Enlightenment theories of political life as based on public assembly 
(Calhoun, 2013, 35; Gitlin, 2013, 9, 19). The Occupy movement is therefore a particularly strong, but 
far from the only, example of the importance that protest camps or occupations can hold for a 
movement. It illustrates a number of ways in which the everyday dynamics of protest camps and 
other movement spaces are important to the core functioning of nonviolent movements, and 
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therefore, why the occurrence of different forms of violence here is crucial to the theory of 
nonviolent resistance.  
First, protest camps are often the organisational centres of a movement (Feigenbaum et al., 
2013, 2). This was certainly the case for the Occupy movement, where the occupations were 
innovation hubs and perhaps the most important space for meeting other activists and forging new 
connections (Calhoun, 2013, 29-31; Gitlin, 2013, 9). The ability to be present at, and ideally live in, 
the protest camps was therefore the key to being able to participate in the organisational work of 
Occupy.  Second, this organisational centre is often linked to a strong symbolic role played by protest 
camps, because organisation and decision-making procedures within occupations are a chance to 
exemplify different ways of organising society and imagining “alternative worlds” (Feigenbaum et 
al., 2013, 1-2). As Rossdale and Stierl (2016, 157) comment, “[t]o ‘occupy’ has become emblematic 
of a politics that is inclusive, subversive and active in a manner that both challenges and goes beyond 
traditional conceptions of politics as (mere) representation”, that is, the occupation or protest camp 
in itself is seen as a demonstration of living and embodying radical political and social ideals. Gitlin 
(2013, 13-14) describes the strength of this narrative in the Occupy camps, which were made up of 
“people who wanted community, a new start, a society in secession or a society somehow of their 
own”. This included a number of procedures for open discussions and horizontal decision-making 
within the camps (Boler et al., 2014, 442). This means that unequal access to physical participation 
in the occupation means not only unequal access to participate in organisational work, but also to 
shape and influence the vision of society articulated by the movement. As discussed in Chapter Two, 
greater and more diverse participation is argued to be an important difference between violent and 
nonviolent resistance and a major advantage for nonviolent resistance. This participation is possible 
because the different barriers to participation are lower - but not non-existent - in nonviolent 
resistance (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 30, 34). Violence between members in social movement 
spaces reduces and complicates this access to participation significantly and should therefore be 
central to arguments around nonviolent resistance, even if these are made from a purely strategic 
standpoint.  
Third, an occupation or protest camp is often, along with large-scale marches and protests, 
a symbol or representation of the movement’s democratic appeal and broad support, a way of 
“representing the people by public gathering” (Calhoun, 2013, 31; Feigenbaum et al., 2013, 2). This 
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means that for participants, these actions give them “the sense of being part of something bigger 
than oneself, of acting not just as a small minority of the population but as ‘the people’” (Calhoun, 
2013, 31). In other words, the physical gathering with the aim of protesting a common cause is a 
strongly unifying experience, but one which comes with a risk of forgetting that even large and 
diverse crowds may not have the universality to speak for or represent the people as such (ibid). 
Again, this becomes especially true when access to participation in the movement is unequal. In the 
case of the Occupy movement, the public spaces created within the occupations were, both 
intentionally and unintentionally, a very diverse, open, and leaderless space (Gitlin, 2013, 13-14). 
While this diverse membership was an important part of the identity of the movement, 
commentators such as Sociology Professor David Meyer argued in the context of the sexual assaults 
that occurred in Occupy camps that this “history of welcoming everyone and just assuming that 
they’re on your side” could be problematic if not followed with a “set of social sanctions or norms” 
to regulate and maintain the space for as many participants as possible to feel safe (quoted in 
Newcomb, 2011). 
For these reasons, protest camps are a compelling example of how and why everyday life in 
between protests and actions, including instances of “private” violence, is extremely important to 
consider in order to fully understand the movement and its work. While the importance of these 
everyday politics is accentuated during occupations because of “the sustained physical and 
emotional labour that goes into building and maintaining the site as simultaneously a base for 
political action and a space for daily life” (Feigenbaum et al., 2013, 2), it is important to emphasise 
that this significance is still not exclusive to occupations and protest camps; everyday life and 
relations are always part of a resistance movement, as members have “private” interactions and 
relationships in between and around meetings, as movements will meet physically in some spaces 
at some point, whether that is to organise or protest, and as many social movements are based on 
networks of private connections (Chen et al., 2016, xxxii).   
In their discussion of the sexual violence in Occupy camps, Lomax (2011) suggests that one 
of the possible reasons why they assume that more sexual assaults than the reported number had 
taken place is that “there is inside pressure not to report rape outside of the camps for fear of bad 
publicity”. This sense that the reporting of violent crimes was discouraged or contested within 
Occupy was at the forefront of the debate when Occupy Baltimore, a relatively small Occupy camp, 
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attracted national attention for a sexual offense policy which discouraged victims of sexual assault 
from reporting the assault to the police in order to avoid “the involvement of the police in [the] 
community” (Gaeng, 2011; North, 2011b). Jenny Gaeng was an activist at Occupy Baltimore and 
wrote about the policy and issues of sexism in the movement (Gaeng, 2011). They later become the 
media contact for Occupy Baltimore’s revised security policy following the reactions and debates in 
the media (North, 2011b). Although Gaeng (2011) does point to problems with gendered violence 
and hierarchies in the movement, they write that the policy in question was never officially passed 
by Occupy Baltimore, was quickly replaced, and had simply been picked up by a “right-wing blogger” 
in order to create outrage and a sense that the Occupy camps were highly chaotic and unsafe spaces. 
Despite this, and an official response from the Occupy Baltimore General Assembly stating their 
commitment to supporting sexual assault survivors in taking the action they want - whether that is 
involving police or not - the story was widely read and discussed (North, 2011b). Similar stories of 
the dilemma over the handling of sexual assaults within Occupy camps, given both the issues with 
the legal systems for sexual assault survivors in general, but in particular the strained relationship 
with the police within the movement, were coming out from other camps (Newcomb, 2011). 
Rather than an overriding concern with publicity, with an implication that problems are 
accepted by the movement as long as they are not discovered by the media and public, however, 
this sense of pressure to not report or publicise violence is perhaps better understood as springing 
from the importance that the Occupy occupations were given, as examples of a better way to be a 
community. That is, because the (successful) running of Occupy was seen to demonstrate and 
validate the ethos and promise of the Occupy movement, pointing out instances which complicate 
the success and purity of these spaces is likely to be met with strong reactions because it may be 
seen as an attack on the spirit and integrity of the movement itself. In their wider analysis of the 
gender politics of the Occupy movement, North (2011b) suggests as much by arguing that if victims 
of gendered violence or sexual assault speak out, they risk being “demonized if they speak up in 
ways perceived to discredit the group”, and that this had happened in high-profile cases of sexual 
assault such as a widely reported assault in the Occupy Cleveland camp (see also Occupy Wall Street 
sexual assault survivor's team (2011) for further context on media narratives around this). “In both 
cases”, North (ibid) continues, “the assumption has been that any allegation of inappropriate 
behavior forever tarnishes a radical movement, and thus should be avoided at all costs”. A strong 
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need and push for a movement identity of being better, less violent, more progressive than “society” 
- or perhaps even being completely free of these issues - can therefore end up marginalising and 
erasing the lived experiences of activists in the protest camps who are exposed to everyday, private 
violences there as well, and thereby lessen the opportunities of challenging and minimising these 
forms of violence. 
The events at Occupy Baltimore especially highlight another process as well, which is a 
conflict over which values or fights against which forms of violence should be at the forefront of 
movement decisions. That is, it is an example of how a particular grouping within Occupy Baltimore 
who were strongly anti-police attempted - consciously or subconsciously - to make this particular 
stance important to the collective identity of the movement through making it a central part of how 
security in the camp was handled, at the expense of approaches and responses advocated by 
survivors’ groups (Gaeng, 2011; Samuel, 2013, 402). Another protester in Occupy Baltimore 
reported an episode which speaks to this conflict, although not related specifically to sexual violence 
or harassment (North, 2011b). The occupier recalls a protest in which they had tried to stop physical 
fighting between other occupiers and police, and “the angry crowd (mostly young white men) 
turned on me. It was not sexual in nature but was out of the ‘calling the police is a violent act’ 
sentiment” (quoted in North, 2011b). This highlights the extent to which these disagreements and 
tensions are, at times, about what is defined as violence, and what is defined as the most important 
violence either universally or in the given context. 
In response to these discussions, Occupy Wall Street published a statement written by 
members of their “sexual assault survivor’s teams” to provide information about a particular sexual 
assault in the New York camp which had been discussed publicly (Occupy Wall Street sexual assault 
survivor's team, 2011). In the statement, Occupy Wall Street reiterated their commitment to the 
right “to participate in peaceful protests without fear of violence” and aimed to “respond to media 
accounts that blame the survivor, and that attempt to use this horrific incident to attack OWS” (ibid).  
The statement further clarified that Occupy Wall Street were seeking to support survivors of sexual 
assault in choosing their course of action, whether that be reporting to the police or aiming at 
community justice approaches (ibid).  
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Although the many aspects of pursuing both legal redress and community justice as a sexual 
assault survivor is beyond the scope of the present discussion, it is worth noting as Andrea Smith 
(Cofounder of the initiative INCITE! Women of Color Against Violence) argues, that attempts at 
“restorative justice” have “often failed women, especially women of color, facing intimate or 
stranger/state violence” (Chen et al., 2016, xxiv). They write that: 
For the community to hold somebody accountable they have to actually think what 
happened was wrong. So therefore you can’t rely on a romanticized notion of community or 
even assume that community actually exists. For a community-based response to be 
effective requires a political organizing component to it that actually creates communities 
that offer accountability” (Chen et al., 2016, xxiv).  
This means that even with the Occupy movement working towards community-based 
solutions, this was no guarantee that protest camps would become safer spaces for women and 
gender minorities. Because of this, opening up debates and discussions about how violence is 
perceived and defined within movements becomes especially important, as opposed to, as Smith 
says, relying on a narrative that declaring a space a “community” will solve tensions, hierarchies, 
and inequalities. Further, this highlights the importance of emphasising the systemic nature of the 
violence discussed here, since systemic violence is still at times misunderstood to be isolated 
incidents as discussed in Chapter Four. In this view, the problem of sexual and gendered violence 
would be solved if a perpetrator – or all perpetrators – are simply removed from the space, and the 
assumption is that these can indeed be easily identified as the “bad” people of the group.  
The systemic nature of this violence is important to the discussion at hand in more, and 
sometimes contradictory, ways as well. It underlines the fact that this system of violence is not 
unique to the Occupy camps - or a number of other protest camps - but rather a continuation of 
systems of violence within wider society. As Gaeng (2011) writes, this purist ideal of a social 
movement space as free of surrounding systems and structures of violence sets unrealistic 
expectations for movements. They write: 
this whole mess is not about us. As much as most of us wish it wasn’t so, Occupy Baltimore 
is a microcosm of the social strata that comprise our messed-up society. If someone here 
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touched me inappropriately or doesn’t care about the lack of female voices at the [General 
Assembly], it’s not because he’s a poster boy for What’s Wrong With the Revolution. He’s 
the depressing norm (Gaeng, 2011).  
Although this “depressing norm” can of course be worked against, thereby creating 
hopefully less violence and repression in movement spaces than outside them, structures of 
repression and violence are not automatically reset or made to disappear simply through setting up 
an autonomous zone with “new” social structures in a protest camp. This means that it does not, 
perhaps, say anything particularly bad about the Occupy movement that these events happened, 
despite the attacks being used to discredit the camps and sometimes protest spaces in general as 
highly unsafe spaces (Knickerbocker, 2011). It does, however, mean that Smith’s (Chen et al., 2016, 
xxiv) reminder that well-meaning communities does not automatically mean universally safe ones, 
is especially relevant, since Occupiers are also brought up and shaped by a society outside of Occupy 
in which these forms of systemic violence are widespread, disregarded, or made to disappear from 
the public’s notice.  
On the other hand, it is important to point out the systemic nature of the violence because 
this makes the violence more noteworthy and impactful; it makes it “mean more”. What the 
systemic nature means is that the sexual assaults in the occupations, rather than being isolated 
instances of “bad apples” within a movement, are part of a larger problem which affects not only 
large parts of society, but also access to participation in the movement and ability to identify with 
the movement ethos and goals. As Gaeng (2011) writes, the assumption that these instances of 
violence were isolated incidents of personal or private violence, also assumes that “it’s somehow 
possible to affect change as a divided and internally oppressive community”. These forms of 
violence are then easily seen as not affecting the core of what it means to be a nonviolent social 
movement, or practice nonviolent resistance, because it is nothing unique about this particular 
space. The above section has aimed to demonstrate, however, why it does in fact in a number of 
ways address and compromise claims of nonviolence.  
Are we all equal here? 
A central and often emphasised feature of both Occupy and Extinction Rebellion is the idea of being 
non-hierarchical, leaderless, and decentralised movements; an idea based on an assumption of 
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equality within the movement and perhaps on an assumption that declaring a space “emancipated” 
makes it so (Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 163). In Occupy, the pull away from hierarchies and structures 
came from core organisers, since “[m]any if not most of the prime movers in Occupy - the inner 
movement - were anarchists and democratic radicals, desirous of reorganizing social decisions 
around directly democratic, ‘horizontal’ assemblies” (Gitlin, 2013, 6). Similarly, Sam Knights (Farrell 
et al., 2019, 11), a founding member of XR, defines Extinction Rebellion as “a decentralized mass 
movement of concerned citizens. It is open to anyone who takes action in a non-violent way”. Unlike 
Occupy, however, which started with no formal structure and no formalised demands (Gitlin, 2013, 
18), the structure of Extinction Rebellion was to an extent well-defined, and the movement had 
three key demands defined by the founding members (Extinction Rebellion UK, 2020; Farrell et al., 
2019, 11).  
This assumption of equality is related to questions of violence within movements in several 
ways. Firstly, it is directly related to levels of safety in movement spaces as discussed earlier in this 
chapter, since an assumption of equal levels of safety and risk prevents actions and procedures 
which might mitigate the different levels that actually exist. This could include actions such as 
recognising a need for a strong support network and preventative work when it comes to sexual 
violence within movements. A reported sexual assault in the Occupy Cleveland camp provides an 
example of the above point on the need for support structures which recognise differences and 
inequalities rather than assuming substantial equality. During the Occupy protests, media sources 
reported an instance of sexual assault in the Occupy Cleveland camp, in which a 19-year old woman 
said that she was raped by a man named Leland, who she said she had “been assigned to share a 
tent with” (Doyle, 2011). However, the organisers of the occupation “denied any potential 
responsibility, pointing to the ‘leaderless’ nature of the movement” (ibid). The claim was, then, that 
no protester would be told they had to share a tent with anyone else, and that therefore, it is not 
the responsibility of organisers if a sexual assault occurs in a shared tent. However, as Doyle argues: 
Whether a girl that young - a girl who attends a school for students with ADD and autism, 
and may not process social interactions in a neurotypical way - would assume 
‘leaderlessness’ to work like this, or whether she might not naturally interpret an organizer’s 
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saying ‘why don’t you share a tent with Leland’ as an ‘assignment’ given how power works 
elsewhere, is not addressed (Doyle, 2011).  
Thus, the actual functioning of anarchy and leaderlessness is not neutral or experienced the 
same by everyone (Doyle, 2011). If these systems of governance are premised on an idea of equality 
between participants which does not exist, then the leaderlessness of a movement will risk 
recreating and reinforcing the systems of oppression, systematic violences, and power structures of 
the surrounding society. In the case of Occupy, Doyle (ibid) writes that “the boundaries of anarchy 
and leaderlessness, as they concern sexual assault, continue to trouble many women who are 
involved - or would like to be involved - with Occupy”. 
An awareness of inequality might also mean recognising the need to publicly acknowledge 
the different relationship that communities of colour will have with law enforcement when planning 
civil disobedience actions, and to actively take this increased risk of violence into account. This 
concern is an extension of the discussion of Extinction Rebellion’s strategy from Chapter Five, which 
brought up concerns that the movement was insufficiently prepared for the mass arrests it aimed 
to provoke. A consequence of not assuming equality between members would also be to recognise 
the increased need for support for more vulnerable activists, at the level of risk they choose to take. 
Although Extinction Rebellion made the concept of “People Care” a tenet of the movement’s 
regenerative culture framework, the actual practice of this had according to Westwell and Bunting 
(2020, 548) a tendency to individualise issues at the expense of a structural and systemic framework. 
The idea of “People Care” is to focus on relationships and “emotional and physical support” for 
activists (ibid). Despite this intention, the researchers report that during their fieldwork in XR 
Manchester, they “witnessed incidents where marginalised groups’ experiences of inequality and 
oppression were not fully recognised or addressed” (ibid, 549). This criticism of exclusionary 
tendencies is backed up in Gil’s (2019) interviews with British activists of colour, who also saw 
different facets of exclusion of people of colour in the movement. A focus on “self-care” was found 
to be an important part of Extinction Rebellion’s internal work in Westwell and Bunting’s (2019, 
549) fieldwork, a concept which “focuses on emotional and physical wellbeing”, but also one which 
is, again, an example of the individualising attitude of the group. The researchers found “that 
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systemic issues such as racism were often individualised, rather than openly discussed collectively 
within the culture of Manchester XR” (ibid).  
Focusing on the role of violence within nonviolent movements requires, amongst other 
things, “rejecting liberal humanism, which equates moral equality to an equal distribution of the 
skills, dispositions and capacities required to participate effectively in political settings and 
negotiations” (Samuel, 2013, 402). That is, the idea that having stated that all members are equal 
in a movement space – or stating that that is the ideal of the movement – is not the same as that 
actually being the case. This inequality can be due to a number of different factors, as explored 
above, and will be reinforced through different mechanisms if it is unacknowledged.  
Such a focus also requires rejecting the idea that social movement spaces are somehow 
independent or outside of the hierarchies and power dynamics of the rest of society and 
“unproblematically open, inclusive and non-hierarchical” (Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 158), in order 
to not simply obscure and reinforce these often violent dynamics further. A famous perspective on, 
and critique of, movements with a lack of leadership and structure is Jo Freeman’s talk-turned-essay 
from 1970 The Tyranny of Structurelessness. Although the essay itself is focused on 
structurelessness within the women’s liberation movement of the time (Freeman, 2013, 231), the 
arguments can be applied to other movement and group contexts. Freeman (ibid) argues that 
although the experiment with structureless movements stem from a “natural” dislike of an overly 
structured society which took away control from women, this had “moved away from a healthy 
counter to those tendencies to becoming a goddess in its own right”. The problem with this status 
is the risk that activists and organisers will assume that an absence of structure is the only non-
oppressive way to organise (ibid, 231-232), and therefore, any attempt at structuring or regulating 
a movement - even in the name of making up for inequalities amongst members - will be rejected.  
The Occupy movement was famous - and prided itself - for its refusal to appoint leaders, and 
state a political programme, even as this was asked for by media and other political actors (Calhoun, 
2013, 30; Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 159). This was a conscious decision because “[h]aving a leader 
often ruins protests - makes them as simple as one perceived failure or weakness on that leader’s 
part” (Doyle, 2011). The way this lack of structure and programme was handled by the movement 
was to use “radical consensus and endless discussion”, a performance of “the people capable of 
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spontaneous order” (Calhoun, 2013, 30). This decision-making process became not only an 
important aspect simply because of the decisions made, but also because the occupation became 
an important part of the “visual identity to outsiders” (ibid). To be part of the core of the Occupy 
movement - or the core of its branches in different cities which were relatively separate (Rossdale 
and Stierl, 2016, 165) - therefore meant having to be comfortable and able to live and share space 
in the protest camps, with everything that that entails, including safety issues, accessibility, mental 
strains and so on. This creates an issue in terms of equal access to decision-making as well as access 
to influence the internal and external collective identity of the movement, especially if the 
assumption is that all potential occupiers have equal access and ability to participate.  
This is especially so in movements such as Occupy that would sometimes “[deny] having 
centres” (Calhoun, 2013, 29) because that means there is no established way to become part of the 
decision-making core of the movement without being able to be consistently physically present. As 
Freeman (2013, 237) points out, even outside of the specific demands that an occupation-based 
movement places on activists wishing to engage, becoming a part of the core of a movement - 
especially an informal or structureless one - takes time, and this is hard to overcome for activists 
with full-time jobs or time-consuming commitments (such as family or care relations). Again, it 
becomes important to not conflate “moral equality”, i.e., the fact that morally all members are 
recognised as equal, with “practical equality” (Samuel, 2013, 405).  
Once activists are present in the different deliberation and decision-making forums, outside 
hierarchies may impact the internal workings of a movement in other ways as well. Again, Freeman’s 
(2013, 232) essay points to this, when they argue that in spite of what actors may want to believe 
when they aim for a non-oppressive, structureless group, groups will always have structure of some 
sort. The essay argues that the claim of structurelessness becomes “a smokescreen for the strong 
or the lucky to establish unquestioned hegemony over others”, because a claimed lack of structure 
will prevent formal structures - which are open to discussion and contestation - but not informal 
structures, which are more difficult to challenge (ibid). In Occupy, everyone was - in theory - given 
a voice, but Doyle (2011) for example writes that “[i]n practice, we knew, ‘everyone’ tended to 
sound like the people who were already in charge - white people, men, straight people”. This is not 
only because “those with privilege tend to bring pre-existing power to the table” in even the most 
well-intentioned movements (ibid), but also because of subtle and normalised social influences 
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which differ according to identity. Socialisation plays an important role here, and “legitimises 
oppression and makes it self-evident (‘natural’)” (Vinthagen, 2015, 255). Vinthagen (ibid) explains 
this with the example of gender dynamics and norms, writing that “[i]n a patriarchal society, men 
are socialised to perceive dominance over women as natural and legitimate. During their normal 
upbringing, men are also taught something that has an even greater impact: the practical ability to 
dominate” through subconscious behaviours, ways of speaking, assumptions, etc.      
An example of a movement approach which recognises both historic and current inequalities 
and aims to account for these in its narrative and structure is the Black Lives Matter movement. As 
discussed in Chapter Five, the movement is often unfavourably compared to the 1960s civil rights 
movement. However, Black Lives Matter themselves emphasise attitudes and aspects in which they 
are different from the civil rights movement to their own favour, by attempting to address issues 
from previous Black liberation movements. They write: 
Black liberation movements in [the US] have created room, space, and leadership mostly for 
Black heterosexual, cisgender men – leaving women, queer and transgender people, and 
others either out of the movement or in the background to move the work forward with 
little or no recognition. As a network, we have always recognized the need to center the 
leadership of women and queer and trans people. To maximize our movement muscle, and 
to be intentional about not replacing harmful practices that excluded so many in past 
movements for liberation, we made a commitment to placing those at the margins closer to 
the center (Black Lives Matter, 2020a).  
 To address this, the BLM network has implemented a “set of guiding principles” for their 
decentralised network structure of local chapters (Black Lives Matter, 2020a). These principles focus 
for example on “center[ing] those who have been marginalized within Black liberation movements”, 
such as Black “women, queer, and transgender people” and people with disabilities (Black Lives 
Matter, 2020b; Banks, 2018, 710). As Maraj et al. (2018, 5) state, this is not an attempt to enable 
these groups to join activism or organising for the first time, but is rather an acknowledgement that 
“radical Black women - … particularly Black trans women – have a long history of organizing and 
resistance”.  
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Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated a number of ways in which violence – in some form – plays a role 
within nonviolent movements, that is, affects the internal dynamics and workings of resistance 
movements which have it as a central part of their identity to not use violence. The discussions in 
the chapter engage with a range of definitions, or kinds, of violence, focusing perhaps especially on 
systemic and symbolic violence, but also the contestation of the category of “private” violence. 
What is at stake here is then both discussions of definitions of violence, that is, are issues such as 
silencing and marginalisation a form of violence or at least inherently connected to violence? But 
also at stake is the question of what instances of violence matter, even if there is agreement that 
they were, indeed, violent. As demonstrated in the chapter, these questions have been brought up 
in nonviolence and pacifist spaces for decades, with some, but limited, success. The reluctance to 
deal with “private” forms of violence, or violence that only affects some groups – such as gendered 
or racist violence – led to breaks within the nonviolence movement, as critical groupings such as 
feminist collectives refused to accept the hierarchy of violence which told them to simply but “their 
issues” to one side for now.  
 The chapter showed the impact of instances of sexual and gendered violence in Occupy 
camps in 2011 as a demonstration of how these forms of so-called private violence are, as feminist 
theory has long stated, in fact very much political issues. As shown in the discussion, the different 
Occupy groups agreed that the sexual assaults and gendered violence which occurred in the camp 
were important in the sense that Occupiers wanted to prevent further violence and support 
survivors. However, there were disagreements about how to handle this, and whether working 
against, addressing, and preventing sexual violence came before other aims and ideologies of the 
movement, such as being anti-police and anti-establishment. Further, the extent to which these 
violent events compromised the functioning, legitimacy, access, and equality of the movement, was 
contested. The argument made in this chapter is that these forms of violence are indeed – or should 
be – integral to an understanding and practice of nonviolent resistance. This argument is both 
practical, in that unequal levels of access to safe participation in movements undermines one of the 
core elements of successful nonviolent resistance, which is large and diverse participation. It is also 
a conceptual and normative argument, however, going back to the title question for this thesis, 
“isn’t all violence bad, though?” and attempting to take this seriously.  
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After this, the chapter examined the way in which an assumption of equality, and a 
preference for structurelessness based on this assumption, may make certain forms of violence 
more likely, and reinforce existing systems of violence and hierarchies. Structurelessness enabled 
by imagined equality highlights two different forms of violence: firstly, the systemic violence of 
wider society which affects people’s ability to participate in movement work and decisions 
unequally; and secondly, the symbolic violence caused by this inequality, because it maintains and 
reinforces systems of domination within nonviolent movements by granting influence and clout 
preferentially to already dominant and privileged actors. The overall argument of the chapter is then 
that everyday relations, and everyday forms of violence, are important to incorporate into theories 
of what it is to be a nonviolent movement, and that these forms of violence cannot, by the people 
exposed to them, simply be pushed aside or forgotten about while working for a movement aim. 
They are always present in people’s lives, and are therefore always present in some way in the 
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Chapter Seven: Violence and Collective Identity Formation 
The annual Auckland Pride parade in Auckland, Aotearoa New Zealand, was confronted with the 
refrain, and attitude, of “Pride is a Protest” in 2015, when the activist group No Pride in Prisons 
(which later became People Against Prisons Aotearoa (PAPA)) broke through a barricade to protest 
the participation of uniformed police in the parade (Murphy, 2018). This was the first year that 
Auckland Pride had uniformed police officer marching as part of the parade (Radio New Zealand, 
2015). The three protesters at the 2015 event were quickly removed by police with one protester 
being injured in the process (Radio New Zealand, 2015; Murphy, 2018; Field, 2015). The following 
year, No Pride in Prisons planned another protest, this time with more participants; the group was 
held back from joining or blocking the Pride parade, however, by police, some of whom reportedly 
used violence against the No Pride in Prisons protesters (RNZ, 2016b). The tension between PAPA 
and some members of Auckland Pride, who were intensely critical of the resistance to uniformed 
police participation, illustrates very well the wider tensions within rainbow communities in a 
number of countries over not just the participation of state authorities in Pride, but whether Pride 
parades are a protest and resistance movement, or a joyous celebration of diversity, inclusion, and 
freedom of expression (Johnston and Waitt, 2020, 3; Peterson et al., 2018, 1146-1147).   
 Pride parades are important in the rainbow community, being “the most visible 
manifestation of lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) movements and politics”, and 
“foundational rituals for LGBT movements across the globe” (Peterson et al., 2018, 1146-1147). 
Peterson et al. (ibid) argue that as such, they “act as collective responses to oppression, encourage 
redefinition of self, and express collective identity”. It is especially this aspect of collective identity, 
and struggles over these in movements, that is the focus of this chapter. The discussion will use the 
examples of Auckland Pride (representing the wider discussion over uniformed police in Pride 
parades), Occupy, Black Lives Matter, and Extinction Rebellion and will focus on disagreements 
about what ideas such as inclusion, respecting everyone, and universal messages of care and 
progress entail, and argue that conceptions of these ideas which see them as having unlimited 
potential are mistaken and often simply overlooking already existing forms of marginalisation and 
violence. In contrast, rhetorics of resistance, such as PAPA at Auckland Pride, Black Lives Matter, 
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and the critics of Extinction Rebellion, openly resist or exclude certain groups or aims, in order to 
actually include others.  
 For this chapter, the process of collective identity formation is viewed particularly through a 
lens of examining the role of symbolic violence in collective identities of social movements, and the 
process of forming collective movement identities. This framework, described by Samuel (2013, 
397) is a rare example of applying the concept of symbolic violence to a social movement setting. In 
the paper, Samuel (ibid) focuses on the “normative issues with process of collective identity 
formation” in social movements. These normative issues arise because movements such as Occupy 
and Extinction Rebellion do not have a static, objective, and innate collective identity based purely 
on a set of “social or political interests” (ibid, 405). Instead, collective identity is formed, defined, 
and maintained through a series of internal and external processes of negotiating or struggling over 
conflicting ideas of the aims, possibilities, and strategies of the movement (ibid). Importantly, this 
process is not necessarily - as is often assumed – one of open, equal, and rational discussion, but is 
often dominated by certain actors and hierarchies who more or less explicitly determine the 
collective identity of the movement (ibid, 403, 407). This means that the collective identity of a 
movement is formed both between the members of the movement - in internal processes - and 
towards and in interaction with an audience consisting of actors such as the general public, the 
media, movement opponents, and so on, whose perceptions and reaction will influence the 
formation process (ibid, 398, 401). In other words, the felt and expressed collective identity of 
movements such as Occupy and Extinction Rebellion will be both the product of internal (more or 
less visible and articulated) struggles for influence, as well as a response to what ‘works’ best in the 
movement’s surroundings. These two processes - internal and external identity formation – means 
that collective identity formation raises normative issues and leads to questions of justice (ibid, 398). 
Importantly, they also make collective identity formation a process in which symbolic power and 
symbolic violence are involved, since the effects can be the maintenance of relationships of 
domination and subordination (Aune, 2011, 432; Samuel, 2013, 401; Topper, 2001, 36). The 
framework of collective identity formation is relevant to this chapter in a number of ways, both as 
a site in which symbolic violence operates, but also as an example of processes in which symbolic 
violence interacts with other forms of violence.  
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 The chapter will start with revisiting the critiques of Extinction Rebellion’s approach to law 
enforcement discussed in Chapter Five. The focus in this chapter is, however, less on the direct 
effects of police violence against marginalised communities, but rather on the effect of Extinction 
Rebellion’s rhetoric around the law and law enforcement. Further, XR’s principle of respecting 
everyone, including police officers, will be discussed with use of the controversy over police 
involvement in Pride to illustrate the problems and tensions with this approach. Following this, the 
chapter will discuss collective identities which emphasise principles of universalism and apolitical 
narratives, that is, that what the movement or campaign is “about” and fighting for, is benefitting 
everyone in society rather than a marginalised grievance group, and that the principles of the 
movement’s collective identity are practically universally shared principles. A clear example of this 
is Occupy’s famous refrain of “We are the 99%”, which was also used by Extinction Rebellion later. 
An issue with such framings, however, is that they may work to obscure the challenge of inequalities 
that is inherent to resistance movements and rhetoric, and based on actually stating and admitting 
that a movement’s goal is primarily aimed at progress for a particular group, because they are 
marginalised at present. The discussion of the refrain of Black Lives Matter, and whether this in 
reality just means “All Lives Matter”, illustrates this. Through these discussions, this chapter refers 
back to the concept of hurrah-words, which were introduced in Chapter One, since a number of the 
concepts nuanced here such as inclusion, diversity, and openness, are examples of hurrah-words as 
well. The tensions around the concepts, and the resistance to their assumed meanings, are at the 
centre of a number of the discussions in this chapter.  
ACAB or “space for everyone”? The issue of police violence 
Collective identity and questions of justice are applicable to the debates around Extinction 
Rebellion’s rhetoric on law enforcement. As discussed in Chapter Five, the movement was criticised 
in its early stages for developing a tactic and conception of social change (e.g., Cowan, 2019; Gil, 
2019; Smoke, 2019). In Chapter Five, the focus of the discussion was the violence committed by 
police and legal systems against nonviolent movements. In this chapter, which focuses on issues of 
violence in relation to a movement’s expressed collective identity, the discussion around Extinction 
Rebellion’s rhetoric on both prison, the legal system, and the police force in the United Kingdom is 
worth revisiting. In terms of forming a collective identity which would increase the perceived 
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legitimacy and seriousness of the movement, Extinction Rebellion combined two different paths to 
legitimacy: firstly, the democratic legitimacy of mass actions as a way of representing “the people” 
as discussed earlier in this Chapter Six; and secondly, the virtuous legitimacy of displaying extreme 
commitment and sincerity through the risk of civil disobedience, as discussed in Chapter Five. In 
other words, the movement attempted to become not only a movement of and for the people, but 
also a movement of resisters so committed to their cause that they would risk arrest and prison 
time for it. The mass civil disobedience actions of Extinction Rebellion were therefore important to 
the collective identity and legitimacy of the movement in a number of ways. 
Extinction Rebellion’s stance and rhetoric of being respectful and civil towards police 
officers, to not critique or attack them for arresting activists, and to collaborate with police (Cowan, 
2019; Westwell and Bunting, 2020, 549) is an important part of these discussions. As Westwell and 
Bunting (2020, 549) note, this was a deliberate choice, based on a classic nonviolent refrain that “all 
human life must be respected”. This is supposed to enhance the respectability and “worthiness” of 
a movement, but the researchers also note that this approach “could be alienating some groups 
who experience the police as an oppressive institution” (ibid). An illustration of this rhetoric is a 
tweet by Extinction Rebellion from the 16th of April 2019, stating that:  
Most police are reasonable people. Some are idiots. No different to the rest of society. We 
hope that the police will soon join the rebellion, either passively or actively, in a move that 
would force the government to the negotiating table (quoted in Cowan, 2019).  
As Extinction Rebellion’s legal team emphasises in the movement handbook, this hope for 
police defections is based on nonviolent resistance theory, notably that of Chenoweth who is 
referenced specifically (Farrell et al., 2019, 136). However, the statement made in XR’s tweet talks 
of “the police” joining XR rather than individuals defecting, thus making the target of their aspiration 
the institution rather than individual members. This is a significantly different argument to 
nonviolence literature, which discusses the defection of individuals working for or collaborating with 
the resistance movement’s opponent (Chenoweth and Stephan, 2011, 46-48). The movement’s 
legal team encourages protesters to “[a]pproach security forces with determination and 
compassion in mind: offer them flowers and speak of the joint efforts needed to protect life on this 
planet. Ask for their views on key issues” (Farrell et al., 2019, 136).  
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Apart from the significant differences between focusing on individual security officers 
defecting and the entire institution of the British police force joining the climate movement, another 
note-worthy difference is that Chenoweth and Stephan’s (2011, 46-48) study talks of defections 
from security forces in authoritarian regimes, in which their job is to suppress key freedom rights 
such as the right to protest altogether. In contrast, it is entirely possible within a liberal democracy 
to do police work, such as managing or shutting down protests, preventing acts of civil disobedience, 
and arrest activists, and at the same time support extensive action against climate change through 
the conventional channels of political influence in liberal democracies. The dilemma created by 
policing nonviolent resistance is therefore significantly different and arguably less compelling than 
in the cases that form the basis of nonviolent resistance theory.  
Further, and perhaps more importantly, what Extinction Rebellion’s tweeted statement 
implies is not merely that the group takes a stance of respecting the individual people that happen 
to work for the police. Rather, the statement made in the tweet suggests that any harm arising from 
policing is because there are some “idiots” in the police force, just as there are in society, rather 
than because of any structural or systemic factors which lead to harm from policing happening much 
more frequently and seriously to some groups in society  than others. That is, rather than 
acknowledging the institutional violence that is specific to the UK police force, but hoping that 
individual police officers may defect and join the rebellion, Extinction Rebellion attribute the harm 
and violence caused by police to individual bad officers, while hoping that “the police” as an 
institution will join XR’s fight for climate change action. This is an example of the confusion or misuse 
of conceptions of unconnected incidents of interpersonal violence, rather than manifestations of 
systemic or structural violence which was discussed in Chapter Four. Although another tweet 
followed which added that “the police are institutionally racist”, the two statements are inherently 
contradictory (Cowan, 2019) and illustrate the problem with acknowledging harm without changing 
behaviour and actions because of it.  
In another example, Extinction Rebellion released a video in which they stated that the 
movement does not want to give more work to the “overworked and undervalued police force” (Gil, 
2019). In Extinction Rebellion’s published handbook from 2019, similar stories of friendly 
interactions with police also dominate the narrative, despite a single declaration from the group’s 
legal team that “Extinction Rebellion is clear that the police continue to be structurally racist, unjust 
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and violent, particularly towards oppressed groups” (Farrell et al., 2019, 136). The overwhelming 
sense continues to be one therefore of stories of a “sweet rebellion” during which police officers 
were “congratulating” activists on their level of organisation, expressing support for the cause (while 
still policing the protest), offering food and drink to arrested protesters in cells “in acts of dear 
hospitality” and even declaring it “the nicest week of my working life” (Farrell et al., 2019, 97-98). 
As British anti-racism activist Youssra Elmagboul stated in an interview, this rhetoric taps “into the 
white, liberal belief that the police are here to serve and protect everyone” (in Gil, 2019). For these 
reasons, as Cowan (2019) sums up, “XR members’ ability to perceive the police and criminal justice 
system as benign structures who might even join their ‘rebellion’ smacks of race and class privilege”. 
While Extinction Rebellion’s rhetoric is then partly based on an idea of respecting “all life” 
by respecting police officers despite the harm caused by the UK police force, it can also be 
interpreted as a different attempt at respectability politics. Through a narrative of mutual regard 
between police officers simply “doing their job” and protesters breaking the law, but nonetheless 
commending officers for the job they do, a respect for law and order, the fundamental rules of 
society, is communicated. This narrative is also an embodiment of the democratic sacrifice narrative, 
as described by Hooker (2016, 451-452) and discussed in Chapter Five. As Smith (2014) describes, 
respectability politics seek to achieve a certain goal by demonstrating commitment to and 
acceptance of the requirement that “compatibility with the ‘mainstream’ or non-marginalized class” 
is required in order to earn a desired goal for a movement. In other words, although Extinction 
Rebellion emphasised disruption, (organised) chaos, and rule-breaking as central to their mode of 
resistance, their early approach to the police and legal system is, I argue, more usefully understood 
as an attempt to practice democratic virtue and respectability politics by demonstrating the 
acceptance of the general rules of protest and social change in the UK. As has been demonstrated 
both here and in Chapter Five, however, these rules make it significantly more difficult for some 
people and groups to achieve and participate in social change than it is for others. In this sense, it is 
understandable why critics, particularly activists of colour, expressed a frustration that Extinction 
Rebellion’s tactics seemed “designed by and for middle-class, white Britain” (Akec, 2019; Gil, 2019).  
The issues around resistance movements and their approach to police and legal systems that 
the example of Extinction Rebellion illustrates highlight another tension within resistance 
movements and their collective identity formation: the problems arising when concepts such as 
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“tolerance”, “respect”, “inclusion”, and “diversity” are described as central to the collective identity 
of a movement without a discussion of the more exact or substantial meaning of these concepts. 
These concepts, if used as unifying and vague descriptors of a movement’s identity or aims, are 
essentially examples of hurrah-words, as discussed in Chapter One. Chapter One defined these as 
words which are “at the top of the linguistic abstraction-ladder”, meaning that they have no clear 
substance (Jensen, 2003, 149, my translation). This means that communication using hurrah-words 
may seem uncomplicated or uncontroversial, because the can be used by different people meaning 
substantially different things by them, without these differences being noticeable (ibid); the 
assumption therefore becomes that the concept, such as “respect for all” denotes widespread 
agreement. The following discussion will use Extinction Rebellion and Auckland Pride to discuss a 
particular incarnation of this issue, which is the assumption that through calls for “inclusivity” and 
“tolerance”, a social movement can peacefully and unproblematically include everyone. That is, if 
all members or potential members simply “respect” or “tolerate” everyone else, then repression, 
marginalisation, and exclusion will not occur in the movement in question.  
Although the question of whether police, and particularly police in uniform, should be 
allowed to march in Pride parades has been discussed in multiple Pride organisations and countries 
(Lopez, 2017; Stryker, 2018), the focus of the present discussion is on the case of Auckland Pride in 
Aotearoa New Zealand. As described in the introduction to this chapter, Auckland Pride was 
confronted with this tension the very first year that uniformed police marched in the Parade, when 
the activist group No Pride in Prisons, later PAPA, protested this (Field, 2015; Murphy, 2018; Radio 
New Zealand, 2015). No Pride in Prisons was originally protesting the conditions for transgender 
prisoners in New Zealand especially, but also the conditions of marginalised prisoner populations 
more generally, and stated that the policies of the New Zealand Police and Department of 
Corrections (who also marched in uniform at Auckland Pride) “directly contributed to physical and 
sexual violence against trans and queer prisoners” (Radio New Zealand, 2016b). This led the 
Auckland Pride board to enter into a discussion with the Department of Corrections, who committed 
to improving conditions and support for transgender prisoners (Radio New Zealand, 2016a; Radio 
New Zealand, 2016b).   
In 2017, Auckland Pride decided to not allow the Department of Corrections to participate 
as an institution in the upcoming march, because they had failed to deliver on the promises made 
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the previous year, although police officers were still allowed to march in uniforms (Furley, 2017; 
Murphy, 2018). Corrections staff were still able to attend the march, with Auckland Pride 
emphasising that the decision was about “the organisation, not the individuals”, but they would not 
be allowed to march in uniform, and were offered to march with other groups (Furley, 2017). While 
No Pride in Prisons welcomed the decision, calling it a “symbolic victory” after their protests and 
challenges during the previous two years, they emphasised that the “actual change” of improving 
conditions for queer and especially transgender prisoners was still missing (Furley, 2017). This 
statement illustrates that No Pride in Prison were already treating this as an issue of intersectional 
violence and activism, where the group’s goal was not limited to the actual Pride parade, but rather 
to use the particular space of Pride to protest and affect change on other, and intersecting, forms 
of violence. Meanwhile, the Department of Corrections said they were “disappointed with the 
decision”, and that they were in the process of developing and implementing better practices, but 
that it would take time due to the size of the organisation (Furley, 2017). 
Uniformed police, and the NZ police force as an institution, participated in Auckland Pride 
again in February 2018. However, the question of police involvement in the Pride parade 
reappeared in New Zealand media already in July 2018, with an interview with a police force 
diversity service coordinator, Tracy Phillips, on the current focus of police outreach work towards 
rainbow communities (Chumko, 2018). While Phillips spoke of a focus on moving “from tolerance 
to inclusion”, measures emphasised in the interview were mainly examples of stating or claiming 
inclusion (such as police cars decorated with rainbows for various Pride marches and rainbow 
lanyards on police recruits) rather than practical steps towards changing policies and procedures in 
police work (ibid). Further, they stated in the interview that “while there was still ‘truckloads’ of 
work to be done, the relationship between police and the rainbow community had come ‘a long 
way’ from the days where gay men could ‘genuinely fear’ being arrested” (ibid), emphasising a 
common theme in narratives of tolerance and diversity, the theme of almost inevitable progress. 
What this view does not address, however, is the especially marginalised communities of trans 
people and people of colour in the rainbow communities, who were the ones mainly highlighted by 
critics of police participation in Pride, as well as the intersection of systemic police violence against 
people of colour - of all gender identities and sexual orientations - and the wider rainbow 
community. The different perspectives of proponents of police participation and PAPA respectively 
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illustrate the argument by Johnston and Waitt (2020, 4) that while “white bodies happily maintain 
structural advantage and are naturalised in place” in spaces such as Pride, “[t]he queer intersections 
of sexuality, post-coloniality, indigeneity, race and racism are evident in Aotearoa”.  
Then, in November 2018 it was announced that the Auckland Pride Festival board had 
decided that police officers taking part in the 2019 parade must wear T-shirts instead of uniforms, 
and that following this decision, police decided to not take part at all (Corcoran, 2018). Phillips, 
representing again the police force, said to media in response to this:   
It’s really, really sad … We’re really proud of what we do for a job, who we are and the work 
that we’ve done - so if we’re not welcome, we’re certainly not going to force our way in, and 
we’ve taken that message as we are not welcome (quoted in Corcoran, 2018).  
They further stated that although police would still be involved with Auckland Pride “on an 
operational basis”, they were now looking “to participate and support other events” (Awarua, 
2018). Following the decision from the Pride Board to not allow uniforms, and the subsequent police 
force decision to not participate at all, media reported that Pride’s decision was controversial not 
only amongst commercial sponsors and other organisations, but also within the rainbow community 
(Boynton, 2018; Murphy, 2018; Radio New Zealand, 2018; Roy, 2018). The decision meant that a  
board member stood down in disagreement, calls were made to boycott the 2019 Auckland Pride, 
a petition was started to overturn the ban, and a Special General Meeting of the organisation was 
called, with the intent of proposing a vote of no confidence in the Auckland Pride board (Boycott 
Auckland Pride, 2018; Boynton, 2018; Radio New Zealand, 2018). After the decision and subsequent 
controversy, another hui (meeting) on the issue became chaotic and confrontational. Although the 
Auckland Pride board survived the vote of no confidence proposal, questions were raised whether 
the parade would be going ahead in 2019 following a substantial loss of corporate sponsors 
(Murphy, 2018). Members of the rainbow community set up a crowdfunding campaign in response, 
making a significant contribution to the 2019 Auckland Pride march (Murphy, 2018). In 2020, 
Aotearoa New Zealand news site Stuff reported that the February 2020 Auckland Pride, now titled 
“Our March” was hugely successful with more than 7000 participants from a range of countries and 
backgrounds, and an absence of uniformed police and corporate sponsors (Block, 2020). Another 
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Auckland Pride parade, organised by a different group in response to the 2018 controversy, would, 
however, include uniformed police (ibid).  
Discussions of this controversy could feasibly choose to examine the arguments and rhetoric 
from the New Zealand Police, especially perhaps the implications of treating positions such as police 
officer or corrections officer as an “identity” rather than a job (as seen for example in Boynton, 
2018; White, 2018), a stance which parallels the “Blue Lives Matter” rhetoric used against the Black 
Lives Matter movement (Solomon and Martin, 2019, 12). However, the discussion here will focus 
instead on the controversy within the New Zealand rainbow community, since this is the community 
in which collective identity formation was being formed and contested. The controversy was 
ultimately founded in disagreements over the meaning and possibility of ideals such as inclusion 
and diversity. This disagreement provides a useful example of the complexity that often lies behind 
ideals such as inclusion or respecting “everyone”, and the unacknowledged exclusions and 
marginalisations that can occur if these ideals are acted on without more thorough discussion. 
Amongst the critics of the uniform ban, there was an idea that police officers were being 
“turned away” from the parade, although in fact, officers were never banned from marching, only 
from marching in uniform (Boynton, 2018; Murphy, 2018). Principles such as inclusion, diversity, 
and acceptance for “all” were often cited as a reason for being against the uniform ban (Boynton, 
2018; Awarua, 2018; White, 2018). As Peterson et al. (2018, 1149) write, this idea of Pride parades 
as “‘open’ demonstrations encouraging everyone with a LGBT identity (or heterosexuals who 
sympathize with LGBT politics) to participate” is a popular narrative, although whether Pride 
marches are in fact as socially diverse as assumed is questionable. This chapter aims to argue that a 
possible reason why this narrative remains in place is precisely because many of the exclusions that 
do happen are indirect, such as the exclusion of communities of colour who do not feel safe 
marching with uniformed police. Furthermore, these exclusions may – as in the present case – follow 
systematic and structural exclusions and marginalisations in society, thus making them significantly 
less visible. The petition against the ban provides an idea of what is understood by these references 
to inclusion, when it calls on Auckland Pride to “Let the Police march in the parade. Let Corrections 
march in the Parade. Let people with different views in the community march in the parade” 
(Boycott Auckland Pride, 2018), a phrasing which suggests that questions such as these are about 
different opinions, not about actual harm and its causes. This idea is perhaps why another critic, 
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who called the decision to ban uniforms “fascist and elitist” also worried that “[a]s soon as we start 
not allowing some groups, where do we stop? You start with the police, then it can lead to lesbian 
groups who don’t like transgender. The list can go on” (quoted in Awarua, 2018). The assumption 
of these arguments, which lament the “exclusion of many very important faces in our community” 
(White, 2018) is that exclusion can be avoided; that is, that by including uniformed police, other 
members of the community are not excluded because of the effect of uniformed police officers 
marching in the parade. Further, evidenced by expressions such as different views, and groups 
excluding other groups they do not “like”, an implication is made that the questions here are not 
about actual systemic and structural violence through physical and non-physical harm, but merely 
about different opinions and world views, and some groups trying to limit openness and open 
discussion by excluding groups they do not agree with.   
An excellent example of this idea that issues such as these are simply different views, and 
the ideal that Pride should be a space in which these should be able to co-exist and be debated is 
the opinion piece written by Andrew Whiteside, an LGBTQIA+ reporter and producer. While 
Whiteside (2018) ultimately remained against the uniform ban, the piece was an attempt to see 
both sides of the controversy, and acknowledged the merit of arguments against uniformed police 
as well. Interestingly, Whiteside brought this ideal of including opposing arguments up as a case 
against boycotting the parade, arguing that a boycott or attempt to have the event cancelled would 
be against the idea of Pride (ibid). This demonstrates another possible interpretation of the “shared” 
ideal of Pride as an inclusive space and movement. He wrote further: 
There is a very simple outlet for everyone who is angry about this. Create a protest float, 
dress in uniforms if you want, march in solidarity with the police and use the damn parade 
to make the point you strongly believe in! That’s what pride parades are for. I remember the 
old Hero parades. They were at their best when they were filled with protesters (Whiteside, 
2018).  
What is overlooked in this vision is, however, the limitations that are consistently placed on 
certain views or arguments resisting power structures, which are not given an equal and open space 
for their point of view. A case in point is this very concrete call from Whiteside to simply participate 
in Auckland Pride with a clear protest, something which No Pride in Prisons was consistently barred 
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from doing as they were forcibly removed or kept away from the 2015 and 2016 events (Field, 2015; 
Murphy, 2018; Radio New Zealand, 2015; Radio New Zealand, 2016b). In this way, arguments that 
rest on an ideal of open and equal dialogue and inclusion of opposing views are at risk of being one-
sided, if they do not look to existing structures and procedures which make the space for dialogue 
limited and unequal. A parallel argument can be made for Extinction Rebellion’s call for activists to 
ask for and include the views and perspectives of police officers (Farrell et al., 2019, 136) without 
acknowledging the privileged position that these views already hold compared to groups and 
communities that resist policing and are simply branded “anti-police”, with no acknowledgement of 
their reasons for this resistance.        
In response to the idea of including everyone, and everyone’s preferences - even that of the 
police to march in uniform - PAPA and other Auckland Pride members expressed both in media and 
during community meetings on the matter that this inclusion is just not possible. As PAPA 
spokesperson Emilie Rākete (2019) wrote, during the meetings “takatāpui [Māori rainbow 
community members] and transgender members of the gay community made it clear that police 
violence was a pressing issue in their lives”. Auckland Pride board chair, Chrissy Rock, added to this 
by explaining that during these community meetings:  
It became really apparent that there are members of our community that didn’t feel like 
they could be included in Pride while the police were marching in uniform because the 
uniform’s a symbol of an institution that has a long way to go by their own admission (quoted 
in Radio New Zealand, 2018).  
In other words, the Pride board had become aware that it was not possible to include 
everyone in Pride while having police officers march in their uniforms. The board was, however, still 
committed to the same principles of including everyone who wanted to participate in Pride, 
including police officers, and therefore supported the same ideals as critics of the uniform ban, 
although with a substantially different idea of what those ideals mean. This illustrates the 
importance of moving away from a using concepts such as inclusion at high levels of abstraction as 
the basis for a movement’s collective identity. This illustrates Johnston and Waitt’s (2020, 3) point 
that Pride marches and other events are “‘parties with politics.’ The question … is: whose politics 
and how political are they?”. Rock stated for example, that this was about finding “a way forward” 
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in terms of police participating in the parade, while also “mak[ing] sure the most marginalised voices 
are heard” as is the tradition in rainbow communities (Radio New Zealand, 2018). The argument 
that rainbow communities are based on a tradition of listening to and respecting marginalised voices 
is backed by Whiteside (2018), despite his stated disagreement with the ban of uniforms. Rock and 
the Pride board described the uniform ban as essentially a compromise, an attempt to “welcome 
any and all rainbow people to be a part of the Auckland Pride Parade” by allowing both police 
officers and communities affected by disproportionate police violence to march in the Pride parade 
(Awarua, 2018; Roy, 2018). A similar compromising stance was seen in the Pride Board’s emphasis 
that the decision was about the institution of the New Zealand Police rather than individual officers 
and that police uniforms were a symbol of this institution (Corcoran, 2018; Murphy, 2018; Rākete, 
2019).  
This discussion demonstrates that being visibly and directly against a group or institution and 
taking actions to limit their access or paths to participation is often not necessarily a simple question 
of reducing diversity and inclusion. Rather, it can mean, and often means, an attempt to include 
groups or individuals who are at present systematically excluded or marginalised. Complete 
inclusion with no restrictions is often not possible because of present systems of violence and 
repression, and narratives calling for this ideal of inclusion. Despite this, this is often what is behind 
expressed collective movement identities of inclusion, tolerance, diversity, etc. Treating 
articulations of resistance and distrust as merely divisive or exclusionary are, intentionally or 
unintentionally, merely working to keep certain forms of systemic and structural violence invisible. 
The calls for Extinction Rebellion to reconsider and change their rhetoric with regards to the police 
illustrate a similar issue. In the Extinction Rebellion Handbook, the legal team for the group writes: 
Extinction Rebellion is clear that the police continue to be structurally racist, unjust and 
violent, particularly towards oppressed groups. We are totally opposed to such 
discriminatory practices. We are taking great care to design our strategy in a way that 
minimizes the chance that the police will shut down our actions before these actions have 
reached a critical mass. Our approach to the police, like that of other non-violent mass 
movements, is based on what will enable radical change. A key objective is to enable both 
younger and older people to participate in protests, something which becomes more likely 
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if the police do not overreact. Additionally, the more we can encourage the police to allow 
our protests to continue through ongoing communication, the more likely it is we can reach 
that critical mass (Farrell et al., 2019, 136). 
This statement presents a perceived compromise, in which XR acknowledges the racism of 
the UK police, but are at the same time able to cooperate with police in order to allow members to 
protest more safely. However, the question is whether this compromise is, in fact, entirely 
realisable, or if – in a parallel to the Auckland Pride discussion – exclusion sometimes happens one 
way or the other, only more or less visibly. That is, if the “younger and older people” who Extinction 
Rebellion argue can participate more safely in protests because of the group’s cooperation with 
police (Farrell et al., 2019, 136) mean that communities of colour are less able to participate in the 
movement’s main tactic, then exclusion is still occurring. XR’s proposed compromise is one which 
despite acknowledging institutional racism and violence, maintains the primacy of being able to 
carry out their distinct tactic of mass civil disobedience in a way that benefits from democratic 
sacrifice narratives.  
This functions to reinforce the dominance of a particular white, liberal, and respectability-
seeking conception of nonviolent resistance in the collective identity of Extinction Rebellion, and 
through the movement’s high-profile status, to an extent in the wider climate movement. For 
activists, communities, and movements that are based on the intersection of racism and climate 
activism – intersectional environmentalism (e.g., Intersectional Environmentalist, 2020) – this 
rhetoric is highly exclusive, because as discussed in Chapter Six, intersecting forms of violence 
cannot simply be viewed or treated as separate for the time being or in certain spaces (Chen et al., 
2016, xxvi-xxvii; Crenshaw, 1991, 1244). That is, climate activists of colour cannot simply put racial 
violence to one side while protesting climate change. This is in part because of the direct issues 
around protesting, policing, and prisons, as discussed above and in Chapter Five, but also because 
of wider intersections, notably the unequal distribution of the effects of climate change, which are 
and will continue to affect indigenous communities, the Global South, and communities of colour, 
while being disproportionately caused by actions in the privileged Global North (e.g. Cowan, 2019; 
Wretched of the Earth, 2019).  
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Peace and love for all? Universalism and apolitical narratives 
A further aspect of collective identity formation as a site of struggle is attempts to frame a 
movement’s overall aim as a universal one, fighting for the good of everyone rather than for equality 
or certain aims for a specific group of people. This theme points back to the discussion in Chapter 
Three of the examples and teachings of Gandhi, Mandela, and King which demonstrated that 
although these are often treated as universally valid and applicable, as well as a part of an inevitable 
progress of society, they are in fact more specific to their historical and political contexts. A rhetoric 
which presents goals and aspirations of a movement as universal can serve an important role in 
building community and support, by “establishing social identification” (Calloway-Thomas and 
Lucaites eds, 1993, 4). In order to achieve this universality, the values and principles promoted tend 
to be “little more than vague and idealized preferences”, which, if made to be more specific, might 
be conflicting; however, “[w]hen considered in the abstract, a community treats its core values as 
altogether compatible with one another” such as the concepts of liberty and equality (ibid). In this 
way, a universalistic framing is another way to turn concepts into hurrah-words, and this is an 
important part of how such references can conjure up widespread (although not necessarily very 
committed or deep-felt) support. Further, the discussion in Chapter Three demonstrated that 
although ideas of universality were and are seen in the narrative that nonviolent movements fight 
for everyone or universal justice, it is often in fact a more limited group’s interests that are the goal. 
In this context, universalism comes to mean one overriding injustice, and thereby one overriding 
solution, rather than aiming at a solution which acknowledges the diversity and intersections of 
different forms of oppression and violence. This tension between universalism and specificity will 
be explored further in the present discussion.  
It is also worth emphasising, that although this section focuses primarily on consequences 
following from narratives and collective identities that aim to universalise, even if this 
universalisation would be more likely to lead to a successful outcome for the resistance movement, 
this is not necessarily the case. The concept of “polarization” as a strategy for social movements is 
well described, through for example King’s civil rights work, and can lead to increased success - 
especially long-term - because it “forces people to take sides” (Case, 2018, 29).  
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The prioritisation of universal issues, or universal framings of issues, often leads to a creation 
of a strong hierarchy of problems, with issues that “affect everyone” at the top of the hierarchy over 
more limited or group-specific issues such as for example racist, sexist, or transphobic violence. The 
enforcement of hierarchies of violence is not new to either social movements more broadly, or 
nonviolent resistance. In Reweaving the Web, Meyerding writes:  
Traditional nonviolence has suffered from a tendency to perceive the various forms and 
expressions of violence as having a hierarchical relationship with one another: this violence 
is more important than that violence. (Hence the tendency toward a series of single-issue 
mass ‘movements’ which, being single-issue, can aim only at reform rather than radical social 
change.) This ‘rating’ of issues has been with us for a long time (McAllister et al., 1982, 8).  
This construction of arguments to favour a focus on one issue or struggle over others is also 
evident in the discussion of more recent nonviolence theory such as Nepstad’s discussion of 
attempts to divide resistance movements with “claims of movement prejudice” which may distract 
from “the real political issues” (Nepstad, 2015, 136-137) as discussed in Chapter Six. However, this 
chapter argues that this form of prioritisation or hierarchy of issues, is not always strictly necessary 
for success, or indeed conducive to this. As Laurie Penny argues:  
men and boys are beginning to learn, slowly and painfully, that they cannot liberate 
themselves alone. Too many social movements have treated women, queer people and 
people of colour as collateral damage, telling us to swallow our suffering until the revolution 
is over - but somehow, that time never comes (Penny, 2015, 88).     
Therefore, it becomes important to challenge universalist narratives which frame an issue, 
or violence,  as the main issue of a certain time or society, which must be solved or overcome before 
any other forms of violence can be resisted – however compelling such narratives may seem, and 
however much they seem to hold a promise of increasing support because of their universality. 
In the case of Occupy, the universalist aspirations are most clearly depicted in the famous 
and successful slogan of “we are the 99%”, which, as Calhoun (2013, 33) argues, was “brilliant 
framing”, because it “concentrated the most basic issues into a phrase”. The phrasing, which was 
vague in terms of specific complaints and solutions to address them, but still maintained an “overall 
Chapter Seven: Violence and Collective Identity Formation  
- 183 - 
 
clear” sense that what the movement was “about” was narrowing “the gross imbalance of wealth” 
(Doyle, 2011; Gitlin, 2013, 18). The invocation of being the 99% managed, then, to be a unifying call 
because of its successful combination of a “populist … invocation of ‘the people’ as the decisive 
locus of moral authority” (Calhoun, 2013, 35), a sense that the people in power were the cause 
because of arrogance and selfishness (Gitlin, 2013, 9; Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 167), and a claim to 
“a big, near-universal grievance” and “promises to address a near-universal problem” (Doyle, 2011). 
As Rossdale and Stierl write, however:  
one can ask whether the image of ‘the 99%’ might also operate as a practice of conduction 
that both side-lines inequalities within the 99% and fails to recognise the complicated power 
relationships within this multitude. As such, we might wonder who among the 99% gets to 
speak and what privileges, hierarchies and subjectivities re-materialise when some (seek to) 
speak in the name of all but the 1%? (Rossdale and Stierl, 2016, 175).   
At stake in this question is then two aspects of the Occupy movement discussed in this thesis: 
the effects of an assumption of equality between members on the internal dynamics of a movement 
(we are all equal between ourselves because we are all “the 99%”), as discussed in Chapter Six, but 
also what that assumption means when it is communicated outwardly as a central part of a 
movement’s collective identity.  
In addition, the 99% and other imagery and messaging used by Occupy provided an apolitical 
framing of these issues, which worked further to increase widespread support for the movement. 
As Calhoun (2013, 33) writes, critiques of inequality and the present financial system were not new 
by the time Occupy made them; however these had previously been framed as critiques of 
neoliberalism, and this more politically specific framing:  
did not invite participants who did not share that particular analysis or its left-wing 
implications. To speak of the ‘99%’ vs. the ‘1%’, by contrast, was a populist message and as 
much more powerful in inviting ‘the people’ to have sympathy for the mobilization (Calhoun, 
2013, 33). 
 This also highlights the way in which apolitical messaging can be used to further universalist 
narratives, by appealing to interests beyond “petty” political speculation or interests. The narrative 
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of speaking for the vast majority of a more or less defined conception of “the people”, rather than 
for a specific political analysis and vision was, then, crucial to the unifying and mobilising power of 
the Occupy movement. In fact, the Occupy movement is described as having “a near ‘phobia’ about 
formal organizations and political parties”, which led to a potential tension in that the movement 
was made up of informal representatives of a number of these without formalising this structure 
(Calhoun, 2013, 36). This avoidance of organisations and traditional political groupings was not only, 
or perhaps even mainly, to avoid influence from right-wing or moderate political parties, but also to 
avoid “leftist forces which would seek to conduct the movement in particular ways” (Rossdale and 
Stierl, 2016, 164). Through that, Occupy was also making it more difficult to potentially challenge 
the involvement of any given party or organization, since they were not “officially” involved or 
represented in Occupy. Similarly, Extinction Rebellion were careful to emphasise that despite the 
inclusion of essays by two British MPs, from the Green Party and Labour Party respectively, 
“Extinction Rebellion thinks beyond politics” and that these two authors were included only because 
“they represent important forward-thinking sentiments that we hope will resonate and develop 
rapidly within the UK political sphere”, and not because of a link between action on climate change 
and certain political leanings or parties (Farrell et al., 2019, 145, 161).  
With a reluctance to admit the involvement of established political parties and groups, and 
their populist messaging, Occupy “tapped into a widespread sense of being the people, being the 
legitimate basis of society, and being ignored”, which allowed Occupy to join “the international 
mobilization of the indignant” (Calhoun, 2013, 34). Such a populist and universalist narrative and 
appeal was a new phenomenon in American social movements, where neither “[t]he industrial 
union surge of the 1930s”, “the civil rights movement”, or “the movement against the Vietnam War, 
nor the women’s nor gay movements” had from the beginning such “majority support” (Gitlin, 2013, 
8). The “great” nonviolent movements of the past were, then - as shown in Chapter Three for some 
of these movements - crucially different from both Occupy and Extinction Rebellion in terms of the 
specificity of their aims, even if they have sometimes later been made into a popular narrative of 
universal progress and betterment for all of society.  
The imagery of the 1% and the 99% is so popular that it has been repurposed by other 
movements, such as Extinction Rebellion (Farrell et al., 2019, 4). In general, Extinction Rebellion also 
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display a strongly universalist narrative around their aim and movement, demonstrated well by the 
first lines of their “Declaration of Rebellion” which reads:  
This is our darkest hour. Humanity finds itself embroiled in an event unprecedented in its 
history, one which, unless immediately addressed, will catapult us further into the 
destruction of all we hold dear: this nation, its peoples, our ecosystems and the future of 
generations to come (Farrell et al., 2019, 1).  
Extinction Rebellion further demonstrate their narrative of placing the aim of their struggle 
– substantial action against climate change - as apolitical, or “above” politics, writing that:  
The ecological crises that are impacting upon this nation … can no longer be ignored, denied 
or go unanswered by any beings of sound rational mind, ethical conscience, moral concern 
or spiritual belief (Farrell et al., 2019, 1).  
As pointed out by Joyce (2020, 384-385, 387), this framing of climate change as an issue that 
goes beyond politics is an example of an “unabashed apocalypticism”, one of a number of traits 
shared by XR and versions of Christianity. This purist phrasing of one, relatively isolated, problem 
above all others creates a clear hierarchy, in which nothing is more important than preventing this 
impending and universal doom. As XR write in their handbook, “[i]n the face of the enormity of 
climate change, all other policy begins to feel like displacement activity” (Farrell et al., 2019, 45). 
Another concrete example of this use of apocalypticism to push other issues of violence and 
oppression to the side is provided by long-time peace activist Barbara Deming in an interview about 
a peace movement conference in the 1960s during which: 
the question as to whether or not pacifists should take part in civil-rights actions began to 
be discussed. Many pacifists who were present said that we shouldn’t. Because there were 
so few of us and disarmament was such a pressing priority, they were afraid that we would 
dissipate our energies. I remember one man making the point: ’If we all blow up, it’s not 
going to matter whether we blow up integrated or segregated.’ That fight was for later 
(quoted in McAllister et al, 1982, 8). 
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In this way, apocalypticism functions to exclude accounts which favour intersectional views, 
or other forms of violence as relevant to the core of a resistance movement and its aims. This 
framing of climate change as the overriding threat to humanity itself has led to some concerns that 
XR’s approach “raises the spectre of the classically recognised dark political consequences of 
invoking security, with the mobilisation of crisis concepts militating against deliberative or inclusive 
politics” (Slaven and Heydon, 2020, 59). In other words, if a movement is centred around a narrative 
of an existential threat to humanity itself, it is difficult or impossible for marginalised or repressed 
voices to gain traction when trying to add seemingly “specific”, or “minority” issues to the 
movement aim and identity. This has led to actors such as The Wretched of the Earth Collective3 
calling for a decolonisation of Extinction Rebellion. These actors acknowledge the encouraging 
development of XR’s highly successful mobilisation, while also calling for an intersectional analysis 
which would “explicitly [politicise] the exclusionary and colonialist power dynamics” that created 
the crisis now presented by movements such as Extinction Rebellion as an equalising and universal 
experience (Slaven and Heydon, 2020, 60), not too dissimilar from popular refrains that “climate 
change doesn’t discriminate”. As Naomi Klein argues, however:  
There is always this discourse when disasters hit: ‘Climate change doesn’t discriminate, the 
pandemic doesn’t discriminate. We are all in this together.’ But that is not true. That is not 
how disasters act. The act as magnifiers and they act as intensifiers (in Viner, 2020).   
One effect of this narrative is discussed by Simmone Ahiaku, a climate activist, who stated 
in an interview that she has felt unwelcome in university climate societies, and for example had 
tried to bring up the racial aspect of climate change hitting Pacific island nations in the Global South, 
but that other activists “did not entirely understand how it was specifically a ‘race issue’, so [they] 
thought it would be better to frame this as ‘all people are suffering under climate change’” (quoted 
in Gil, 2019). Another interview in the same article on racism and climate change activism with 
Zamzam Ibrahim, a student politics officer in the UK, suggests that such seemingly universalist views 
 
3 “Wretched of The Earth is a collective of over a dozen grassroots Indigenous, black, brown and diaspora groups, 
individuals and allies acting in solidarity with oppressed communities in the Global South and Indigenous North” 
[Wretched of the Earth, n.d.] 
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are in fact more about a sudden sense of urgency once the Global North and white people are 
impacted: 
For decades, our families and communities in the global south have faced land exploitation 
and poisoning, toxic waste dumping and ecological disasters … While entire communities 
were facing catastrophe in the ‘80s from climate catastrophes, [the wider environmental 
movement] chose to focus on penguins, polar bears and fluffy animals, thereby sending the 
clear message that they did not care about these communities (quoted in Gil, 2019).  
What these narratives risk leading to is not only the silencing of relevant and crucial 
intersections of forms of violence - such as those between race and climate change, or the safety of 
women and non-men in any public space, including important protest spaces - but also the exclusion 
of important actors, who, if they try to challenge this claim to universality risk seeming to go against 
the “99%” or “the people”, rather than just a specific group or movement. Given that these actors 
will often be – as in the examples used in this thesis – already marginalised groups and people, this 
silencing maintains a system of domination in which already privileged actors maintain their access 
to and central role in shaping social change; this dynamic is, in essence, a form of symbolic violence 
(Aune, 2011, 432; Topper, 2001, 36).  
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, another aspect in which Extinction Rebellion, especially 
early on, took a universalistic approach was through expressing a respect for “all human life”, which 
meant for example treating police officers with respect, as a central part of the movement’s 
collective identity (Westwell and Bunting, 2020, 549). Although this principle should be interpreted 
as significantly different in intention - due to the context the statements are made in - to the refrain 
of “All lives matter” as made in response to the Black Lives Matter movement, the similarities 
nevertheless highlight one of the potential tensions when proposing a universalising narrative. The 
discussions over the alternative “All Lives Matter” (as well as the previously mentioned counter of 
“Blue Lives Matter”) slogan are part of a wider controversy in which BLM have been called “racist 
and anti-law enforcement” (Banks, 2018, 709).  
While the “All lives matter” refrain can be interpreted in different ways, there is an emerging 
consensus that it is, firstly, made in response to an interpretation of “Black lives matter” as meaning 
“Only black lives matter”, and, secondly, that it is “rooted in an ethos or ideology of color-blindness” 
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or “post-racialism”, an ideology which “directs us to aim to make race an insignificant category in 
public life; it tells us that race should not matter” (Atkins, 2019, 1-2; Sundstrom, 2018, 491). All Lives 
Matter is a statement which does conform to the ideal of colour-blindness, while Black Lives Matter 
does not (Atkins, 2019, 2). In their discussion of the question of universality and Black Lives Matter, 
Judith Butler argues that when people respond to Black Lives Matter with All Lives Matter:  
they misunderstand the problem, but not because their message is untrue. It is true that all 
lives matter, but it is equally true that not all lives are understood to matter which is precisely 
why it is most important to name the lives that have not mattered, and are struggling to 
matter in the way they deserve (Yancy and Butler, 2015).  
In other words, to Butler, the aspiration of the universal ideology that all lives matter is 
important; however, the way to achieve such universality is precisely through specificity in calling 
for resistance to “foreground those lives that are not mattering now” (Yancy and Butler, 2015). 
While this foregrounding is sometimes criticised as failing to create a colour-blind public sphere and 
discussion, it is relevant to maintain the specificity that Butler discusses, because racial 
discrimination and inequality do still exist and impact the public sphere (Atkins, 2019, 2; Sundstrom, 
2018, 492). Further, what a response of All Lives Matter - sometimes declared to be made in 
solidarity with the Black Lives Matter movement - does, is make Black Lives Matter “a trivial 
consequence of an obvious truth” - “Of course, black lives matter; all lives matter” (Atkins, 2019, 2) 
rather than a stated aim which is significantly different to present reality and will take struggle and 
conflict to achieve because of structural and systemic racist violence; that is, an important and 
confrontational statement. As Butler states: 
When we are talking about racism, and anti-black racism in the United States, we have to 
remember that under slavery black lives were considered only a fraction of a human life, so 
the prevailing way of valuing lives assumed that some lives mattered more … One reason 
the chant ‘Black Lives Matter’ is so important is that it states the obvious but the obvious 
has not yet been historically realized (Yancy and Butler, 2015).     
In contrast to Butler’s and others’ re-interpretation of the Black Lives Matter refrain as being 
in reality universal in its message, Atkins (2019, 3) actually challenges the idea that a movement goal 
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must be universal in some way in order to be valid or acceptable. They (ibid, 4) argue that an 
insistence that the meaning of Black Lives Matter is in fact universal entails the acceptance of a 
“false dilemma” for the movement against racist violence. The dilemma is based on the premise 
that a statement about the value of Black lives must necessarily be taking a stance on the value of 
non-Black (mainly white) lives as well; this means that the choice is between a meaning of “Black 
lives matter, too” in which case the statement becomes trivial, or “Only black lives matter”, in which 
case the statement is exclusionary or perhaps even dismissive of non-Black lives (ibid). However, 
writes Atkins (ibid) “’Black lives matter’ need not be understood as doing either”. In other words, 
the dilemma which Atkins (ibid, 9) aims to reject is that “Black lives matter” is seen as either 
exclusionary, or required to be inclusive, as in, affirm specifically that white lives matter. The 
universalising interpretation of “Black lives matter” to mean “Black lives matter, too” is then “a way 
of repositioning, not clarifying” the statement (ibid). Instead, Atkins (ibid, 8-9) takes “Black lives 
matter” to be a statement which exposes the current system of values in which white lives already 
matter and dominate, and therefore do not need affirming.  
As a parallel, Atkins (2019, 5) discusses the rise of the concept of Black Power in the 1960s, 
a movement which was repeatedly requested by “the white intelligentsia” of the time to define 
what Black Power meant. However, any confusion or controversy over the meaning of Black Power 
was because of an atmosphere of white fear, and Atkins states that: 
its meaning was clear enough to the poor, uneducated, and disenfranchised blacks to whom 
it was, in the first instance, addressed. I would venture that its meaning was clear to them, 
though not to white Americans, because it spoke to their exclusion from the field of power 
and articulated this exclusion in a way that wasn’t calibrated to white racial sensibilities 
(Atkins, 2019, 5).  
For example, during voting rights campaigns in the Southern states, and campaigns to 
register voters, the attempt to break dependence on white people (for housing, jobs, etc.) was in 
fact a step not towards separation, but participation, through participating in the democratic 
processes on a more equal footing (Atkins, 2019, 7). Building on this, the suggestion is that rather 
than the contention over the meaning of Black Lives Matter being because of a miscommunication, 
a failure from the BLM movement to communicate their meaning properly, it may be because Black 
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Lives Matter expresses a “black solidarity movement” as a “group understanding”, not in relation to 
white Americans, and further, with an aim “of provoking white Americans into developing a more 
adequate, more racially aware, group understanding” (ibid, 11, 17). Illustrating this parallel between 
the Black Lives Matter movement and the Black Power movement, BLM describe themselves, not 
as a movement mainly aimed at achieving state protection from racist violence, but one whose 
“members organize and build local power to intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities 
by the state and vigilantes” (Black Lives Matter, 2020a).  
These statements of Black Power and Black Lives Matter as a continuation of this, are a sharp 
contrast to Martin Luther King, Jr.’s famous and popular brand of civil rights struggle. Where King 
famously appealed to white conscience and called for freedom and rights, the Black Power 
movement abandoned appealing to conscience (and “implicitly recognize[d] the failure of these 
appeals”), demanded “a place in political life whether that seemed good (or timely) to whites”, and 
left the idea of a “shared pursuit of the freedom promised to all” (Atkins, 2019, 7; Calloway-Thomas 
and Lucaites eds, 2005, 87-103; Dyson, 2001, 104; Hooker, 2016, 457).  
To further illustrate the difference between a more nuanced and inequality-conscious 
universal framing (such as Butler’s discussion of Black Lives Matter) as opposed to a rhetoric of 
resistance, the example of police participating in Pride parades is useful to examine further. As 
discussed in this chapter, the Auckland Pride board essentially wanted to plan a Pride march in which 
everyone could be included, even though they acknowledged that this would require compromising 
and limiting some participants’ actions. However, the arguments and rhetoric of No Pride in 
Prisons/PAPA is more usefully understood here as not an attempt at universal inclusion, but rather 
exactly as a rhetoric of resistance against the institution of the New Zealand Police, policing more 
broadly, and police violence disproportionately aimed at communities of colour. PAPA 
spokesperson Emilie Rākete (2019) declared directly that the ban on police uniforms had also been 
a compromise on their side, since many from the community disproportionately targeted by police 
“don’t want them to show up at all”. Similarly, the group stated in 2016 with regards to the 
participation of the New Zealand Department of Corrections “The fact of the matter is that prisons 
… are violent, racist institutions that have no place in any pride parade” (Radio New Zealand, 2016a).   
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As Atkins (2019, 14) explains, the goal for a resistance movement is not necessarily 
universality in the form of being included in “the great conversation” of all parties, “enabling 
speakers who had been marginalized to articulate and contribute their understandings for collective 
epistemic benefit”, although this is often the assumed goal. In the case of Auckland Pride, the New 
Zealand Police’s rhetoric certainly framed the question in this way, by calling on PAPA, the Auckland 
Pride board, and activists supporting a uniform ban to “discuss the group’s issues with them” and 
what the police could improve on, but that “no one’s come back to us” (Corcoran, 2018; Radio New 
Zealand, 2015). This lack of response to an invitation to discuss the issues is, however, perhaps 
unsurprising given not only that PAPA had already made very public statements about what they 
were criticising, that the police had themselves held back activists protesting police participation in 
Pride, but also that Auckland Pride had held open community meetings and published the issues 
and questions discussed during these, notably discussions of racism, structural violence against 
marginalised groups, and the role of state institutions such as police and corrections in Pride 
marches (Murphy, 2018). The ban on uniforms was clearly, then, not sprung on the NZ police with 
no prior discussion or direct critiques.  
Further, the lack of interest in talking to the New Zealand Police at the time was perhaps less 
a sign of “prejudices” and being “ill-informed” as police stated (Radio New Zealand, 2015), and more 
a recognition of the fact that the issues were unlikely to be resolved in the short term. Although 
PAPA did not state that they would always resist police participation, they did make it clear that 
their reasons for resisting were not short-term issues, but rather that “New Zealand’s Police Force 
has a lot - a lot - of work to do before they should be celebrated in a parade of this kind” (Boynton, 
2018; Rākete, 2019). The stance of PAPA is therefore rather a realisation that an open and equal 
debate is not going to occur, and a choice to instead take advantage of the opportunities for creating 
and strengthening solidarity and power within the resistance community (Atkins, 2019, 14-15).  
As PAPA spokesperson Emilie Rākete (2019) argues, the strong reaction of the New Zealand 
Police to the uniform ban, by refusing to participate altogether, likely has less to do with a shock 
that an open and equal discussion of the issues did not take place, and more to do with the fact that 
they were, indeed, met with a rhetoric of resistance against their institution. This is both because, 
as shown above, open and public arguments were presented to the New Zealand Police, and also 
because police had on other occasions opted to wear either civilian clothes or “casual” police clothes 
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while representing the organisation at community events (ibid). Rākete argues that statements from 
the police demonstrate why the demand to not wear uniforms on this particular occasion was met 
with a refusal to participate: 
Speaking to gay media outlet Express, [Police] Inspector Tracy Phillips says that ‘if our people 
are not allowed to proudly march as police officers, we won’t come.’ And that, really, is it. 
The police couldn’t march proudly, in their uniforms, because the Auckland Pride community 
has made it clear what that uniform represents to us. It represents a cowering 12 year-old 
being mauled by a trained attack dog. It represents teenagers burning to death inside 
wrecked cars following preventable Police pursuits. It represents the constant racist 
overpolicing of Māori communities. In short, the police pulled out of the Parade because 
Auckland Pride had the audacity to point out they have very little to be proud of (Rākete, 
2019).  
Also worth noting in this argument is the intersectional resistance which uses Pride as a 
platform to protest and resist not only police violence against rainbow community members, but 
against communities of colour more broadly, underlining the fact that for some members of the 
rainbow community, these forms of violence cannot be separated because they are intersecting 
parts of their identity. This form of resistance is potentially highly problematic for a police force 
which, despite increasing levels of violence against Māori and other New Zealand communities of 
colour, has chosen a public relations strategy “hinged on the language of diversity and inclusion” 
(Rākete, 2019), the very same principles that are fairly widely agreed on to be fundamental to the 
Pride movement. The argument that increased inclusion and diversity in violent and oppressive 
institutions such as the police force will solve the violence is, however, not yet realised, since as 
Hooker (2016, 463) writes of the US, “the presence of black police officers does not appear to 
prevent violence toward black citizens. That is because white supremacy produces a racial state that 
exceeds mere demography or phenotype”. Rākete (2019) writes that in order to promote this 
narrative of inclusion and diversity, whenever police had been allowed “to represent themselves as 
innocuous part of [rainbow] communities” and use these as an opportunity to promote the New 
Zealand Police Force as a diverse and inclusive organisation, wearing something other than formal 
uniform was acceptable to the police. They write therefore that:  
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The police-led boycott of Auckland Pride has in my view never been about their uniforms. It 
has been about dominating a public conversation about racist police violence. It has been 
about punishing, in the most public and contemptuous manner possible, the Auckland Pride 
community for daring to raise the issue of racist police violence. This only makes it more 
important, more necessary, that we remain absolutely unrelenting in the pursuit of our 
mutual liberation – something which flows not from the heel of a police officer’s boot, but 
from the collective power of masses (Rākete, 2019).            
This form of resistance, by refusing to include police in Pride because of disproportionate 
police violence against not only rainbow community members of colour, but all people of colour, is 
clearly a form of nonviolent resistance, even accepting more expansive definitions of violence, 
because they are not reinforcing hierarchies of domination or systemic violence. It does, however, 
challenge the well-known tenets of pacifism’s call to respect all life for ethical reasons, and strategic 
nonviolence’s attempted use of respectability politics for tactical reasons, because it not only 
refuses this, but exposes the harm that can be done by following these principles.     
In a similar manner, the critiques of Extinction Rebellion’s approach to and rhetoric around 
police, prisons, and law enforcement are arguably better understood by reading them as a rhetoric 
of resistance than an attempt to be included. That is, by pointing out the inherent issues with XR’s 
approach - including providing positive PR for the kind and hospitable UK police force (Farrell et al., 
2019, 97-98), masking or ignoring systemic and structural violence against communities of colour, 
and reinforcing a hierarchy of superior forms of activism which rest on the privilege to be able to be 
arrested - the critics may be more interested in resisting not only Extinction Rebellion’s colour-
blindness, but the general white-washing of climate justice. Further, the aim may be less to reform 
Extinction Rebellion into a perfectly equal and inclusive climate justice space, as the new centre for 
the climate justice cause, but to raise the profile of other groups and movements, with a more 
intersectional approach, without necessarily - in a parallel to Atkins’ arguments about the Black Lives 
Matter refrain - meaning this to be an evaluation of the worthiness or promise of Extinction 
Rebellion or other climate movements like it. Further, it is possible that Atkin’s (2019, 17) argument 
that the hope for both the Black Lives Matter and the Black Power movements “for a transformation 
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so radical that it couldn’t be described in terms of inclusion” applies to the examples of Extinction 
Rebellion and Pride as well.    
Conclusion 
 While questions of collective identity formation and expression in nonviolent movements 
may seem very distant from impacts of violence on civil resistance, this chapter has aimed to 
demonstrate a number of ways in which these processes and expressions are, in fact, impacted by 
different forms and definitions of violence. This is both because collective identities can, in certain 
manifestations, mask and marginalise important occurrences of violence, but also because these 
identities risk working as symbolic violence by maintaining and masking hierarchies and relations of 
domination. The chapter focused on collective identities of inclusion, diversity, universality, and 
apolitical – understood as above or beyond politics – framings, as areas of contestation and 
resistance, despite narratives of these as all-encompassing through a vague and abstract use of the 
concepts.  
The chapter revisited the critiques of Extinction Rebellion’s approach to policing in the early 
days of the movement. This was shown to be relevant not only in terms of the impact that police 
violence has on activists – as discussed in Chapter Five on the backfire effect – but also in terms of 
the attempts at respectability expressed in the collective identity of XR, and in this case, within the 
wider climate justice movement which Extinction Rebellion is part of. The case of Pride marches and 
conflicts over police marching in these in uniforms was used as another illustration of the problems 
with claiming to be respecting or including everyone, which in reality often turns out to exclude the 
same people that are exposed to systemic and structural forms of violence, such as communities of 
colour facing disproportionate police violence. These themes cannot be understood without 
treating forms of violence and repression as intersectional, which leads to the argument that not 
everyone has the luxury of separating forms of violence – that is, protesting climate change or 
celebrating the advancement of LGBTQIA+ rights while ignoring police violence against communities 
of colour. Therefore, a policy of inclusion and respect of “everyone” is not possible, and inclusion of 
some will lead to exclusion of others.  
Moving on from the ideals of inclusion and diversity, the chapter discussed the cases of 
Occupy, Extinction Rebellion, and Pride with regards to the framing of movement goals in universal 
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terms, and the role of violence within this. This discussion brings up another recent nonviolent 
movement, which has been discussed in previous chapters already, Black Lives Matter. The debates 
surrounding the Black Lives Matter or All Lives Matter polemic demonstrates a number of the issues 
with attempting to turn a specific and limited aim, such as justice for Black communities in the US, 
into a universal one. Using Atkins’ (2019) critique of this universalist narrative, the chapter argues 
that the critiques of police participation in Pride and the white-washing of climate activism by 
Extinction Rebellion are better understood as rhetorics of resistance than as attempts to improve 
or increase the universal aim of Pride or Extinction Rebellion. This conception of a different kind of 
nonviolent resistance challenges popular conceptions of nonviolence as being necessarily about 
aiming for the good of everyone, even the opponent or passive bystanders in a struggle.  
Although the chapter addresses both strategic and principled nonviolence, the chapter does 
in many ways go beyond strategic nonviolence and is perhaps more relevant to principled 
nonviolence arguments. That is, the discussion here goes beyond whether a nonviolent movement 
achieved their stated goals, which would make it successful in a strategic analysis. Instead, as Samuel 
(2013, 398) also argues, a collective identity formation analysis, which is used throughout the 
chapter, allows a discussion beyond evaluating the achievement of stated goals, but also “whether 
injustices in the production of collective identities translate into normative problems of movement 
goals themselves”. Or, in the case of specifically declared nonviolent movements, whether 
occurrences of forms of violence within the movement, for example in the collective identity 
formation process, constitute a blurring or complication of the identity of being a nonviolent 
movement. In the case of Extinction Rebellion’s attitude towards police and the legal system, the 
discussion would then not simply be whether this exclusion and alienation of activists of colour 
presents a practical hindrance to achieving the key goals of the movement (although that is certainly 
still part of the discussion, as also demonstrated in Chapter Five), but also whether it becomes an 
issue for a movement so strongly self-identified as nonviolent to perpetuate and potentially 
reinforce structural violence against people of colour and other groups marginalised or victimised 
by the British legal system. 
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Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
 In some senses, what all of this leaves us with is more questions and open endings than 
answers. While this openness is a part of the overall argument of this thesis, some answers and 
arguments were, of course, still offered in this project. This conclusion will summarise the main 
arguments and lessons from the individual chapters of the thesis, discuss the wider arguments and 
implications of the thesis as a whole, and point to some potential avenues for further investigations. 
In Chapter One, I present a starting point for this research project through asking, firstly, if 
it is problematic if all violence becomes equalised as simply “bad” to the point that protesters 
throwing rocks through windows come to be seen as just as bad as the global system of exploitation 
and harm that they are protesting; and secondly, if it is not still true, in some sense, that all violence 
is bad, and whether this means that nonviolence theory has so far been too narrow in its 
conceptualisation of violence. The chapter introduces the two frameworks of hurrah-words (a more 
commonly used expression in my native language of Danish) and purity politics as ways to describe 
how nonviolent resistance is popularly viewed. What both these concepts cover is an attempt to 
interrogate more closely the messy, unclear, and problematic parts of a concept which is commonly 
seen as a universally positive phenomenon. However, this often covers quite substantial 
disagreements about what is actually behind the concept, or masks how some issues, people, or 
groups, are excluded from this without notice. From these concerns come the two main research 
questions for this project:  
1: What are the present assumptions around the definition of violence and the definitional 
line(s) between violence and nonviolence in the field, and what are the implications of this? 
2: What are some ways in which violence occurs in nonviolent civil resistance and how does 
nonviolence theory start to make sense of this?  
The methodology for answering these draws on hermeneutical principles, adopting a 
narrative approach to case studies, and a thorough investigation of concepts, theories, and 
arguments, all with a focus on the importance of meaning. The two research questions are each 
discussed and answered in different chapters, with some discussions being more focused on a 
Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
- 197 - 
 
concrete impact of a form of violence, and others more on contestations and tensions over what 
counts as violence, and what forms of violence count in nonviolent theory and practice.  
 The second chapter provides an overview of the field of nonviolence literature, focusing 
especially on how violence, nonviolence, and the definitional line(s) between them are imagined, 
conceptualised, and defined – or how they are sometimes not or barely considered at all. An 
important part of this is to understand the observation-based and naturalist methodologies that are 
the foundation of the field of nonviolence literature and which lead to a strong focus on empirical 
data, and relatively little theoretical or conceptual analysis. This has also led to an attempt within 
the field to articulate regularities and dynamics of nonviolent resistance campaigns that cross 
temporal and cultural boundaries. In contrast, this thesis emphasises the importance of context a 
number of times throughout. The literature review discusses the two major strands of nonviolence, 
which are principled nonviolence or pacifism, and strategic nonviolence. The chapter outlines the 
main differences between the two strands, but also the intersections and overlaps, and arguments 
that the two strands cannot, in fact, be fully separated. For the purposes of this thesis, the 
distinction between the two strands is not of major significance, since the questions and issues I 
examine speak to both versions of nonviolence. While the literature review purposefully does not 
attempt to arrive at a single, unified definition of nonviolence, it provides an overview of different 
definitional strategies and approaches within the field and uses this to demonstrate the complex 
and multi-dimensional character of not only the concept of nonviolence, but its relationship to 
violence. Finally, the chapter looks more closely at some of the central dynamics and arguments of 
how nonviolent resistance works, and why it is argued in the literature to be more effective than 
violent insurgencies. These arguments are all centred around the ability to mobilise a greater 
number and wider range of participants. This, in turn, allows both for a greater diversity of tactics 
and for the central effect of repression backfire to work.  
Following from this overview of the literature on nonviolence, Chapter Three provides a brief 
overview of a certain popular narrative of the history of nonviolent resistance. The chapter looks at 
the nonviolent resistance movements of the anti-colonial struggle in India, the anti-apartheid 
struggle in South Africa, and the 1950s and 1960s civil rights struggle in the United States . Given 
the importance of these three movements in the history and development of civil resistance, they 
are important to introduce in order to further illustrate the role that violence and definitions of 
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violence play in nonviolent civil resistance. The chapter focuses on a particular popular narrative, 
influenced by purist conceptions of the relationship between violence and nonviolence in the 
movements; the heavy focus on the three leader figures of Gandhi, Mandela, and King; and ideas of 
the universalist aims and applications of these movements and their approach. Importantly, the 
chapter emphasises the argument that while these movements are in very meaningful ways 
nonviolent, this does not mean that violence was fully absent in the movements, their path to 
success, internal structures, or rhetoric. The history of these three movements also demonstrates 
the variability and changeability of what it means to practice nonviolent resistance, given the 
significant differences between the three leaders’ and movements’ interpretation of nonviolence.  
In order to discuss the role of violence in nonviolent resistance more thoroughly and 
nuanced, Chapter Four draws on a number of academic fields to provide an overview of different 
possible definitions, conceptions, and theories of violence. Building on this wide range of literature 
on the concept of violence, the chapter demonstrates and argues that violence – much like 
nonviolence – is a complex, varied, and often deeply contested phenomenon. Despite this 
contestation, and the subjective and interpretive aspects of the concept of violence, the chapter 
also argues that this is not the same as an argument that violence can mean anything and 
everything; a certain rigour of arguments and analysis is needed, as is an understanding of the basic 
arguments and logic of other interpretations of violence than our own. While the argument of this 
thesis is therefore that the work of thinking about violence and its impact in nonviolence theory is 
never finished, the chapter on the concept of violence is intended as a tool – or tool-box, if you will 
– for these discussions, by outlining a number of the dividing lines, categories, and definitions that 
are important for the rest of the thesis, and/or for the field of nonviolence more generally.  
Finally, chapters five to seven each look at a more specific situation or dynamic in which 
violence and definitions of violence impact nonviolent resistance. Chapter Five looks at the situation 
of repressive violence by the opponent against a nonviolent movement or campaign. While this 
occurrence of violence is by no means unacknowledged in nonviolence literature, which uses this 
as the starting point for one of the major mechanisms of nonviolent resistance, the backfire effect, 
the chapter demonstrates that a number of implications and aspects of this are not discussed. The 
underlying argument of the chapter, and under-investigated aspect of backfire theory, is the 
inherent importance that normative principles and ethical perspectives continue to play in the 
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backfire dynamic. These include assumptions about the universality or reliability of bystander 
sympathy, the narrative that public, performative suffering demonstrates dedication and 
commitment more so than other forms of activist work, and the acceptance of suffering as a justified 
requirement in order to earn social justice and progress towards equality. This chapter 
demonstrates scepticism towards purist conceptions of nonviolence, not only through the argument 
that surely, this integral importance of an occurrence of violence breaks any sphere of nonviolence 
to some extent, but also by nuancing and complicating key, and often romanticised parts of backfire 
theories, as described above.  
The sixth chapter starts with examining the meaning and impact of sexual and gendered 
violence in Occupy camps, focusing especially on the tension over which forms of violence matter 
to nonviolent movements. The chapter argues that occurrences of violence such as these should be 
treated as integral to our understanding and treatment of nonviolent resistance movements, since 
they not only limit and reduce some of the advantages of nonviolent resistance, such as wider 
participation, but also because different forms of violence intersect. Therefore, for a movement to 
maintain a strict focus on only one form of violence as “the main issue” limits the extent to which 
this form of violence is actually being reduced for all people. The chapter makes use of a number of 
different definitions of violence, and discussions of hierarchies of violence, such as private violence 
being relegated to a less important status than public or political violence. The chapter then 
examines the impact of an assumption of equality between members when setting up internal 
structures of a movement. While the decision to have an unstructured or leaderless organisation is 
mostly based on an aspiration to avoid hierarchies and marginalisation, this can in some cases have 
the opposite effect. Hierarchies, abilities, resources, and repressions from outside society impact 
the internal dynamics of nonviolent movements and a lack of procedures or guidelines to account 
for this may end up reinforcing these systems and structures instead.  
Finally, Chapter Seven examines, as the title suggests, how collective identity formation 
processes in nonviolent movements can lead to or produce violence – mainly as symbolic violence 
– but also how these processes are impacted by different forms of violence. This chapter revisits 
earlier case studies by looking at both Extinction Rebellion, Occupy, and the Black Lives Matter 
movement. It also introduces the story of protests and tensions at Auckland Pride over the 
involvement of uniformed police, since this case is an excellent example of the limitations of 
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concepts such as tolerance, inclusion, and diversity. The chapter argues that universal inclusion is 
rarely actually possible, and that in cases where this is seen as happening, it is rather that the people, 
groups, or ideas that are left out are the ones usually marginalised and excluded, which often goes 
unnoticed. Protests to gain inclusion, such as the protests at Auckland Pride and the push against 
police participation may therefore be perceived as limiting inclusiveness, rather than the re-
negotiation of who gets to be included that they actually are. The chapter also discusses potential 
impacts of universalistic and apolitical rhetoric and messaging as part of the collective identity of a 
movement, and argues that sometimes – such as with the discussion of the Black Lives Matter/All 
Lives Matter contention – a perceived universality is, once again, in fact a specific world view and 
promotion of specific interests. The chapter argues, overall, that sometimes the least violently 
exclusive or repressive approach is, in fact, to admit that a movement or campaign is not for and by 
everyone, but specifically for marginalised or oppressed people and groups. While this may sound 
less attractive to nonviolence proponents, it will have the effect of working more successfully 
against systemic and structural forms of violence.  
The three chapters examining different concrete impacts of violence and definitions of 
violence are, clearly, far from an all-encompassing or final list of these impacts. They are, however, 
attempts at demonstrating what nonviolence theory might look like if violence is acknowledged and 
taken seriously as an important part of how and why nonviolence works. An obvious and promising 
avenue for further investigation of the questions and points raised in this thesis would be an 
empirical project looking at how the role of violence and definitions of violence is, or is not, 
discussed or acknowledged in the practical work of nonviolent resistance. A future research project 
might even develop suggested frameworks for facilitating such discussions and debates within 
movements and assess the feasibility of performing this kind of slow and ongoing work in the middle 
of what is most often hectic and demanding activism, organised by run-down and busy activists.  
It might seem – and could be argued – that this project simply asks too much of nonviolence 
theory and practice by looking at such a wide range of forms of violence, and interactions between 
violence and nonviolence as relevant to the core of the concept of nonviolence. That is, if we start 
to look at all forms of violence as potentially relevant to defining nonviolence, will that not just lead 
to paralysing movements and making any kind of action impossible? However, the argument here 
is not to mandate that all forms of violence be thought about and acted on equally at all times. But, 
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the fact that that would clearly be impossible is no argument for automatically excluding some forms 
of violence from the conversation, perhaps especially not if these are the forms of violence often 
overlooked and excluded from conversations in general. As Joanna Russ wrote in 1981: 
All the issues are related. Now nobody can deal with all the issues - there isn’t energy and 
time. But we can deal with ‘our’ issues (the ones that affect us immediately) in a way that 
relates them to all the others. I think we had better, because otherwise we’re bound to fail. 
And … that’s fine if what you really want is to be right. But not if you want to change things 
(McAllister et al., 1982, 9).  
While the delineation that movements might only deal with issues, or forms of violence, that 
directly impact them is not necessarily a universally applicable rule, the point here is that being open 
to “all the issues” does not mean that we have to stay paralysed by not being able to work on all of 
them at the same time. The point is to keep discussing, deliberating, and perhaps most importantly, 
listening. And while these may be ambitious aims, that is nothing new within the area of 
nonviolence, which is after all characterised by strong ideals, high aspirations, and a wish within 
both scholarship and activism to change the world for the better.  
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